

PROTECTIVE FORCE  
INSPECTORS GUIDE



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## Preface

As part of an effort to enhance the appraisal process, the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) and the Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations (OA-10) have prepared a series of documents that collectively provide comprehensive guidance and tools for the evaluation of safeguards and security program effectiveness across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The OA Appraisal Process Protocol describes the philosophy, scope, and general procedures applicable to all independent oversight appraisal activities. The OA-10 Safeguards and Security Appraisal Process Guide describes specific procedures used by OA-10 in planning, conducting, and following up safeguards and security inspections. This Protective Force Inspectors Guide, as one in a series of topical inspectors guides, provides detailed information

and tools to assist inspectors assigned to evaluate the performance of protective forces in DOE.

Although this inspectors guide is designed specifically for the OA-10 inspector, it is made available to the field through the DOE homepage and may be useful to field element and facility contractor personnel who conduct surveys or self-assessments of the protective force topic.

OA-10 anticipates making periodic revisions to this guide in response to changes in DOE program direction and guidance, insights gained from independent oversight activities, and feedback from customers and constituents. Therefore, users of this process guide are invited to submit comments and recommendations to OA-10.

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## Acronyms

CAS	Central Alarm Station
CAT	Composite Adversary Team
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
ES&H	Environment, Safety, and Health
ESS	Engagement Simulation System
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
ISM	Integrated Safety Management
JTA	Job Task Analysis
LLEA	Local Law Enforcement Agency
LSPT	Limited Scope Performance Test
MC&A	Material Control and Accountability
MILES	Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NSSI	Non-Proliferation and National Security Institute
OA	Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance
OA-10	Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations
POC	Point of Contact
SNM	Special Nuclear Material
SO	Security Officer
SO	Office of Security and Emergency Operations
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPO	Security Police Officer
SRT	Special Response Team
SSSP	Site Safeguards and Security Plan
STRESS	Security Training and Evaluation Shooting System
TA	Trusted Agent
TID	Tamper-Indicating Device
VA	Vulnerability Analysis

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## Definitions

**Composite Adversary Team (CAT)** – Individuals who play the part of adversaries during performance tests.

**Controller** - An individual assigned to assist a Test Coordinator in conducting and controlling a performance test.

**Evaluator** - An individual assigned the responsibility for formally evaluating the performance of security system elements during a performance test. For OA-10 inspections, evaluators are usually members of the OA-10 inspection team.

**Insider** - For performance testing purposes, a person from an inspected facility who is assigned to assist the Composite Adversary Team, to the best of his/her abilities, in planning and executing their activities for a performance test. (For a more detailed discussion of insider responsibilities, see “Context and Protocols for Performance Testing of Protective Forces,” February 1999.)

**Limited Scope Performance Test (LSPT)** - A performance test designed to evaluate specific skills, equipment, or procedures. An LSPT may involve Engagement Simulation System/Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (ESS/MILES) equipment and CAT adversaries or live fire. The events of an LSPT may be interrupted to facilitate data collection, and they may be purposely directed by OA-10 in order to achieve certain evaluation goals. Although used as a data collection method for input to the protective force topic, LSPTs are not assigned individual ratings.

**Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)** - Equipment consisting of weapons-mounted laser transmitters, and laser sensors that are mounted on potential targets (e.g., personnel, vehicles, buildings). MILES permits accurate assessment of the effects of weapons fire during simulated hostile engagements. Also referred to as Engagement Simulation Systems (ESS).

**Observer** - An individual who observes a performance test, but who does not take part in test planning, control, play, or evaluation.

**Player** - An active participant in a performance test, either as a person being tested or as a role player, such as an adversary or a bystander.

**Shadow Force** - Members of a facility protective force who are armed with live weapons and ammunition and are under the direct supervision of a Controller. The purpose of the shadow force is to provide armed response to an actual security emergency that might occur within performance test boundaries during a performance test.

**Test Coordinator** - An individual assigned the primary responsibility for planning and conducting a performance test.

**Trusted Agent (TA)** – A technically knowledgeable individual from an inspected field element or facility who acts as a neutral party to assist in planning and conducting a performance test. (For a more detailed discussion of Trusted Agents and their responsibilities, see “Context and Protocols for Performance Testing of Protective Forces,” February 1999.)

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# Section 1

## INTRODUCTION

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### Purpose

The Protective Force Inspectors Guide provides a set of detailed tools and references that the inspector can use to plan, conduct, and close out an inspection of the protective force. These tools serve to promote consistency, assure thoroughness, and enhance the quality of the inspection process.

The information in the guide is intended to be useful to both the novice and the experienced inspector. For the experienced inspector, detailed information is organized to be easily referenced and can serve as a reminder when conducting inspection activities. For the novice inspector, the information can serve as a valuable training tool. With the assistance of an experienced inspector, the novice should be able to use the tools and reference material to collect data more efficiently and effectively.

### Organization

This introductory section (Section 1) describes the inspection tools and outlines their use. Sections 2 through 5 provide detailed guidance for inspecting each of the following major protective force subtopics:

- Section 2 – Management
- Section 3 – Training
- Section 4 – Equipment and Facilities
- Section 5 – Duties.

Section 6 (Interfaces) contains guidelines to help inspectors coordinate their activities both within the protective force team and with other topic teams. The section emphasizes ways in which data gathering can be made more efficient by coordinating with other teams and by identifying data that inspectors on other teams can collect.

Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) contains guidelines on how to organize and analyze information gathered during data collection activities. These guidelines include likely impacts of particular information on other topics or subtopics, and a discussion of interpreting the significance of potential deficiencies.

Appendix A (Performance Test Procedures) discusses the procedures for planning and conducting protective force performance tests in general, without dealing with specific tests. The purpose, importance, scope, and goals of protective force performance testing are addressed, followed by a detailed discussion of the procedures and considerations involved in planning and conducting performance tests.

Appendix B (Performance Test Descriptions and Commentary) contains generic performance test descriptions to represent the selection of commonly used protective force performance tests used in data collection in the “Duties” subtopic area.

Appendix C (Performance Test Plan) is the annotated outline for a performance test plan used in inspecting the protective force. Attachments include the scenario, controller instructions, rules of conduct, safety plan, and other information important in performance test planning.

Appendix D (Performance Test Safety Plan) provides information on the performance test safety plan. In addition to numerous other safety considerations, the plan is designed to address safety equipment, test boundaries, ESS/MILES safety provisions, and safety for individual participants.

Appendix E (Evaluation Criteria and Worksheets) provides the evaluation criteria and worksheets used to record, analyze, and evaluate performance.

Appendix F (References) identifies references applicable and useful when inspecting the protective force topic.

## General Considerations

The tools contained in this guide are intended to be used at the discretion of the inspector. Typically, inspectors select the tools that are applicable and most useful on a facility-specific and inspection-specific basis. Although the guidelines presented here cover a variety of inspection activities, they do not and cannot address all protection program variations, systems, and procedures used at all DOE facilities. The tools may have to be modified or adapted to meet inspection-specific needs, and in some instances, inspectors may have to design new activities and new tools to collect information not specifically covered in this guide.

The information in this guide does not repeat all of the detailed information in DOE Orders. Rather, it is intended to complement the Orders by providing practical guidance for planning, collecting, and analyzing inspection data. Inspectors should refer to this guide as well as DOE Orders and other guidance at all stages of the inspection process.

One consideration in developing OA-10 inspectors guides is to provide a repository for the collective knowledge of OA-10’s most experienced inspectors that can be enhanced and updated as inspection methods improve and inspection experience accumulates. Every attempt has been made to develop specific guidelines that are as useful as possible to both novice and experienced inspectors. In addition to guidelines for collecting information, the inspection tools provide aids for prioritizing and selecting activities, then analyzing and interpreting results. The specific guidelines should be viewed as suggestions rather than requirements, and they must be critically examined and interpreted on an inspection-specific basis, taking into account site-specific factors.

## Characterization of the Protective Force Topic

The basic mission of the protective force is to protect both DOE security interests from theft, sabotage, and other hostile acts that may adversely impact national security or the health and safety of the public, as well as life and property at DOE facilities. How a protective force accomplishes this mission depends upon the specific security interests it must protect; this process is defined in locally promulgated orders, procedures, plans, and mission statements. The inspection of a protective force must determine its ability to accomplish site-specific requirements as well as the applicable DOE policy requirements.

One or more of the subtopics (Management, Training, Equipment and Facilities, and Duties) will be the subject of inspection activities, depending upon the goals of the inspection. All of the subtopics are closely related and interdependent. The Duties subtopic is by far the most important, because it integrates the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses of other areas, and answers the question of whether the protective force can accomplish its mission. Further, due to the interrelationships of the subtopics, the inspection of the Duties subtopic automatically results in collection of data pertaining to the other three subtopics. Figure 1 illustrates this point.

## Inspection Goals

The primary inspection goal is to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the protective force is both adequately meeting the appropriate standards established by DOE policy and providing appropriate protection to DOE security interests. In other words, the inspection must determine to what degree the protective force is able to accomplish its mission. In order to do this, it is necessary to determine whether the protective force is adequately managed, trained, equipped, and capable of performing all mission-related tasks and duties.

While additional goals may be assigned from time to time, the primary goal always remains the same: to determine whether the protective force meets DOE standards in the areas inspected.

## Compliance/Performance

While a protective force inspection includes both compliance and performance activities, a greater emphasis is placed on the performance aspect, as it is more useful in determining if the protective force can perform its missions. Many of the DOE protective force policy requirements contained in DOE O 473.2 and DOE M 473.2-2 are stated in performance terms: that is, they state a mission, duty, or set of duties that must be performed. Therefore, compliance requires effective performance. Even when dealing with policy requirements for which a compliance approach may seem appropriate (e.g., Does the training program contain the required elements? Are there post orders?), the OA-10 approach for this topic is to go beyond compliance and determine the performance aspects of these requirements (e.g., Does the training program adequately prepare Security Police Officers to perform their mission? Do post orders provide adequate and appropriate guidance?) Therefore, whenever possible, data collecting activities for the protective force topic should be performance-oriented.

## Planning Goals

The ultimate goal of planning is to anticipate and provide for every action necessary to conduct the highest quality inspection possible with the resources available. That is an extremely broad goal, and it provides little structure for actual planning. However, it is useful to focus the planning process on several narrower, yet major, goals. Examples of such goals might include:

- Understanding the character of the protective force, including its size, composition, organization and mission; having a general familiarity with how it is trained, managed, and equipped; and understanding the environment in which it operates




Figure 1. Interrelationship of Protective Force Subtopics

- Determining the subtopics to be inspected and the specific areas of focus for inspection activities
- Determining the specific data collection methods to be used, including any performance tests to be conducted
- Identifying and arranging for the provision of all personnel, administrative, safety, and logistical requirements necessary for data collection
- Producing necessary planning documents
- Determining what follow-up requirements (test plans, etc.) must be accomplished prior to conducting the inspection, and by which members of the inspection team.

### Planning Decisions

Based on analysis of the information gained from the document review, discussion with other topic teams, and discussion with the points of contact (POCs), the topic team must make a number of decisions, including:

- Scope and emphasis of inspection activities (including final selection of subtopics)
- Data collection methods and tools to be employed, including performance tests
- Test samples and how they will be selected
- CAT support required
- Logistics, administrative, and personnel support required, and its sources
- Team members and their data collection activities
- A tentative schedule for data collection activities.

Once these decisions have been made, work assignments can be made and the detailed planning of data collection activities can proceed.

### Using the Topic-Specific Tools

Sections 2 through 5, organized around the protective force subtopics, provide topic-specific information intended to help inspectors collect and analyze inspection data. Each subtopic section is further divided into the following standard categories:

- General Information
- Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns
- Planning Activities
- Performance Tests (if applicable)
- Data Collection Activities.

#### General Information

The General Information section defines the scope of the subtopic. It includes background information, guidelines, and commonly used terms intended to help inspectors focus on the unique features and problems associated with the subtopic. It also identifies the different approaches that a facility might use to accomplish an objective and provides typical examples.

#### Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

This section addresses potential concerns or deficiencies that OA-10 has noted on previous inspections. Accompanying each potential concern or common deficiency is a short discussion giving more detail. Information in this section is intended to help the inspector further focus inspection activities and identify site-specific factors that may indicate whether a particular deficiency is likely to be present. By reviewing the list of common deficiencies and potential concerns before gathering data, inspectors can be aware of these deficiencies and concerns during interviews, tours, and other data gathering activities.

## Planning Activities

This section identifies activities normally conducted during inspection planning. If applicable, specific activities or information available to inspectors should be identified for all planning periods, including pre-planning, the planning meeting, and ongoing planning. These planning activities include reviews of general documents and interviews with the facility protective force managers. The detailed information in the Planning Activities section is intended to help ensure systematic data collection and that critical elements are not overlooked.

## Performance Tests

General guidelines are provided to help the inspector identify site-specific factors that may indicate which specific performance tests may be particularly important. Details of protective force performance tests, including scenarios, are provided in Appendices A and B.

## Data Collection Activities

This section identifies activities that inspectors may choose to perform during data collection. The information is intended to be reasonably comprehensive, although it is recognized that it will not address every conceivable variation. Typically, these activities are organized by functional element or by the type of system used to provide protection. Activities include tours, interviews, observations, and performance tests. Inspectors do not normally perform every activity on every inspection. Most often, activities and performance tests are selected during the planning effort. The activities listed in this section include those most often conducted and reflect the highest level of OA-10 data collection experience and expertise possible. Also, the activities are identified alphabetically for easy reference and for assigning data collection tasks.

## Performance Testing

Appendices A and B provide detailed information on protective force performance testing, including commonly used performance tests and scenarios that may be used as shown or modified to address site-specific conditions or procedures. Performance testing is the most important data collection activity used in evaluating the protective force (specifically the Duties subtopic); therefore, it is customarily the focus of most data collection efforts. Accordingly, the information on performance testing is provided in two appendices rather than in detail in the subtopic sections.

In comparison with other data collection tools, several aspects of performance testing should be noted. First, performance testing is the most labor- and time-intensive of all data collection activities. Second, performance testing places the greatest demands on the resources of the inspected site and requires the highest degree of coordination and planning. Third, performance testing offers the greatest potential for generating safety or security problems. Thus, performance tests should not be used when relevant data can be gathered using other collection tools. Also, the tests must be carefully planned and coordinated prior to arrival on site to ensure the most efficient use of time and resources. This planning and coordination process should continue after the inspectors arrive at the site, often up to the moment the test is administered.

Most facilities have local requirements and procedures for planning, coordinating, and conducting performance tests. If the local procedures are acceptable to OA-10, considerable time and effort can sometimes be saved by having the facility plan, coordinate, and conduct specific performance tests (particularly more elaborate tests) in cooperation with OA-10.

## Validation

Validation is the set of procedures OA-10 inspectors use to verify the accuracy of the information they have obtained during data collection activities. OA-10's validation procedures, which are discussed in detail in the OA-10 Appraisal Process Guide, include on-the-spot validations, daily validations, and summary validations. Effective validations are particularly important in the protective force review because of the extensive performance tests conducted by the protective force team and the inherent difficulties associated with evaluating the performance of protective force personnel. Further, the protective force team faces unique challenges because of the tendency for performance testing to extend past normal working hours; in such cases, the protective force team often must conduct the daily validations the next morning. Therefore, the protective force team must assure that it places high priority on validation efforts, and that its efforts are effectively coordinated.

In the protective force reviews, on-the-spot validations are particularly critical because of the large number of people typically involved in performance tests, and because it is often difficult to reassemble all the people involved for the daily and summary validations. Therefore, it is important for the individual team members to keep track of significant information covered in on-the-spot validations so it can be reiterated for the protective force managers during the daily and summary validations.

## Using the Tools in Each Inspection Phase

The inspection tools are intended to be useful in all phases of the inspection. The following discussion summarizes the use of the inspection tools in the various phases.

In the **planning phase**, inspectors:

- Use the General Information section under each subtopic to characterize the program and focus the inspection.
- Perform the activities identified under Planning Activities to gather the information necessary to further characterize the program and focus inspection activities. It is useful to make photocopies of the applicable tools for use during interviews, and to make notes in the margins or highlight sections that need to be discussed in more detail.
- Review Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns to help focus inspection activities, to determine whether any common deficiencies are apparent, and to identify site-specific features that may indicate a need for emphasis on selected areas or activities.
- Assign specific tasks to individual inspectors (or small teams of inspectors) by selecting performance tests and specific items from the Data Collection Activities section. The assignments should be made to optimize efficiency and to ensure that all high-priority activities are accomplished.
- Give appropriate consideration to the guidelines in Section 6 (Interfaces) when assigning tasks, to ensure that efforts are not duplicated and critical elements are not overlooked.
- Prioritize and schedule data collection activities to optimize efficiency and to ensure high-priority activities are conducted early in the process. A careful prioritization of these activities helps to determine whether personnel resources and inspection times are sufficient for evaluating the topic adequately.

In the **conduct phase**, inspectors:

- Use the detailed information in the Data Collection Activities section as guidelines for interviews and tours. Inspectors may choose to make notes directly on photocopies of the applicable sections.
- Review Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns after completing each data collection activity to determine whether any common deficiencies are apparent at the facility. If so, inspectors should determine whether subsequent activities should be reprioritized.
- Review Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) after completing each data collection activity to aid in evaluation and analysis of the data, and to determine whether additional data are needed to evaluate the program. If additional activities are needed, inspectors should then determine whether subsequent activities should be reprioritized.

In the **closure phase**, inspectors:

- Refer to the appropriate policy references to determine whether the facility is complying with all applicable requirements, including those issued by DOE Headquarters.
- Use Section 7 (Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results) to help analyze the collected data and identify the impacts of identified deficiencies. Doing so will help determine the significance of findings, if any, and assist inspectors in writing the analysis section of the inspection report.

## Integrated Security Management

In the environment, safety, and health (ES&H) arena, DOE uses an approach called integrated safety management (ISM) that has helped to improve management of ES&H programs. As part of the ISM approach, DOE has delineated

guiding principles and core functions of safety management that establish the framework for ISM.

The seven ES&H guiding principles of ISM are:

- Line management responsibility
- Clear roles and responsibilities
- Competence commensurate with responsibilities
- Balanced priorities
- Identification of standards and requirements
- Hazard controls tailored to work being performed
- Operations authorization.

The five ES&H core functions of ISM are:

- Define work
- Analyze vulnerabilities
- Identify and implement controls
- Perform work within controls
- Feedback and improvement.

Several DOE sites are considering the benefits of adopting a similar approach for safeguards and security programs. This approach is generally referred to as integrated security management. Development of the safeguards and security policies, such as the integrated security management concept, is the responsibility of the Office of Security and Emergency Operations (SO). If adopted, integrated security management would be formally established through the DOE directives system.

Although not currently a formal policy in the security arena, many aspects of the guiding principles and core functions of DOE's ES&H ISM policy are fundamental to management of any program. In addition, it is sometimes useful to apply ISM concepts in planning and conducting safeguards and security inspections and in analyzing data related to the effectiveness of DOE site safeguards and security programs. Further, the use of ISM concepts can be a useful approach for diagnosing the root causes of identified weaknesses, and thus can benefit the

site by organizing inspection results in a manner that highlights root causes.

In view of the potential benefits of integrated security management, OA has taken a proactive approach to designing this Protective Force Inspectors Guide to reflect certain aspects of the integrated security management concept. Specifically, OA has organized the relevant section of the Protective Force Inspectors Guide (i.e., Section 2, Protective Force Management) to parallel certain aspects of the ISM principles and core functions. Also, Section 7, Analyzing Data and Interpreting Results, includes a brief discussion of the use of the integrated security management concepts as an analytical tool.

For the purposes of this Protective Force Inspectors Guide, OA has established four general categories that encompass the concepts embodied in the guiding principles and core functions of ISM. These four categories are listed below:

- **Line Management Responsibility for Safeguards and Security.** This category encompasses the corresponding ISM guiding principles that relate to management responsibilities (i.e., line management responsibility for safety, clear roles and responsibilities, and balanced priorities).
- **Personnel Competence and Training.** The category encompasses the ISM guiding principle related to competence of personnel (i.e., competence commensurate with responsibilities). It also encompasses DOE requirements related to ensuring that personnel performing safeguards and

security duties are properly trained and qualified, and the need for sufficient requirements and an appropriate skill mix.

- **Comprehensive Requirements.** This category encompasses the corresponding ISM guiding principles and core functions that relate to policies, requirements, and implementation of requirements (i.e., identification of safeguards and security standards and requirements, protection measures tailored to security interests and programmatic activities, operations authorization, define work, analyze vulnerabilities, identify and implement controls, and perform work within controls).
- **Feedback and Improvement.** This category encompasses the corresponding ISM core function (i.e., feedback and improvement) and DOE requirements related to DOE line management oversight and contractor self-assessments.

It is important to note that the categories above are only used to organize information in the Inspectors Guide in a way that will help inspectors gather data about management performance in a structured and consistent manner. OA will not use the guiding principles or core functions as a basis for the ratings, and will not cite them as the basis for findings (unless and until a formal policy is promulgated). Further, OA has only identified general categories of information that would be expected to be in an integrated security management program. OA has not attempted to specifically define guiding principles for the safeguards and security arena because the development of such policies is the responsibility and prerogative of SO.

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## Section 2

# PROTECTIVE FORCE MANAGEMENT

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### General Information

The protective force management standard emphasizes the effective application of protective force resources to perform the assigned mission. It further emphasizes such specific items as careful planning, precise documentation, sufficiency of resources, effective command and control, coordination with outside agencies, and an organizational climate conducive to productivity and personal development. Specific elements essential to protective force management are:

- Supervision
- Plans, orders, and procedures
- Allocation of personnel resources
- Personnel administration.

These elements are listed in order of priority. Unless unusual factors exist, data collection priorities should reflect this hierarchy when resources are limited.

Supervision that is both competent and sufficient is essential to effective protective force mission accomplishment. A successful supervisory program usually includes procedures for inspecting Security Police Officers (SPOs) reporting for duty to determine job knowledge, fitness for duty, and adequacy of equipment. Also, procedures should be in place for contacting every SPO on duty several times during each shift to ensure that adequate security is being provided, equipment is functioning

properly, and essential information is disseminated. It is important that a complete and accurate record of post visits, inspections, and incidents bearing on security is maintained, and investigations of anomalies noted in recording visits and reporting are thorough and timely.

An important function of management is to ensure the presence of clear and concise plans, instructions, and orders. Typically, plans address potential contingencies, natural disasters, and emergencies; instructions implement the provisions of DOE orders; and special orders cover each post, patrol, or other position. It is essential that these instructions and orders be readily available to protective force personnel and management, and that a system is in place to ensure that changes are incorporated in a timely manner. It is important that memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) and other documents delineating agreements and outside assistance are current and have been exercised to determine their effectiveness. At DOE facilities with Special Response Teams (SRTs), plans are required to ensure adequate response to events involving sabotage or theft of nuclear weapons and other selected materials. Where the requirement for an SRT is met by an MOU with LLEAs, it is essential to ensure that the LLEAs possess the skills required by DOE policies.

The protective force must have sufficient personnel resources available to ensure an adequate response in the amount of time and with

the number of personnel required to contain and neutralize the adversary, as defined in approved Site Safeguards and Security Plans (SSSPs).

SPOs are required to meet DOE medical and physical fitness standards and requalification requirements. These requirements must be appropriately met and recorded. Individuals receiving SRT training must be formally evaluated and certified as competent to perform their duties. Armed officers must qualify at least semiannually, under both day and night conditions, with all weapons reasonably expected to be used in their duty assignments.

Before inspecting a protective force's management, an inspector should understand the protective force's position within and relationship to the facility and other organizations. Knowing this information can have a significant impact on the protective force manager's options. There are essentially three types of possible relationships: a proprietary relationship, where the protective force is part of the facility prime contractor organization and protective force members are employees of the prime contractor; a subcontractor relationship, where the protective force contractor is a subcontractor to the facility prime contractor; and a prime contractor relationship, where the protective force contractor is a prime contractor directly to the DOE field element and does not work directly for the facility prime contractor. Inspectors should understand the relationship in effect at the inspected facility.

Inspections of protective force management includes: reviewing directives, plans, orders, and related documentation; interviewing protective force management personnel; observing the conduct of supervisory functions and operations; reviewing the allocation of personnel resources available for normal and contingency operations; and analyzing the results of data collection in protective force management, training, equipment and facilities, and duties, to determine the effectiveness of programs to protect critical assets. Inspectors must place particular attention

on DOE threat guidance and its potential impact on the protective force mission. Where appropriate, operations office and area office management and oversight roles should be examined.

## Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns

### Line Management Responsibility for Safeguards and Security

**Inadequate Operational Supervision.** Sometimes individual members of a protective force are not adequately supervised while on duty. This may be caused by inattentive, overworked, improperly trained, or inadequate numbers of supervisors, or by inadequate policies defining supervisory responsibilities. Whatever the cause, the results can degrade the performance of the protective force. Lack of adequate supervision may result in failure to properly carry out duties and enforce policies; inappropriate conduct on duty; inadequately informed or instructed personnel on duty; and the impression by protective personnel that management does not care what they do on duty. Indications that supervision may be inadequate include: supervisors spending most of their time at their desks, at headquarters, or doing administrative chores; poor housekeeping and equipment maintenance on posts; sloppy appearance or poor attitude by SPOs on post; protective personnel who are uninformed regarding current policies, procedures, or events (daily guard mount pass-on information); and indications by SPOs that they never see their supervisors during their shift.

**Inadequate Tactical Supervision.** Supervisors are sometimes so completely occupied with their routine operational responsibilities that they neglect to develop or maintain the tactical supervisory skills required in emergency situations. Such skills include those involved with the command, control, and tactical employment of the protective force or a protective force element. Lack of such skills can result in failure

to establish control over and direct an appropriate protective force response to an emergency situation; such a failure can result in an ineffective response and can greatly diminish the protective force's chances of accomplishing its mission. Indications of this condition include demonstration of poor leadership during performance tests; absence of appropriate tactical supervisory training in the training program; and supervisors' failure to "play" (their leadership roles) during internal training exercises or performance tests.

**Failure of Field Element to Approve Plans/Orders.** Often, the DOE field element manager or his designee either does not approve protective force plans and orders or changes such plans and orders. In some cases, no one outside the protective force approves plans and orders. This practice makes it difficult for the responsible DOE managers to ensure that protective force practices are adequately implementing required policies. In some cases, the DOE field element may indicate that it provides review and tacit approval of plans and orders during periodic security surveys. However, orders and changes thereto could be in effect for a year or longer before being subjected to a security survey.

**Failure to Review Plans and Orders.** Some protective force managers do not ensure that plans and orders are thoroughly reviewed and updated by supervisory personnel on the required occasions. This lack of supervisory oversight is often a contributing factor to the other deficiencies indicated above. A record of each review is required, so determining whether reviews are being made is simple: the adequacy of the reviews may be indicated by the number of other deficiencies contained in the plans/orders.

**Improper Classification of Plans.** Some response/contingency plans provide fairly specific information regarding protective force responses to particular threats, including response routes and locations, number of responders, response times, and weapons and

equipment carried by responders. Such response/contingency plans may not be given an appropriate security classification or afforded other appropriate administrative controls to ensure that potentially damaging information is protected from inappropriate disclosure. Although this is essentially an information security problem, it has potentially serious consequences for the protective force.

**Inadequate Memoranda of Understanding.** Some protective forces rely on assistance from other federal or LLEAs during unusual or emergency conditions. However, MOUs often do not exist or do not include sufficient detail to describe the support to be provided, the conditions under which it will be provided, command relationships, each party's responsibilities, and similar important information. This condition can result from the LLEA's reluctance to commit themselves in writing to commitments they freely made orally, or the field element's failure to identify all essential details and coordinate their inclusion in the agreement.

**Deficient Personnel Policies.** Protective force management may not have clearly established, fully explained, and equitable personnel policies governing issues such as job and shift assignments, promotions, and overtime. It is important to protective force morale that personnel policies be equitable, generally understood by all protective force personnel, and strongly enforced by management. Deficiencies in personnel policies are of special concern and require close examination by inspectors, because low morale and real or perceived inequities can adversely affect individual performance. Lack of written policies in this area is usually self-evident. Inappropriate application of policies may be indicated by low morale or lack of enthusiasm among protective personnel, or complaints voiced during SPO interviews.

**Inadequate Records.** Occasionally, protective force management fails to provide for the effective maintenance of training and

certification records for the general training program, the physical fitness program, or the various required specialized programs such as Central Alarm Station (CAS) operators, SRT members, or armorers. Lack of required records and certifications makes it difficult to track certification status and training needs, and impossible to ensure that personnel are actually certified to perform their assigned tasks.

**Lack of Management Coordination.** At some facilities, there has been a lack of effective coordination between the protective force and the DOE field element and/or operating contractor. A facility with an independent protective force contractor or subcontractor is particularly susceptible to this condition. Each of these organizations has significant security-related responsibilities, and each must be fully involved in determining a coherent security plan for the facility. If the protective force is left out of the basic analysis and decision-making effort that determines the site's security strategy, there is a reasonable possibility that the resulting strategy will be flawed. Indicators that this situation exists include lack of protective force representation on vulnerability analysis teams and security strategy and policy boards, and in daily decisions concerning implementation of security practices. If such conditions exist, inspectors should look for protective force security concerns that are not addressed by the facility security strategy.

### Personnel Competence and Training

**Inappropriate Personnel Resources.** Insufficient personnel resources may be a problem at some sites, often because of contractual restrictions, substandard working conditions, inappropriate management policies, lack of appropriate security clearances, or training program deficiencies. The effects on the protective force's ability to accomplish routine and emergency missions are obvious. Indications of insufficient personnel resources

may include low morale, absenteeism at required posts, or excessive overtime. Often, the lack of personnel resources pertains to a particular type of SPO or required skill; for example, the number of trainers or qualified trainers is often inadequate. On the other hand, some organizations are manned in excess of their needs. This situation is most likely when there has been a recent change in site mission, a reduction in the threat, or the installation of improved physical security systems without a commensurate reduction in protective force personnel. Similarly, posts may be eliminated without eliminating supervisory positions, resulting in excessive layers of management and possible confusion as to roles and responsibilities. While such conditions do not necessarily represent a security concern, they may indicate that management is not using resources efficiently. This situation may prompt the inspectors to coordinate with the protection program management inspectors for a more detailed review of resource usage. (Also see Section 3, Protective Force Training, for other relevant potential deficiencies/concerns.)

### Comprehensive Requirements

**Inadequate Post/Patrol Orders.** A commonly observed deficiency involves failure to adequately maintain and update post/ patrol and general orders. This problem involves includes several specific deficiencies, including: orders not changed/updated to reflect current practices; compensatory protective force measures (for physical security system deficiencies, for example) not documented in orders; voluminous changes/modifications to an order, rather than a rewritten order; and changes that are not properly approved. Also, orders or portions of orders may be missing from the posts/patrols to which they apply. Failure to keep orders current makes it difficult for protective personnel to thoroughly understand their duties and responsibilities. In such an environment, they must rely on memory and word-of-mouth instructions, and if they do refer to and follow an (outdated) order, they may

receive improper guidance. As a result, protective personnel may fail to properly carry out necessary duties or procedures, or may carry out duties or procedures that are no longer appropriate. Indications that this problem may exist include post orders not physically located on post; orders that are several years old; orders with many changes/modifications; orders that differ from observed practices; and orders that prescribe procedures different from those explained by SPOs and supervisors.

**Incomplete or Inadequate Response Plans.**

Often, response or contingency plans do not provide adequate guidance for emergency response. Again, this may involve a number of specific deficiencies, such as plans that do not reflect actual response practices; plans that are obsolete; plans that provide insufficient detail to provide for a rapid, coordinated, effective response; that do not address the use of available offsite support; and plans that do not address essential elements of an emergency response, such as command, control, and communications methods and procedures. One consequence of an inadequate response plan is that it is much more difficult for the protective force to make a rapid, coordinated, appropriate, and successful response to an emergency condition. Review of the plans should reveal insufficient details or failure to address an important area. Other indicators include confusion or inadequate response during performance tests, or a response different from that called for in plans.

**Failure to Test LLEA Support.** The failure to adequately test the ability of LLEAs to actually provide promised support is common and has potentially serious consequences, particularly for facilities whose security plans rely heavily on such support. Most facilities rely on LLEA support to some extent, either for SRT or other specialized emergency support or for backup in serious situations. In order to truly count on receiving such support in a timely manner, the protective force must fully understand and test the capabilities of the supporting organizations and the abilities of both organizations to quickly

and effectively integrate their resources to counter an emergency. Without detailed planning and periodic practice (testing), it is unlikely that effective support can be provided in a timely manner. Indicators that previously relied-upon support may exist only on paper include the lack of periodic, realistic exercises involving the facility and specific LLEA support promised; lack of specific planning and execution details in MOUs or supporting documents; and lack of detailed knowledge among protective force supervisors regarding the specific capabilities of supporting LLEA organizations or how those organizations would be summoned, would respond, and would be integrated into the protective force response.

**Feedback and Improvement**

**Inadequate Self-Assessment Program.** Not all protective forces have implemented a comprehensive self-assessment program involving a thorough internal review of capabilities using performance testing and other appropriate investigative tools. The lack of such a program can result in deficiencies going undetected and uncorrected for extended periods. If inspectors encounter significant deficiencies or numerous minor deficiencies not already known to protective force managers, it is a clear indication that an effective self-assessment program is not in place.

**Inadequate Corrective Action Plans.**

Inadequate corrective action plans also can result in deficiencies remaining uncorrected. However, once deficiencies have been identified (by whatever source), organizations frequently fail to accomplish one or more of the following actions: 1) prioritize deficiencies so resources can be used to correct the most serious first; 2) establish a corrective action schedule with milestones and an integral, accurate tracking system so progress can be monitored and slippages can be identified early; 3) assign responsibility for completion to specific organizations or individuals; 4) continually update the plan as known deficiencies are corrected and new ones are identified; and 5)

assure that adequate resources are applied to correct deficiencies. This process helps eliminate the frequent mistake of devoting resources to “putting out fires” (i.e., correcting the most recently identified deficiency instead of the most serious).

#### **No Root Cause Analysis of Deficiencies.**

Another common and related problem that can result in recurring deficiencies is the failure of management to determine and correct the underlying causes of identified deficiencies and correct the surface problem or symptom instead. Unless the root causes of identified deficiencies are corrected, it is likely that similar deficiencies will recur.

### Planning Activities

During the planning meeting, inspectors interview POCs and review documents. Specifically, inspectors must:

- Review the protective force mission
- Review appropriate documents (SSSP and associated Joint Tactical Simulation [JTS] results) to determine the site protection strategy
- Review results of the OA-10 pre-planning efforts and the facility characterization review, and coordinate with other topic teams to determine whether the site threat, vulnerability assessments, and response plans bring any aspect of security into question. The questions raised here typically determine the scope and thrust of protective force performance tests.
- Review facility self-appraisals, site corrective programs showing action taken on previous inspection findings, and SSSP exceptions.
- Review post orders and plans for currency, accuracy, and completeness; determine

whether the required personnel plans have been established and what the requirements are; and review response plans and contingency plans, classified and unclassified, for security emergencies, environmental emergencies, natural disasters, civil emergencies, labor strikes by protective force personnel, and call-outs of off-duty protective personnel. Questions raised during this process should be resolved during site interviews and, in some cases, through performance testing.

- Determine what physical security and facility upgrades have recently been completed or are in progress, and how they affect security force manning and allocation of resources.
- Characterize the site safeguards and security organizational structure; determine whether guard-to-supervisor ratios are adequate; develop a list of questions, determine the supervisors and managers to be interviewed, and allocate interviews and questions to be resolved to inspectors as appropriate; and assign inspection responsibilities to members of the protective force topic team. For example, on a team of four, one team member may be assigned responsibility for the “Management” subtopic, another “Training,” and the two remaining members to “Duties.”
- Plan to observe guard mounts and post inspections conducted by supervisors.
- Review MOUs or agreements with Federal, state, and local law enforcement and military organizations dealing with assistance to be provided to the protective force.
- Develop a tentative schedule for data collection activities, including the schedule for range activities, LSPTs, or other performance testing activities.

## Data Collection Activities

Document reviews and interviews with management and supervisory personnel (including interviews with DOE field element personnel responsible for the administration of protective force and other security activities) are key methods of data collection for this subtopic. Many of the requirements in this area deal with establishing, publishing, and enforcing policies and procedures, and maintaining required records. Usually, document reviews and interviews are adequate for establishing compliance. Interviews provide a means of rounding out the picture of management activity and, in particular, of identifying those aspects of management performance that ordinarily escape documentation.

Observations and performance tests also provide data useful in evaluating this subtopic. For example, observation can indicate whether required supervisory contact is being provided to SPOs. Results of performance tests can indicate whether resources are properly allocated to protect security interests.

The ultimate measure of management performance, however, is overall protective force effectiveness. Thus, data collected in the other subtopic areas, particularly "Duties," may be an extremely valuable source of data concerning management. Widespread or systemic problems are usually an indicator of management deficiencies and should be followed up accordingly.

### Line Management Responsibility for Safeguards and Security (Includes Supervision and Allocation of Personnel Resources)

**A.** Inspectors should determine whether an adequate number of supervisors is assigned to all shifts. The first step is to determine the supervisory positions through review of job descriptions and interviews with the protective

force manager/personnel manager. Procedures or post orders pertaining to supervisory positions can be reviewed to determine whether all members of each shift fall under a supervisor's responsibility. Current and several recent duty rosters should then be examined to determine whether adequate supervisory personnel are assigned to each shift.

**B.** Inspectors should determine whether supervisors are actually providing the level of supervision required by local and DOE policies.

- Attend guard mounts or pre-shift briefings for all shifts to determine whether supervisors conduct fitness-for-duty inspections and pass along necessary information and instructions. If certain personnel (i.e., CAS operators, SRT, dog handlers, training instructors, construction escorts) do not attend guard mounts, determine if and when these personnel should be contacted by supervisors.
- Observe supervisors from each shift for a portion of their shifts to determine how much direct contact they have with personnel, as opposed to time spent at their desks on administrative tasks. Not all supervisors need be observed, but practices on all shifts should be observed if possible.
- Review supervisor's and post logs to determine whether supervisory visits are recorded. Supervisor's logs can be reviewed while observing or interviewing supervisors. Post patrol logs can be reviewed during post visits conducted in conjunction with inspection of the "Duties" subtopic.
- Interview supervisors and SPOs. A sampling of supervisors will normally be interviewed during an inspection to elicit information on a number of topics. Some questions regarding their supervisory responsibilities and how they carry them out should be included in these interviews. A sample of SPOs should be interviewed to determine whether they are receiving supervisory visits

on post/patrol and whether they believe they are receiving adequate supervision. These questions can be asked during interviews conducted at post visits, which are a normal inspection activity.

**C.** Inspectors should determine whether there is an adequate number of protective force personnel to effectively accomplish mission requirements. Conversely, inspectors should examine the mission requirements to determine whether the protective force is over-manned. The adequacy of manning levels can usually be determined in conjunction with other inspection activities.

- The adequacy of manning levels at routine posts can be determined during the course of observations, interviews, and performance tests conducted to evaluate skills and procedures. Inspectors should ensure that they address this issue for all shifts and take into account special requirements pertaining to such events as general plant shift change and construction projects inside security areas.
- Manning adequacy for emergency duties can be evaluated during no-notice response tests and other emergency-mission-related performance tests. Properly designed performance tests can reveal whether sufficient resources are available for an adequate response to selected targets.
- Adequacy of manning levels in other areas should be examined in conjunction with other inspection activities. For example, sufficiency of training developers/ instructors should be examined in conjunction with the training program.

**D.** If the protective force includes Security Officers (SOs), inspectors should determine whether the SOs are properly employed. Orders pertaining to guard posts and duties should be examined, and SOs should be observed and interviewed to determine the actual scope of their duties. Results should be compared to policy limitations regarding the use of SOs.

**E.** Inspectors should determine whether the protective force, as a significant element in the facility's security system, has an appropriate amount of input into facility protection strategy and policy decisions and directions.

- Interview protective force managers and DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers to determine the protective force's level of participation in developing site-wide security policy and strategy.
- Review membership on and minutes of facility security policy boards or steering groups, VA teams, or special task forces for evidence of protective force participation or input.

**F.** Inspectors should determine whether protective force managers have an open and frequently-used line of communication with appropriate DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers and staff. This can be determined during interviews of such managers and with a review of correspondence between the parties.

### **Personnel Competence and Training**

**G.** Inspectors should examine personnel administration policies and procedures to determine the presence of required elements, including pre-employment screening, job descriptions, position classifications, promotion policy, appropriate security clearances for SPOs, work scheduling policy, and overtime policy. Document reviews (of various policies, job descriptions, etc.) can provide much of this information. Interviews with managers can provide additional details regarding personnel policies and their implementation. Inspectors should ask SPOs pertinent questions during interviews to determine whether the policies or procedures have actually been implemented, as stated, and have produced the desired results at the working level. (Also see Section 3, Protective

Force Training, for other relevant data collection activities.)

**Comprehensive Requirements  
(Includes Plans, Orders, and  
Records)**

**H.** Inspectors should determine whether directives, plans, and general and special orders meet DOE requirements for currency, clarity, and applicability to site-specific standards.

- Review the directives management system. If a written policy exists, examine it to see whether it contains procedures for development, review, approval, distribution, and updating of plans and orders. If no written procedures exist, interview the responsible protective force manager to obtain this information. If no formal procedure exists, the adequacy of plans and orders should be given particularly close scrutiny during the inspection.
- Review response/contingency plans and general, special, and post/patrol orders. Review plans and orders to see whether they are comprehensive, detailed, understandable, and approved by the DOE field element or other appropriate manager, and whether they properly implement local and DOE policies. Generally, all response plans should be reviewed. These will cover protective force response to such events as natural disasters, labor disputes, demonstrations, hostile attacks on security interests, and employment of offsite resources. All general orders should be reviewed. If there are a large number of special and post/patrol orders, only a sample need be closely examined. The sample should include a cross-section of types of posts such as CAS operators, SRT, fixed posts, construction escorts, and foot and vehicle patrols. Post orders can be reviewed during post visits, as each post/patrol normally has all pertinent directives readily available.

- Interview SPOs to determine whether plans and orders are understandable, readily available, contain sufficient guidance regarding their duties and responsibilities, and accurately reflect the way the protective force operates. These questions can be covered during SPO interviews conducted during post visits or other inspection activities.

**I.** Inspectors should review MOUs with Federal agencies and LLEAs to determine whether they are current, specific, and adequately detailed with regard to level of support, responsibilities, and implementation procedures. While it is usually a DOE field element responsibility to execute MOUs, the protective force should have copies on hand for planning purposes. Protective force managers and supervisors should be interviewed to determine their understanding of the support MOUs should provide and when and how the support is to be provided and integrated with the protective force. At times it may be beneficial to interview managers from supporting agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], LLEA) to determine their interpretations of support levels, responsibilities, and procedures. This may be necessary if a protective force relies heavily on outside support, (e.g., to provide the facility's SRT capability).

**J.** Inspectors should check to determine whether the following required records are being accurately maintained: event logs; medical, physical fitness, and firearms qualifications; firearms cards; and SPO, SRT, etc., certification records. Normally only a representative sample of these records needs to be examined. Several of these records are routinely checked, or may be checked, as part of other subtopic inspection activities. For example, training inspectors normally check certification/qualification records in conjunction with examination of training records.

**K.** Inspectors should determine whether the strategies employed by the protective force (through policies, procedures, budget, personnel

allocations, training, weapons, and equipment) appropriately complement the facility protection strategy and contribute adequately to the protection of the facility's security interests.

- Determine the applicable security interests, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the protection strategy adopted by the facility. This determination can be made in reviewing site SSSPs, associated vulnerability analyses (VAs), and other related documents. Additional details can be provided through interviews with DOE field element and facility safeguards and security managers (which may be conducted by the protection program management team).
- Compare the protective force's protection strategy and implementation procedures to determine whether it appropriately addresses the threat(s) and supports the overall facility protection strategy. During the normal course of inspection activities, inspectors interview protective force managers and supervisors, and review protective force policies and procedures. While doing so, they should be sure to collect the information required to make this comparison.

## Feedback and Improvement

**L.** Inspectors should determine whether the protective force's self-assessment and corrective action programs are adequately implemented.

- Review self-assessment procedures and reports of past self-assessments to determine whether they are comprehensive; whether they involve performance testing where applicable; and whether analyses are conducted to determine the underlying causes of identified deficiencies.
- Review corrective action plans developed to correct deficiencies identified through self-assessments for other evaluations. A good self-assessment plan includes prioritization of deficiencies; a roadmap to correct each deficiency, with measurable milestones; a tracking system to monitor progress; assignment of responsibility for each corrective action; allocation of necessary resources; and a procedure to validate whether the problem has been corrected.
- Interview appropriate managers, supervisors, and staff personnel to obtain more details concerning the application of self-assessment and corrective action procedures.

## Section 3

### TRAINING

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#### General Information

The protective force training standard identifies the objective of protective force training as the effective and efficient development and maintenance of the capability to perform the tasks required to fulfill the protective force mission. Most effective training programs for protective forces are:

- Mission oriented
- Based on a valid and complete set of job tasks
- Directed by appropriate training objectives
- Aimed at achieving the level of competency required to perform each job task
- Designed so that training activities make optimum use of available resources
- Implemented so that competency is attained by all qualified trainees
- Accomplished on a timely basis.

It is important that the training program design is based upon a complete set of job tasks; identified tasks should be essential and authentic and should directly contribute to the fulfillment of the protective force mission. To be functional, the tasks must be clearly identified and documented

and must include measurable performance criteria.

Training objectives are best defined when written to be consistent with the job tasks; gaps between desired competencies and existing competencies should be identified and described in the training needs analysis. Further, when information on trainees (age, experience, education, physical fitness) is systematically gathered and applied to the process of designing and implementing training activities, the training program can more easily be focused on job requirements, the gaps between competencies, and individual needs.

To achieve its organizational training goals, management needs sufficient resources and authority. Usually, management operates from written plans that specifically implement the training plan. It is important that the plans include all provisions designed to meet DOE compliance requirements. In successful training programs, management ensures that there is an adequate training staff manned with qualified personnel, is involved in developing the organization's training plan, and provides oversight to a training staff that has been delegated the necessary authority and responsibility for carrying out the training program.

The specialized nature of the Training subtopic and the range of activities included in the process of gathering data usually require at least one

member of the inspection team to work full-time on this subtopic during the data collection phase. It is important that this requirement be considered in both the team selection and planning phases. If the scope of the training subtopic inspection must be limited for any reason, the most important elements to evaluate are training effectiveness, program development and structure, instructor qualifications, and training records.

### **Common Deficiencies/ Potential Concerns**

#### **Lack of a Comprehensive Training Plan**

While most protective forces have a document called a training plan (or annual training plan, etc.), in many cases this document is not comprehensive. That is, it does not fully address the training needs and objectives of the protective force or outline the strategy, methods, and resources to be used to meet those needs and objectives. Often, the many bits and pieces of a training program have nothing to tie them together and ensure that they are each essential parts of a coherent program. The absence of a comprehensive plan increases the likelihood that scarce training resources will be wasted and that important training needs will not be met.

#### **Inadequate Job Tasks or Job Task Analyses**

Frequently, inspectors find that the site-specific job tasks are not complete, that they are not all essential to the fulfillment of the protective force mission (i.e., non-critical or otherwise superfluous tasks are included), or that all critical tasks are not listed. It is essential that task statements represent real-life tasks, including specific actions performed by individuals or groups with definite beginning and ending points. It is also important that identified tasks be observable events, with measurable performance, and with specific success criteria. Additionally, job task analyses (JTAs) may not have been completed for all identified jobs, or if completed, may lack essential components such

as performance standards. If the JTA is not thorough and does not include all tasks associated with protective force duties, it is likely that the training provided to protective personnel will not comprehensively prepare them for all mission requirements.

There is a general lack of understanding among managers of how the JTAs and critical tasks that guide training are related to vulnerabilities or protection strategies. The job or JTAs and training needs assessments often are not part of the manager's "tool kit," and there is a lack of awareness on the part of managers of the potential value of these documents in fulfilling the management role.

#### **Lesson Plans Inconsistent with Tasks or Needs**

Often, lesson plans do not incorporate current or valid objectives and expertise, and do not establish complete linkage with job task descriptions. It is best if lesson plans are written to be consistent with the job tasks and with the prioritized gaps between desired and existing competencies identified and described in the training needs analysis. Since lessons plans determine the details of the actual training provided, weaknesses in lesson plans usually translate into deficiencies in the training actually delivered. Protective force training departments often use lesson plans supplied by other agencies, particularly the Non-proliferation and National Security Institute (NNSI). The use of these lesson plans is acceptable as long as the contents are consistent with the training needs identified on site; if they are not, inspectors should identify whether they have been modified to meet site-specific needs. Often, instructors use the lesson plans just as they are received from the NNSI without site-specific modifications, and this can result in inappropriate or incomplete subject matter coverage.

#### **Training Not Properly Designed or Focused**

A common problem encountered in protective force training is that it is "classroom oriented" in the traditional sense, requiring trainees to achieve

“passing grades” and attend mandatory training sessions on all topics. In these programs, the trainees are compared to each other, rather than to their specific job requirements. Training is accomplished by repetitively targeting the whole population, rather than targeting specific members and sub-groups of the population based on individual or sub-group need. Usually, these programs are not designed to promote continuous improvement, and momentum is lost when the arbitrary standard or grade is achieved. The standard or grade most often has no defensible rationale; that is, how good is good enough? Or, how good is 75 percent? For example, the passing grade for critical tasks, such as “arrest procedures,” is typically set at 70 to 75 percent. Momentum is usually lost when the trainee achieves 70 to 75 percent, rather than persisting until the trainee achieves 100 percent. A more constructive approach would be to set the standard at 100 percent for selected tasks, then design the training program to instruct and motivate trainees to continue to improve until they achieve 100 percent.

### **Lack of Qualified Training Instructors/Developers**

Many protective forces still rely on uncertified instructors to develop and deliver training. Often, protective force operations supervisors are responsible for providing in-service training; however, they are not usually professional or certified trainers. Although untrained or uncertified instructors may be very good SPOs, their training skills may vary considerably, resulting in inconsistent training provided to the protective force. Instructor certification is easy to verify; instructor performance is more difficult to determine. Lack of adequate performance throughout the force in specific skills or significant differences in skill levels between shifts (or other subgroups) may be indicators of inconsistent quality of instruction.

### **Lack of Interface Between Operations and Training**

Often there is insufficient communication and feedback between the operations and training elements within a protective force. It is essential that operations supervisors inform trainers of operational training needs and provide trainers feedback regarding the adequacy of the training provided. It is also essential for trainers to ensure that any training, including exercises, provided or conducted by operations personnel meet the appropriate training needs, objectives, and standards. Without this essential interface and feedback, the effectiveness of the training program will suffer. Organizational, physical, or attitudinal isolation of the operations and training elements are obvious indications that this situation may exist, but inspectors should be alert for more subtle manifestations of this condition when inspecting a training program.

### **Insufficient Training Resources**

Some training programs lack the resources to meet all necessary training objectives. Shortfalls may be identified in certified training developers/instructors; classroom, range, and field training facilities; funds; or availability of protective personnel for training times. A significant deficiency in any of these areas can seriously degrade a training program and affect the protective force's mission performance.

### **Lack of Adequate Supervisor Training**

Some protective forces do not provide mission-oriented supervisor training. While some use the NNSI leadership training package, it is not sufficient in scope or site-specificity to fully train supervisors. Neither does general (non-protective force-specific) management or supervisory training fully meet the mission-related needs of

protective force supervisors. The lack of comprehensive supervisor training can have adverse effects on force training, morale, and the force-wide performance of routine and emergency duties.

### **Lack of Performance Testing**

Written or oral knowledge tests are often used to measure competency in tasks that are better evaluated by performance testing. This situation is akin to the previously mentioned use of classroom instruction when hands-on or performance training would be more appropriate. The best and only reliable way to determine whether an SPO has a particular skill is to have the SPO perform that skill. Programs that use knowledge testing in lieu of performance testing risk having low skill levels among protective personnel. Inspectors should emphasize performance testing when inspecting protective forces with knowledge-oriented testing programs.

### **Inadequate Tactical Skills Training**

Unrealistic tactical skills training is a common problem. While some elements of tactical skills/knowledge can be taught in the classroom, the proper application of most tactical skills can only be learned by repetitive practice in an appropriately realistic setting. This type of training is often minimized because it requires more time, planning, instructor skill, and logistical support than classroom training. However, lack of adequate realistic tactical training is likely to result in a protective force that cannot adequately perform in an emergency situation requiring the application of tactical skills. Inspectors should emphasize performance testing of tactical skills during all inspections.

### **Response Plans and Training Not Complementary**

Emergency response training frequently does not reflect the guidance provided in response/contingency plans. Protective forces normally

publish response/contingency plans to govern responses to various types of emergencies. However, sometimes the response procedures training conducted by the protective force does not support, or even follow, the guidance or procedures dictated by the plans. As a result, there could be at least two different ways to respond to an emergency—that prescribed by the plan, and that practiced in training. This could lead to mission-endangering confusion during an actual emergency. Inspectors should determine whether training activities are compatible with published and approved plans.

### **Unqualified Physical Fitness Trainers**

While all protective forces are required to have a physical fitness program, some forces do not provide a qualified individual to administer or monitor their program. As a result, physical training may not be realistic or adequate for getting individual SPOs in shape and keeping them in shape.

### **Inadequate Individual Training Records**

In some programs, individual training records do not support the training program as well as they should. This general weakness includes a number of specific problems. In some cases, records of competency tests indicate only “pass” or “fail,” and do not indicate areas of weakness that require additional training. Many training records are kept in databases, and the printouts of those records, used by trainers and managers, are often not kept current. Insufficient, incomplete, or out of date information in training records adds to the difficulty of properly managing a training program, and can result in unnecessary duplication of training or failure to provide needed training.

### **Planning Activities**

During inspection planning activities, inspectors interview POCs and review available documents.

Elements to cover include:

- Statement of training objectives
- Annual training plan
- Curricula for basic and refresher training
- Job task analyses
- On-the-job training procedures
- Written tests currently in use (with answers)
- A number of representative lesson plans
- A list of protective force instructors and their qualifications, with an indication of whether they are NSSI certified
- A list of protective force firearms instructors and their qualifications/ certifications
- State and local training requirements for armed and unarmed SPOs, which apply to the protective force
- The training records system used for the protective force.

Inspectors should also:

- Interview site personnel to identify characteristics of the program and corroborate documentation
- Identify training activities scheduled during the inspection and arrange to observe some or all of these activities
- Coordinate all training inspection activities with other protective force subtopic areas.

## Performance Tests

Results of performance tests conducted to evaluate the Duties subtopic are valuable in determining the effectiveness of the protective force training program.

In addition to the performance tests described in the appendices, inspectors should consider having the protective force develop in-service training classes to remediate deficiencies identified in performance tests conducted by the other protective force subtopic areas.

## Data Collection Activities

Basic information about the training program is usually collected by reviewing training documents and conducting interviews with training managers and trainers. Such activities will indicate whether the required elements of the training program exist, and will indicate, to some extent, how active the program is.

Training staff interviews can identify how the training program operates, the responsibilities for training development and delivery, program strengths and weaknesses, and ways in which weaknesses are being remedied. SPOs are interviewed to determine whether protective force training responds to their perceived needs and to ascertain the effectiveness of training. Optimum results are most often obtained when training management interviews focus on program organization and structure, training resources, and management involvement in the training needs analysis process. Where on-the-job training responsibilities are assigned to supervisors and experienced protective force members, it is important that these personnel also be interviewed.

When possible, training activities should be observed by inspectors. Observation of training in progress will provide information about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the instructors and instructional methods. Observation of SPOs performing their duties will provide an indication of the effectiveness of training. Written knowledge tests, based on the content of lesson plans employed at the site, can be used to test training effectiveness and retention levels. Knowledge tests of SPOs, either formal or through informal interviews, will also provide an indication of training effectiveness. The results of performance tests, whether administered

specifically as part of the training inspection or as part of the inspection of other subtopic areas (typically Duties), is one of the most important indicators of the effectiveness of training.

### Training Program Development and Structure

**A.** Inspectors should review the JTAs for protective force members. Things to look for include:

- Have all jobs been the subject of a JTA? A comprehensive training program requires that JTAs be completed for all positions, not just for basic SPOs. Look for JTAs for SRT, supervisors, CAS operators, dog handlers, armorers, etc. Look for a JTA for every position description.
- Have the JTAs been thorough in identifying and prioritizing all tasks associated with a job? It is not practical to thoroughly study JTAs during an inspection. Inspectors should review the methodology used to conduct JTAs with the appropriate personnel and determine whether necessary areas were covered. For example, in addition to entry control and tactical tasks, are such tasks as vehicle operation, report writing, and running one mile identified?
- Are the JTAs site-specific? Some generic JTAs have been developed (for example, for basic SPOs). Some organizations operating protective forces at several facilities have developed common JTAs. To be fully effective, these generic JTAs usually require some modification for site-specific conditions. Checking job descriptions or seeing whether facility-unique activities have been incorporated will quickly answer this question.

**B.** Inspectors should determine whether systems exist that identify annual refresher training and in-service training requirements. An effective training needs analysis process can identify these

requirements. Inspectors should interview training personnel, review documentation pertinent to the methodology used to determine training needs, and review the most recent example of work done in this area.

**C.** Inspectors should review the training plan and discuss it with training managers to determine whether it provides a clear roadmap for accomplishing the organization's training. This information may be contained in one or more documents, such as a training plan, a training order, an annual training plan, or a training standard operating procedure (SOP) supported by one of the above. Whatever the form, essential ingredients of a good plan include:

- Identification of site-specific training needs and goals (at least for the period being addressed)
- Description of training resources and an explanation of how they will be used to meet the training needs and goals
- All basic training requirements, both general (SPO) and specialized (SRT, CAS operator, health physics, etc.)
- All required and necessary annual refresher training, both general and specialized. This is normally based on a training needs analysis or similar evaluation
- All training exercise requirements for the protective force in general, SRT, and supporting FBI/LLEA.

**D.** Inspectors should review training schedules and other associated documents used to implement the training plan to determine whether the identified training needs and goals are actually being scheduled and conducted. Training schedules are normally published on a monthly or weekly basis. Inspectors need not review an entire year's training schedules; randomly selecting a few monthly or several weekly schedules is usually adequate. Another option is

to select one (or more) training item(s) from the annual training plan and track it through all training schedules to see whether they collectively serve to achieve the goal.

**E.** Lesson plans currently in use should be examined to determine their adequacy in supporting training goals. A review of six to ten lesson plans should be adequate unless inspectors discover that lesson plans are inconsistent in format, detail, and quality; in such a case, a more extensive look may be needed. If training is going to be observed during the inspection, it is a good idea to include lesson plans for the class(es) observed among those reviewed. Inspectors should look for format, appropriate level of detail, and site-specificity. If lesson plans produced by other organizations, such as NSSI, are used, inspectors should determine whether they have been modified, as appropriate, for site-specific needs.

### Training Records

**F.** Inspectors should select and review a sample of class rosters and compare them with training schedules to determine whether scheduled training was actually conducted and the required personnel attended. A review of 10 or 12 rosters is usually adequate, although more may be reviewed, if necessary. Another approach is to select a particular class (or several) and look at the entire year's rosters for that class to determine whether all scheduled classes were held and all required personnel attended.

**G.** Inspectors should review the individual training records of a random sample of protective personnel. Sample size may vary; for example, it may be 10 percent or it may be based on a formal population-based sample size table. Records of specialists (SRT, CAS operator, etc.) as well as basic SPOs should be included in the sample. If one or more samples of personnel are selected for other purposes, such as performance tests or written tests, training records of the same personnel may be reviewed. In some cases, each individual may have more than one record;

records of all training and certifications may not be consolidated. Records should be reviewed for:

- **Accessibility**—information on the records should be easily retrievable, readily available to those who need it, and in a useful format.
- **Currency**—cross-check records against recent class rosters to see whether training received has been recorded. Also check to see that credit was not given for training not attended.
- **Completeness**—check to see whether all required training, evaluation, and certification information is included in the records to provide trainers/managers with an accurate and complete picture of the individual's training performance history.

**H.** Certification records should be reviewed to ensure that personnel on the job have met all pertinent certification requirements. From a training standpoint, these would include physical fitness, firearms qualification, and competency certifications for basic SPOs and specialized duties for SRTs and CAS operators. These records may be consolidated with training records or kept separately. A sample of individual training records may be used, and it is usually most convenient to review all individual records at the same time. Certification records should be compared with training and testing records to validate that the individual has actually completed all certification requirements.

### Instructor Qualifications

**I.** Inspectors should review the certifications of all training instructors. Documents should be reviewed to determine whether each instructor has been trained and certified through an approved program or process.

**J.** Inspectors should evaluate the proficiency of instructors. Depending on the number of instructors, inspectors may evaluate all or just a sample. If supervisors or other operations

personnel not on the training staff are used as instructors, they should be included in the sample. Several techniques are useful in this evaluation, including:

- Instructors can be interviewed to ascertain the scope and depth of their knowledge relating to training development and instructional techniques.
- Inspectors can review instructor products, such as lesson plans, instructional aids, and exams or performance tests for completeness, appropriateness, site-specificity, etc.
- Inspectors can observe an instructor teaching a class or directing a training event. This is a very effective way to evaluate an instructor, because it involves performance of instructional skills under real conditions. It also affords an opportunity to observe and evaluate teaching methods, instructional techniques, establishment of rapport with students, use of student feedback, and testing methods. If no training is scheduled during the inspection, inspectors may want to have the protective force schedule a class or have an instructor prepare and deliver a class to the inspectors.

**Training Aids, Equipment,  
and Facilities**

**K.** Inspectors should examine the training aids and support equipment available to the training program to determine whether training objectives and instructional techniques are adequately supported. Availability and functioning of the equipment should be included. Typical items to examine include:

- Videotapes, players, and other audiovisual equipment
- Facilities for making viewgraphs, slides, etc.

- Security training and evaluation shooting system (stress) or other interactive shooting systems
- ESS/MILES equipment
- Various mock-ups and props called for in lesson plans
- Physical fitness exercise equipment.

**L.** Inspectors should examine the availability and adequacy of training facilities. When appropriate, attributes such as space, climate control, and lighting should be checked. Ideally, facility attributes and availability should support the training needs; training should not be artificially designed to fit inadequate training facilities. Facilities normally necessary to support an adequate training program include:

- Classrooms
- Live fire ranges (for day/night, all available weapons)
- Tactical training areas, including facilities/buildings for realistic training
- Physical fitness training facilities, including a running track or other safe running course.

**Training Effectiveness**

**M.** Inspectors should determine how well the training program prepares the protective force for mission accomplishment. (That is, inspectors should determine how well trained the protective force is). This question can only be answered by the assimilation of information collected by various means throughout the inspection.

- Interviews of personnel at all levels of the protective force should include appropriate questions to provide indications of general

job knowledge and an overall sense of how well personnel feel the training program is serving their needs.

- Oral and written knowledge tests should provide evidence of how well the training program has imparted necessary general and specialized knowledge. Site-developed knowledge tests may be used or new tests may be developed in conjunction with the protective force training department. Although the tests may be administered by the training inspectors, they more likely will be administered as part of the inspection of the Duties subtopic.
- The most telling and useful information regarding training effectiveness comes from the performance test results. While training inspectors may conduct some performance tests, usually involving training staff members and training-specific tasks, most performance tests will be conducted during

the inspection of the Duties subtopic. Training inspectors should observe as many such performance tests as is practical; detailed results of all performance tests and their training implications should be discussed among training inspectors and inspectors who evaluated the performance tests.

### Management Support of Training Program

**N.** Throughout the inspection process, inspectors should be alert for indications of the level and adequacy of management support for the training program. Indicators include the availability of adequate resources of all kinds, including funding; training staff and their development; facilities and equipment; and availability of training time for all protective force members. Most data collection activities described above can contribute some information reflecting the level of management support.

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## Section 4

### EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

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#### General Information

The protective force equipment standard requires that equipment and facilities enable the protective force to:

- Effectively, efficiently, and safely perform routine duties
- Prevent adversaries from accomplishing their objectives by bringing necessary force to bear
- Move in a timely manner and in sufficient number under all expected weather conditions
- Detect the presence of adversary forces under all lighting conditions
- Operate from fixed facilities that effectively support the overall protective force mission and are constructed in accordance with DOE specifications.

The most efficient use of inspection time and resources is achieved when the collection of data on equipment and facilities is accomplished in combination with data collection in other subtopic areas. For example, an inspection of an individual SPO's personal equipment can be conducted as part of an interview with that SPO, or while observing the SPO performing routine duties.

Maintenance of firearms and the effectiveness of communications equipment can be noted during post visits and performance tests. If time or resources are limited, inspection activities in this subtopic should concentrate on the equipment and facilities critical to the protection of the highest priority targets under routine and emergency conditions.

Observation is the primary method of determining whether the protective force has the required equipment, whether it is adequate and appropriate for their mission, and whether it is properly maintained. Examination of facilities and equipment will also provide significant data in this area.

Observation, however, must be supplemented with document reviews of inventory records, maintenance records, facility specification documentation, and work orders. Moreover, when equipment or facility-related problems are identified, these problems will demand more extensive investigation. For example, if random checks of auxiliary weapons at fixed posts indicate that proper maintenance is not being performed, a followup examination of armorer procedures and practices, and the inspection and test-firing of a broader sample of these weapons, might become necessary.

Typical elements under the Equipment and Facilities subtopic include:

- Weapons and explosives
- Vehicles
- Protective force communications equipment
- Individual special purpose and duty equipment
- Facilities.

To prevent adversaries (identified in the generic or site-specific threat guidance) from accomplishing their objectives, the protective force must be able to bring the necessary force to bear against those adversaries. To accomplish this, they must have appropriate and sufficient individual and auxiliary weapons and ammunition readily available.

It is important that armories be well organized, properly maintained, conveniently located, and secure. Out-of-service weapons are required to be tagged and segregated from operational weapons. A qualified armorer must inspect all weapons semi-annually, and inventories of weapons and ammunition must be conducted in accordance with DOE requirements.

It is essential that a sufficient number of vehicles be available to ensure that the required number of protective force personnel can respond according to plan. These vehicles must be maintained in good serviceable condition, readily accessible, and appropriately identified.

At some facilities, both normal telephone and two-way radio communications are required. To be effective, protective force communications equipment must be operable, permit timely transmission of routine and emergency information, and be readily available for use. Radios are most effective when they provide multichannel capability and, when required, are equipped with a voice privacy or digital encryption capability. It is essential that a sufficient number of radio channels be dedicated for use by security personnel.

Depending on mission requirements, protective force personnel are assigned certain items of individual special purpose and duty equipment. It is important that all items of equipment are properly carried or otherwise stowed, easily accessible, and maintained in serviceable condition. These items often include a handgun and ammunition, holster, handcuffs, flashlight, portable radio with carrier, observation devices, protective masks, personal protective armor, chemical agents, or baton. Customarily, the uniform worn by protective personnel is designed and tailored to enhance efficient performance of duties and promote a public image of professionalism.

Protective force facilities range from regular buildings and offices to specially constructed features, including reinforced doors, walls, and windows that provide specified bullet penetration resistance characteristics and other protection features. It is essential that facilities permit protective force personnel to perform their duties efficiently, protect individual SPOs from weather and temperature variations, and provide for effective communication.

### **Common Deficiencies/ Potential Concerns**

#### **Inappropriate Weapons/Ammunition**

Sometimes the weapons (particularly auxiliary weapons) and/or ammunition available to SPOs are inappropriate for their mission requirements, threat, or environment. For example, high-powered rifles may be inappropriate for use inside certain types of buildings, and shotguns may be of little use to a vehicle patrol operating in open country on the fringes of a facility. As site missions and facility usage change, or new facilities are constructed, protective forces may fail to re-analyze their weapons and ammunition requirements. Inappropriate weapons or ammunition can result in two types of problems: insufficient firepower to counter the threat, and unacceptable levels of collateral damage (to

people and facilities). Inspectors should be aware of the rationale behind weapon selection and look for the presence of inappropriate weapons that may not support mission requirements.

### **Lack of Post-Maintenance Weapon Check Procedures**

Sometimes there are no procedures or practices in place to determine whether weapons are operable after being repaired or after undergoing routine maintenance. Weapons, including those worked on by offsite contract armorers, may be issued to SPOs or placed on posts with no live-fire functional check. As a result, the reliability of these weapons is unknown and will remain unknown until they are used.

### **Inadequate Numbers and Types of Vehicles**

Inspectors may find that protective force vehicles are not adequate to support mission requirements. This may be due to an insufficient number of vehicles or the wrong types of vehicles. A protective force obviously needs enough vehicles to cover all vehicle patrols, response requirements, and supervisory and transportation needs. Vehicle type and equipment is also important. Some off-road or 4-wheel drive vehicles may be needed, depending on terrain, roads, and weather. Motor pool vehicles that lack radios, gun racks, and other special equipment do not fully support protective force needs. Inspectors should examine the rationale for the vehicle fleet mixture and determine whether the vehicles available are being used to best support mission requirements (for example, is the supervisor driving the new 4-wheel drive on paved roads, while a patrol on dirt roads and open terrain is using an older sedan?)

### **Poor Vehicle Maintenance**

Poor vehicle maintenance procedures and scheduling are sometimes observed and can contribute to the problem mentioned above by making vehicles unavailable for use. While

maintenance problems may be directly related to the age of the fleet, other contributing factors include vehicle abuse, maintenance priority, and quality of maintenance. Examination of vehicle treatment by SPOs, maintenance policies and priorities, and replacement schedules may reveal a lack of adequate supervision or management support for the vehicle fleet.

### **Insufficient Radio Frequencies**

Most protective forces rely heavily on radios for both routine and emergency communications. However, some protective forces do not have enough radio frequencies available to effectively segregate communications functions. If sufficient frequencies are not available for all necessary uses, such as routine operations, tactical operations, training, or SRT, the primary frequency becomes cluttered, and the probability that important information will be lost increases. This problem is exacerbated during emergencies, when communications traffic normally increases. If the protective force does not have enough frequencies assigned, inspectors should examine what is being done to manage the available frequencies and employ alternate communications methods.

### **Unreliable Radio Communications**

The size and/or terrain of some facilities may result in “dead spots” where radio messages cannot be received and/or transmitted. Such “dead spots” can be either outside or inside buildings. Often this problem is intensified when radios are used in the encrypted mode, which may decrease range. The resulting inability of protective personnel to communicate with each other can have serious consequences during both routine and emergency operations. When this problem exists, inspectors should determine the extent and impact of the problem and identify protective force efforts to solve the problem (e.g., install repeaters, devise compensatory radio procedures, or use alternate means of communication).

### **Inadequate Encryption Procedures**

As protective forces have moved to comply with the requirement to provide encrypted radios to their SRTs, several problems have been observed. Even with secure (capable) radios in hand, some protective forces have been slow to develop procedures to install the encryption codes. Others have not established clear procedures for switching to the secure mode when necessary or for communication between the SRT, while in the secure mode, and the rest of the protective force, which is in the clear mode. Inspectors should determine whether the various complications inherent in the use of encrypted radios by all or part of the protective force have been identified, analyzed, and adequately managed.

### **Storage and Issue of Extra/Special Equipment**

Remote or inaccessible storage locations and/or problems with issue procedures (or lack of procedures) for extra or special equipment, weapons, and ammunition at some facilities decrease the availability of such resources, all of which fails to support emergency mission requirements. During an unexpected emergency, it may be necessary to distribute special equipment, additional ammunition, etc. If the equipment is not stored in an accessible location 24 hours a day, or if there are no procedures detailing how the equipment will be issued, by whom, to whom, and under what conditions, it is unlikely that equipment will be available when needed. An indicator of this problem is that SPOs may be unsure about how they would get additional ammunition or a particular item of equipment when needed.

### **Maintenance of Post/Patrol Equipment**

Equipment assigned to a post or vehicle is often not properly cleaned, maintained, or given functional checks. While procedures may call for

periodic functional checks of such things as duress alarms, radios, telephones, and intercoms, they often do not address responsibilities for other items of equipment assigned to the post or vehicle. These could include auxiliary weapons, binoculars, night vision devices, respirators, flashlights, and so forth. Any of these items, under emergency conditions, may be mission-essential; yet, it is not uncommon to find such items dirty, broken, with missing parts, or with dead batteries. If procedures do not clearly spell out responsibilities for these items and SPOs on post are vague about who is responsible for them, inspectors should take a close look at the serviceability of these items.

### **Individual Duty Equipment**

Frequently, inspectors will find that SPOs do not have or do not carry all necessary equipment, such as handcuff keys, operable flashlights, ammunition, extra eyeglasses, or equipment carriers. Inspectors often find that protective masks are not being carried by SPOs even when required by established procedures. During spot inspections, protective masks are sometimes found to be unserviceable or without necessary corrective lens inserts.

### **Inadequate Training Facilities**

Training facilities may be unavailable or inadequate to support training requirements. These deficiencies most often involve live-fire ranges, tactical training areas, and physical fitness training facilities, but even include lack of adequate classroom space at some sites. The training requirements imposed by DOE and performance levels expected of SPOs make adequate training facilities essential.

### **Poorly Maintained Posts**

Poorly maintained posts can be a problem, particularly in older structures. Problems observed vary and include such things as cracked or broken bullet-resistant glass; inoperable or inadequate climate control equipment; broken

doors/locks; burned out lights; and a crowded, cluttered, or trashy appearance. Such conditions can adversely affect job performance by lowering morale, making it difficult to move about and work in the post, or providing inadequate ballistic protection.

### Inadequate Fixed Posts

Some interior fixed posts have been established at locations not designed or properly modified for the purpose. Some posts, including material access area (MAA) entry/exit control posts, have been established in halls or intersections of hallways with little or no modification to accommodate the necessary post equipment, SPO protection, or traffic control requirements. As a result, the SPOs and their weapons/ equipment are accessible and vulnerable to passers-by; traffic flow (entry/egress) is difficult to control, particularly during heavy traffic periods; and the orderly conduct of post business is difficult at best.

### Planning Activities

Inspectors should interview POCs and review equipment lists and facility projects (ongoing and planned). It is helpful to determine where equipment is stored to ensure that major facilities and equipment are inspected during data collection. Other elements to review include:

- Firearms inspection procedures
- List of armorers who inspect, certify, maintain, or repair protective force weapons, and whether they are NNSI certified or hold other certification
- Topographical map of the site, including all site property, and site map with all buildings, roads, security fences, and other significant features; this would include the location and description of firing ranges, physical fitness areas, armories, equipment and weapon issue facilities, and maintenance sheds

- Inventories of significant protective force equipment, including:
  - firearms, indicating type, manufacturer, serial number, and location
  - vehicles (including air and water craft), indicating type and model
  - protective masks, indicating type and location
  - non-lethal weapons, indicating type
  - chemical agents and dispersal devices
  - radios, indicating manufacturer, model, and number of channels; indicate duress feature and data encryption capability, if any
  - duty ammunition, pyrotechnics, and explosives, indicating type and caliber
  - metal detectors and other contraband detection devices, indicating type and location.

### Performance Tests

Performance testing and interviews with protective force personnel will help determine whether facilities and equipment are functional and appropriate. Most performance tests conducted to evaluate the “Duties” subtopic require the use of equipment, and many require the use of facilities, offering an excellent opportunity to determine whether they are adequate and functional.

Inspectors may be able to check the operation of radios, phones, and duress systems during post checks and while conducting exercises. Weapons in the armory can be randomly selected to check for operability, cleanliness, and other requirements (for example, whether the armorer set the correct “battle sight” on auxiliary weapons).

Protective force members can be asked to demonstrate deployment of their M-60 machineguns and other auxiliary weapons, and exercises can be conducted that require the issue and deployment of stored, specialized equipment.

## Data Collection Activities

Most data collection activities for this subtopic are normally conducted concurrently with data collection activities for the Duties subtopic. Most equipment and facilities are located with or in the immediate vicinity of protective force members, and are used by them in performing routine and emergency duties. Therefore, most equipment and facilities can be inspected and tested while protective personnel knowledge and skills are being inspected. Only a few activities, such as reviewing records and examining the armory and other storage and maintenance locations, need be conducted separately.

### Weapons and Explosives

**A.** Inspectors should determine whether the protective force has adequate numbers of the appropriate types of weapons and ammunition (and explosives, if appropriate) properly located to comply with local and DOE requirements and to support accomplishment of routine and emergency missions. This information can be collected in several ways.

- Review documents such as weapons inventories and general, special, and post orders to determine the types of weapons and ammunition available and where they are normally located.
- Observe the types, numbers, and locations of individually assigned and post/auxiliary weapons during all inspection activities, such as post visits and tours. Post/patrol visits provide an excellent opportunity to see what weapons are where.
- Performance tests, including no-notice response tests, conducted to evaluate performance and procedures provide an excellent opportunity to determine if adequate numbers of the appropriate types of weapons are available in a timely manner. The collection of this data should be considered during performance test planning.

**B.** Inspectors should determine whether weapons and ammunition are controlled and stored safely and securely in accordance with DOE and local requirements. Armory procedures should be reviewed and their implementation observed during all shifts. During post/patrol visits, weapon/ammunition carriage and storage should be noted. If auxiliary weapons and ammunition are stored for ready access in locations other than the armory or at posts, inspectors should examine those storage locations. If the protective force has long-term bulk storage of weapons, ammunition, or explosives, storage facilities and procedures should be checked for compliance with the DOE Explosives Safety Manual (DOE M 440.1-1).

**C.** Inspectors should determine the operability of weapons available for protective force use.

- During all live-fire inspection activities (qualification courses, stress courses, etc.), inspectors should pay close attention to weapon functioning. During these activities, SPOs should be required to use their own individually assigned weapons, including rifles, submachine guns, and shotguns, if individually assigned.
- A random sample of weapons assigned to posts/patrols should be selected, removed from post (replaced), and test fired. For weapons with adjustable sights, testing for proper battlesight setting should be included. All types of weapons available to the protective force should be included in the sample. If plans call for issuance of additional weapons from the armory during a response, armory weapons can be included in the sample. The size of the sample will depend on the total number of weapons and the time and facilities available for testing.
- Maintenance procedures should be reviewed to determine whether required preventive maintenance is programmed. Check to see whether procedures include verification of proper functioning before a repaired or inspected weapon is placed back into service.

Qualifications or certifications of armorers and gunsmiths should be verified.

- Maintenance records should be checked to determine whether required inspections and maintenance are being conducted. The number of records checked will depend on the number of weapons and the time available.
- Weapons at any location may be spot-checked for cleanliness and obvious (visible) maintenance problems.

**D.** Inspectors should determine whether the protective force is properly accounting for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Inspectors should review not only accountability and inventory procedures but also records of periodic inventories to determine whether they are thorough and timely. A good check of accountability practices can be made by generating a random sample of weapons, then going to the locations where records indicate those specific weapons should be and verifying the weapons by serial number.

### Vehicles

**E.** Inspectors should determine whether the quantity and types of protective force vehicles are adequate to support routine and emergency mission requirements. The adequacy of integral vehicle equipment (light bars, radios, and weapons racks) should be included in this evaluation.

- Interview managers and review any pertinent documentation that explains the rationale for the makeup of the vehicle fleet.
- Observe, during routine operations and performance tests of emergency operations (or actual responses), whether the vehicles available are adequate to support the necessary tasks.

**F.** Inspectors should determine whether adequate vehicle maintenance support is provided.

- Inspectors should observe the condition of every protective force vehicle they encounter during the course of the inspection. Cleanliness, care, and general condition can be observed by visual inspection.
- Inspectors should review maintenance schedules (kept either by the protective force or the motor pool) to determine whether routine scheduled maintenance is appropriate. Maintenance records should be checked for a sample of vehicles to determine whether scheduled maintenance is performed. Inspectors should also check records for excessive unscheduled vehicle down time, which might indicate inadequate maintenance or careless operation.
- SPO interviews should include questions regarding their opinions about the suitability and reliability of the vehicle fleet. Interviews of protective force and vehicle maintenance (motor pool) managers can reveal maintenance priorities afforded protective force vehicles.

### Communications Equipment

**G.** Inspectors should determine whether the protective force has sufficient numbers of the appropriate types of communications devices as required by DOE and local policies.

- Inspectors should review equipment lists, including equipment specified in post/patrol orders, to determine the quantities and types of communications equipment available. Information regarding the number of available radio frequencies should be determined.
- Inspectors should determine, through a combination of SPO interviews, observation

of routine operations, and performance tests of emergency operations, whether the protective force has adequate communications equipment to perform its mission requirements.

**H.** Inspectors should determine the reliability of communications equipment, particularly of radios. This may be accomplished by reviewing maintenance records and observing the ability of the protective force to communicate during routine operations and performance tests simulating routine or emergency operations. Interviews with SPOs, including CAS operators, can provide added data about communications reliability.

**I.** Inspectors should determine whether maintenance and testing of communications equipment is adequate. Maintenance and testing, and to some degree suitability, of radios is normally inspected by the physical security systems topic team, and Inspectors should coordinate with that team in this area. Procedures and practices for the operational testing of other communications devices, such as telephones, intercoms, and duress alarms, should be inspected by review of procedures, observation of tests, and review of test records.

#### **Individual Special Purpose and Duty Equipment**

**J.** Inspectors should determine whether the uniforms and equipment required by DOE and local policies are available, appropriate, functional, and reliable. Numerous items could be included in this category, including such things as uniforms, load bearing equipment, sidearms, handcuffs, flashlights, body armor, hand held metal detectors, protective masks, and extra eyeglasses.

- Inspectors should review appropriate protective force policies, orders, and equipment lists to determine what equipment is required and where it should be located.
- Information regarding availability, suitability, reliability, and functioning can be obtained through SPO interviews, observations of routine operations, and performance testing. In addition to observing equipment during performance tests of SPOs, inspectors may also select items of equipment to be performance tested for proper operation. The particular items and the size of the sample to be tested will vary with the circumstances.

#### **Facilities**

**K.** Fixed posts should be inspected to determine whether they meet the minimum requirements for their use. Specific things to look for include:

- Adequate environmental controls and protection from the weather
- Adequate human engineering features
- Design and equipment suitable to facilitate the SPOs' performance of required duties.

Generally, all fixed posts should be examined. If there is sufficient time, posts should be selected on the basis of their importance to the facility protection strategy.

**L.** Inspectors should determine whether the fixed posts that DOE policy requires to be hardened do in fact meet the appropriate construction and materials requirements. This should be determined in coordination with the physical security systems topic team, which normally inspects this area.

## Section 5

## DUTIES

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**General Information**

All protective force members must be able to effectively and efficiently operate all equipment assigned to them for the performance of their duties. Individual and team skills must enable the protective force to protect DOE security interests from theft, sabotage, and other hostile acts that may adversely affect national security, program continuity, or the health and safety of the public. The ability to effectively perform these functions is the most important measure of the ability of the protective force to fulfill its mission and is thus, customarily, the focal point of any protective force inspection.

Inspection priorities should be established to ensure that data are collected for critical areas. These would include the duties involving protection, under routine and emergency conditions, of the highest priority targets. Specific duties that would normally always be inspected include those associated with access controls, weapons handling, tactical response, and the use of deadly force.

Although document reviews, interviews, observation, and knowledge tests are all employed in collecting data on the performance of duties, one key data collection tool is performance testing. It is only by means of performance testing that reasonable conclusions can be drawn concerning the overall ability of the protective force to meet the Duties requirements.

Document reviews are important in preparing to inspect this subtopic, but they play a small role in actual data collection during the inspection visit. Some records and log books may need to be examined to determine whether SPOs have been routinely performing various required functions.

Observation provides accurate data regarding actual performance of some routine duties, and, in some cases, may provide similar data regarding some emergency duties. Knowledge tests and interviews provide data concerning knowledge of laws, policies, and procedures. This type of data is often useful to inspectors, particularly when inspection activities do not afford the opportunity to test the actual application of this knowledge by means of performance tests.

Data collection activities should strike a balance between examination of routine and emergency duties. The ability of the protective force to respond in a tactically effective manner to a major adversarial threat may be the ultimate test of its ability, but its ability to perform routine patrols or access control is of equal importance in providing ongoing protection to DOE security interests. The selection of performance tests to be administered during a given inspection must also take into consideration the time and manpower requirements for a particular test and its impact on the overall objectives of the inspection. A large-scale tactical performance test may absorb

more resources, without necessarily yielding more relevant data, than a series of smaller-scale performance tests. If the inspection team decides that a large-scale tactical performance test should be conducted, adequate manpower resources should be made available to ensure that the conduct of routine duties is not adversely impacted. Also, allowance must be made for the greater level of planning and on-site coordination required to conduct such large scale exercises successfully.

Specific elements of protective force duties typically examined include:

- General Skills and Knowledge
  - Observation, assessment, and reporting
  - Weapons-related skills
  - Individual tactics
  - Use of individual special purpose and duty equipment
  - Driving skills (routine and stress)
  - Communications skills
  - First aid and fire protection
  - Access and egress controls
  - Alarm station operation
  - Self-defense
  - Knowledge of laws, policies, regulations, and orders
- Canine Handlers
- Aviation
- Explosive Entry Techniques
- Planning Tactical Assaults
- Sniper/Observer Teams.

Although competency levels vary throughout the complex, SPOs and SOs must have the general skills and knowledge required to effectively accomplish their duties at any particular site. Basic observation and reporting skills provide the foundation on which the remaining, more demanding skills are built. The SO must be able

to identify potential problems, details of events, or potential evidence, and provide clear and accurate reports involving these occurrences.

At facilities requiring armed protective forces, the SPOs must effectively master targeting skills and the use of firearms. Proficiency with firearms requires a detailed knowledge of their mechanical operation, component parts, maintenance requirements, and deployment. SPOs must be able to qualify, under both day and night conditions, with all firearms they may be required to use while on duty. In addition to the customary handgun, this may include individual qualification with automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons, grenade launching and shotguns. Also, SPOs may be required to be proficient in the use of the baton, explosives, or other specialized equipment.

SPOs have to be knowledgeable in the use of radios and other communications equipment. They also may have to be familiar with the use of special purpose equipment, such as aerosol irritant systems, night vision devices, protective masks, or self-contained breathing devices. In some cases, protective force personnel will be involved with aviation, canine handling, demolitions, and sniper/observer team techniques.

Access and egress control is usually one of the most important routine functions performed by protective force personnel. To effectively perform this function, SPOs must be able to operate all items of detection equipment, perform effective searches, and apply knowledge of the policies and guidelines governing access and visitor control.

At most sites, the alarm station operators are key players in the successful accomplishment of the protective force mission. These individuals must be able to effectively operate and monitor all phases of the alarm system, initiate immediate response of protective force personnel, and maintain accurate reports and records.

Critical to all protective force operations is the effectiveness of its supervision. Supervisors must

be well trained, possess good leadership skills, and be thoroughly knowledgeable of all pertinent policies, orders, and regulations. Typically, the supervisors are key in ensuring that protective force personnel maintain high morale, sustain necessary skill levels, remain informed, perform as a team, and display a professional image.

### **Common Deficiencies/Potential Concerns**

#### **Ineffective Personnel Identification Skills**

Perhaps the most commonly observed set of duty-related deficiencies involves access/egress control skills. One of the most common of these involves failure to positively identify personnel entering or exiting security areas. Unauthorized persons, or persons with improper badges, manage to gain entrance to security areas at an unacceptable rate during performance tests. This problem is most often observed at facilities that rely solely on the SPO visually examining a badge and comparing the picture and description on the badge with the person presenting the badge.

#### **Searches Not Conducted Properly**

The ability to conduct thorough entry and exit searches of vehicles, personnel, and hand-carried items is a recurring problem. Frequently, as the result of a superficial or careless search, SPOs do not find contraband items. Inadequate searching is also a common deficiency encountered during arrest procedures and suspect handling performance tests. Further, during the search of suspects, SPOs often unsafely mask the line of fire of backup SPOs.

#### **Inability To Use Post Equipment Properly**

Another often-observed problem is the inability of SPOs to properly operate all equipment available to them on various posts. While most items of equipment available on post are fairly

simple, others are more complex, and they all require some level of skill to place them in operation and use them properly. Generally, more problems are observed with activating, checking, and employing such items as night vision devices, metal detectors, and SNM detectors than with flashlights, protective masks, and communications devices.

#### **Inadequate Understanding/ Application of Deadly Force Policy**

Problems with the application of deadly force policy are still encountered. Past training methods emphasized the ability to memorize the DOE deadly force policy and did not address the ability to properly apply it in realistic circumstances. While knowledge of the policy is necessary in order to properly apply it, knowledge does not assure proper application. As a result, SPOs who could recite the policy often could not properly apply the policy (that is, make correct deadly force decisions) in scenarios representing real-world situations. Deficient skills in this area are extremely serious, because SPOs are always armed with deadly force while on duty, and misapplication of deadly force policy can have fatal consequences for the SPO, a suspect, or innocent bystanders.

#### **Lack of Knowledge of Mission-Essential Information**

A very basic problem, still encountered, involves the inability of SPOs to identify what they are protecting. For example, they may not know what special nuclear material (SNM), SNM containers, or critical weapons components look like. Consequently, they may not take the necessary measures to protect something that requires protection, or they may use deadly force to protect something that doesn't warrant that level of protection. While this deficiency is more prevalent at certain facilities, individual instances have been observed at many facilities.

### **Deficient Tactical Weapons Skills**

When using individual and auxiliary weapons, SPOs frequently fail to demonstrate proficiency in tactical weapons skills, such as proper weapon employment, fire discipline/control, clearing malfunctions, use of sights, tactical reloading, and firing while wearing a protective mask. Failure to develop and maintain sound skills in this area can seriously lessen the chances for personal survival and mission accomplishment in case of an armed encounter.

### **Deficient Tactical Communications Skills**

Other frequently observed problems involve communications skills in a tactical environment. Specific problems include an inability to deal effectively with jamming or other interference; inadequate reporting techniques and procedures; compromising friendly positions either through communicated information or loud volume settings on hand-held radios; and failure to use forms of communication other than the radio when appropriate.

### **Inadequate Tactical Skills**

A common area of deficiency involves the inability to properly use tactical techniques. This encompasses a broad range of skills, and deficiencies are not uncommon in any of the specific skill areas. Deficiencies are encountered in all positions, from basic SPOs to SRT members. Observed deficiencies include failure to employ proper or adequate techniques in tactical movement, use of cover or concealment, tactical driving, arrest and handcuffing procedures, and other personal survival measures. The potential consequences of failing to properly employ these tactical measures during an armed encounter are obvious.

### **Inability to Implement Protection Strategy**

For all applicable DOE sites and facilities, the protection strategy and threat are described in the approved SSSP. It is of primary concern that the appropriate organizations be able to successfully implement the protection strategy, and that the strategy be sufficient to fully defend against the threat. Performance tests should be used to ensure that the facility can effectively accomplish these objectives.

### **Insufficient Control of Construction Personnel**

It is often necessary for uncleared contractor and construction personnel to enter secured areas. It is important that procedures be in place to maintain positive control of these individuals to preclude unauthorized access to classified matter. Occasionally, the protective force (or other responsible organization) fails to establish effective procedures for this purpose, or fails to maintain effective control over these individuals throughout their stay.

### **Planning Activities**

Inspectors should interview POCs and review documents. Elements to cover include:

- General and special orders
- Protective force post orders and other written procedures regarding performance of duties on posts/patrols
- Response and contingency plans for security emergencies
- MOUs with law enforcement and military organizations

- Current rosters of all personnel, including managers, supervisors, staff members, and SPOs (indicate those authorized to carry firearms)
- Rosters of SRT personnel
- Protective force shift rosters showing all post assignments
- List of protective force personnel performing crucial, high risk functions
- List of protective force personnel scheduled to be on vacation or known to be on medical restriction during the period of the onsite inspection
- Description of protective force hiring and selection procedures and criteria
- Roster of SPOs who are required to wear corrective lenses
- Descriptions of approved initial qualification courses and re-qualification courses for all protective force duty firearms
- Descriptions of any live-fire stress courses used by the protective force.

Planning for the Duties subtopic presents the greatest challenge to the protective force topic team. It is important to focus the inspection and performance tests on the appropriate areas, and ensure that sufficient information is collected to allow the team to draw reasonable conclusions on the ability of the protective force to accomplish its mission. The review of past inspection report deficiencies and other pertinent documents and discussions with the Inspection Chief and with other topic teams will assist in focusing the activities of the protective force topic team.

Once focused, the performance tests selected should, to the extent possible, have some interrelationship. This will provide more data points for drawing conclusions. Responsibility

for planning and conducting the performance tests should be determined as early in the planning process as possible. It may be appropriate to place the major planning and coordination responsibilities on the inspected facility. Ideally, all performance tests selected will be fleshed out during the planning phase; however, frequently, final planning must be completed on site.

## Performance Tests

Performance tests can range from a single SPO demonstrating gas mask donning procedures, to alarm response exercises, to a full scale force-on-force exercise utilizing ESS/MILES equipment. A balanced approach will result in a mix of tests that evaluate individual and team skills, and together help provide the big picture on the ability of the protective force to accomplish “Duties.”

Inspectors have a variety of performance tests from which to choose when planning for an inspection. These tests may be broadly categorized as LSPTs, individual performance tests that lend themselves to the “round robin” type of testing, and isolated, individual performance tests. The following performance tests are commonly used in the inspection of “Duties”:

- LSPTs
  - No-notice response (alarm or duress)
  - Area or building containment (MILES)
  - Building/room clearing (MILES)
  - Demonstration control (MILES)
  - Convoy/SNM movement (MILES)
  - Bomb threat
  - Weapons handling/individual tactical skills (MILES)
  - High risk vehicle stop (MILES)
- Individual Performance Tests (Round-Robin Stations)
  - Weapons qualification course

- Live-fire stress course
- Live-fire with protective mask
- Range estimation
- Vehicle search
- Arrest procedures - suspect handling
- Observation, assessment, and reporting
- Night vision device operation
- Baton proficiency
- Don and clear protective mask

- Individual Performance Tests

- Interior patrol
- Exterior patrol
- Parcel search
- Badge checks
- Metal/SNM detectors
- Sniper/observer
- Canine handling
- Post/Patrol (observation and equipment operation)
- Tactical movement

To make the best use of available time and resources, the protective force topic team usually schedules performance tests to evaluate as many skill and knowledge requirements as possible for both protective force and SRT personnel, or to evaluate specific deficiencies or areas of concern identified during previous inspections or inspection planning. Figure 2 shows a number of performance tests by type (LSPT, round-robin, and individual) with the corresponding skill and knowledge requirements that may be evaluated when using one or more of these tests.

## Data Collection Activities

A detailed list of general skills and knowledge areas required by DOE policy appears earlier in this section. Local requirements may amend or increase this list. There are four types of data collection methods that inspectors use to gather information about performance of duties: interviews, observations, knowledge tests, and performance tests. These methods are discussed below, followed by a list of specific data collection activities.

## Interviews

Interviews provide the inspector with valuable information regarding protective personnel's understanding of policies, procedures, and responsibilities, as well as insight into attitude and morale. Interviews need not always be formal or scheduled activities; every conversation an inspector has with an SPO is essentially an interview in which data are being collected. Since interviews are an important source of information, they should be conducted with deliberation and purpose. Several things should be considered when conducting interviews.

- The sample of SPOs interviewed should be as large as time permits. The sample should include a representative cross-section of jobs (basic SPOs, supervisors, SRT, CAS operators, etc.) and encompass all shifts. A stratified sample can be taken from the protective force roster. However, a more common method is to conduct most formal interviews during post/patrol visits and whoever happens to be on post during the visit is interviewed. If this method is used, posts should be visited on all shifts, and categories of personnel who do not stand posts/patrols should not be overlooked. The sample is usually increased through ad hoc interviews conducted during performance tests, while entering/exiting posts, and during the many contacts with SPOs during the course of the inspection.
- At least for the formal, planned interviews, inspectors should know what they are going to ask and the types of information they are going to try to elicit. Since several inspectors will normally conduct interviews independently, a list of core interview questions should be used so that desired topics are covered uniformly in all interviews. This does not prevent an inspector from asking additional questions or further pursuing a line of questioning.

Examples of Performance Tests for Skills & Knowledge		Performance Tests																	
		Skills & Knowledge																	
Observation/Reporting	Individual Performance Tests	Canine Handler	✓			✓								✓					
	Round –Robin Stations	Sniper/Observer	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓	✓			✓	✓
Weapons-Related Skills	Individual Performance Tests	Metal/SNM Detection and X-Ray	✓			✓				✓				✓					
	Round –Robin Stations	Badge Check	✓							✓				✓					
Individual & Team Tactics	Individual Performance Tests	Parcel Search	✓			✓				✓				✓					
	Round –Robin Stations	Interior/Exterior Patrols	✓					✓						✓					
Special Purpose & Duty Equip.	Individual Performance Tests	Interview/Equipment Checks	✓			✓	✓	✓						✓	✓		✓		
	Round –Robin Stations	Baton		✓		✓						✓	✓	✓	✓				
Communications Skills	Individual Performance Tests	Observation, Assessment & Report	✓				✓							✓					
	Round –Robin Stations	Suspect Handling	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
Access/Egress Controls	Individual Performance Tests	Vehicle Search	✓			✓			✓					✓					
	Round –Robin Stations	Weapons Livefire Stress Course	✓	✓	✓	✓						✓	✓						
Alarm Station Operator	Individual Performance Tests	Weapons Qualifications Course (Indiv & Aux)		✓										✓	✓				
	Round –Robin Stations	Demonstration Control (MILES)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Self-Defense	Individual Performance Tests	Bomb Threat	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓					✓					✓
	Round –Robin Stations	High-Risk Vehicle Stop (MILES)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
Law/Police/Orders	Individual Performance Tests	Pop-up Target/Tac Skill Course (MILES)		✓	✓	✓								✓	✓	✓			
	Round –Robin Stations	Building Entry/Clearing (MILES)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Use of Force	Individual Performance Tests	Containment Response (MILES)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
	Round –Robin Stations	No-Notice Response (Alarm/Duress)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓			✓			✓
Suspect Handling	Individual Performance Tests																		
	Round –Robin Stations																		
Response & Containment	Individual Performance Tests																		
	Round –Robin Stations																		
Building Entry/Clearing	Individual Performance Tests																		
	Round –Robin Stations																		
Command & Control	Individual Performance Tests																		
	Round –Robin Stations																		

Figure 2. Performance Tests for Skills and Knowledge

- Interviews should be conducted in a conversational and non-threatening manner. Much of the interview is essentially an oral knowledge test, and the person being interviewed will consider every question to be a test. The interviewer should not be bound by the text of prepared questions. Questions may have to be phrased and rephrased, as necessary, to elicit the desired information. The goal is to determine the SPO's true perception or understanding of the subject matter; it will take more effort to elicit that information from some people than from others.

### Observation

Observation is a good way to see how personnel perform their routine duties. Observations may be either deliberate or ad hoc. For example, entry control procedures may be observed for 30 minutes during shift change to see whether proper procedures are followed; however, entry control procedures may also be observed every time one passes through or by an entry control point.

- The time and location of deliberate observations should be carefully planned to provide representative and sufficient data. They should be limited to instances where the activity to be observed will definitely occur. It is a waste of time for an inspector to stand around in the hope that something will happen.
- Ad hoc observations can provide valuable information. Inspectors should be alert at all times while on site and actively pursue, as appropriate, anything they observe that is pertinent to protective force duty performance.
- For best (unskewed) results, the inspector should position himself so that the subject being observed is unaware that he is being observed. In all cases, the inspector should be positioned so as not to interfere with the function being observed.

### Knowledge Testing

Knowledge testing is useful to determine whether protective personnel know and understand policies and procedures. Its use should be limited to that purpose, since it cannot reveal whether personnel can actually apply the policies or execute the procedures.

- Random sampling techniques should be used to determine who will take the test. The sample size and target population (i.e., entire force, CAS operators only, etc.) will vary with the test objectives.
- Written test questions and answers should be taken from existing protective force tests or validated by the protective force training staff before being administered.
- Inspectors should schedule, administer, and correct the tests. Confidentiality of the test questions should be closely guarded.

### Performance Testing

Performance testing is the best way to evaluate skills and determine if procedures are adequate and if protective personnel can perform the duties required of them. A list of common performance tests appears earlier in this section. Detailed information and tools applicable to performance testing are provided in Appendices A through E. Additional things to keep in mind are:

- Performance testing should be the inspector's first choice of data collection method. If a skill or duty **can** be performance tested (and most can), it **should** be performance tested.
- If the whole population or a significant portion of the population cannot be tested, use random sampling techniques to decide who to test. Make sure the sample is selected from the correct population. For example, the population for firearms testing should be all armed personnel; the population for SRT

building clearing testing should be all special response teams.

### Specific Activities

The major protective force duty areas are summarized below, with indications of the applicable and recommended data collection activities for each.

**A.** Inspectors should determine whether SPOs have adequate observation, assessment, patrolling, and reporting skills. This is best determined by performance testing. They may be evaluated by specific tests designed for this purpose. Pertinent skills can usually also be observed in most larger-scale performance tests that involve a tactical scenario and the use of adversaries.

**B.** Inspectors should determine whether armed personnel possess adequate weapons handling skills. The required skills include basic marksmanship abilities, tactical weapons handling skills and field firing techniques, and weapon safety habits. The best way to test these skills is through live fire performance testing. Tactical weapons handling, field firing techniques, and, to a lesser extent, weapons safety can also be evaluated during non-live fire, MILES-enhanced tactical performance tests.

**C.** Inspectors should determine whether SPOs possess tactical skills adequate for mission performance. These skills should be evaluated through performance testing. Most performance tests that OA-10 uses test at least some tactical skills.

**D.** Inspectors should determine whether SPOs can properly operate all equipment available for their use. The routine operation of some equipment can be evaluated by observation. Skill in operating virtually all equipment can be determined by performance testing. Some tests may be specifically limited to the operation of a particular piece of equipment. However, most performance tests afford the opportunity to

observe SPOs operating some items of equipment.

**E.** Inspectors should determine whether personnel can properly operate assigned vehicles, including appropriate equipment on the vehicles. Routine vehicle operation skills and some emergency operation skills can be evaluated by observation. Specific driving skills may be performance tested, and many tactical performance tests provide an opportunity to evaluate driving skills under emergency conditions. If facilities have armored vehicles, special off-road vehicles, watercraft, or aircraft, pertinent skills related to these vehicles should be tested.

**F.** Inspectors should determine whether SPOs possess adequate communications skills (that is, communications equipment operation and using appropriate communications procedures). Routine communications skills can be evaluated by observation, including monitoring of radio nets. Tactical and special communications skills can be evaluated by performance testing. Again, both specialized tests and many emergency/tactically-oriented performance tests provide opportunities to evaluate communications skills.

**G.** Inspectors may wish to determine whether protective personnel have the required first aid and fire protection skills, including the ability to operate appropriate equipment. These areas can be evaluated by knowledge testing (including interviews) and performance testing, with performance testing providing the most useful data.

**H.** Inspectors should determine whether protective force personnel can properly perform access control duties, including personnel identification, searches, and operation of available detection equipment. Inspectors can determine knowledge of access control procedures through interviews. Observations allow evaluation of application of routine procedures. Performance testing is necessary to determine skills in detecting and dealing with

entry attempts by unauthorized personnel, contraband items, etc.

**I.** Inspectors should determine whether alarm station operators can adequately perform their assigned duties. Pertinent data can be collected by observations, knowledge testing, and performance testing.

**J.** Inspectors should determine whether SPOs understand and are capable of applying pertinent laws, policies, regulations, and orders, including those pertaining to the use of deadly force. Knowledge can be ascertained through knowledge testing, either written or oral. Oral testing (including in interviews) is usually preferred when trying to determine an individual's understanding of a concept, because it allows more latitude to get at the depth of the person's knowledge. The ability to apply policies can be determined only through observation or performance testing.

**K.** Inspectors should determine whether supervisors have the appropriate skills and knowledge to perform their supervisory duties. Appropriate data can be collected through observation, knowledge testing, and performance testing. Inspectors can evaluate both routine supervisory skills by observation and tactical leadership skills during performance tests.

**L.** Inspectors should determine whether the appropriate personnel have the necessary skills and knowledge to perform special duties that may be required on a site-specific basis. Such special duties include dog handling, flight operations, explosive entry, and sniper operations. All data collection methods may be applicable to these areas, but observation and performance testing are most useful, with emphasis on performance testing.

## Section 6

# INTERFACES

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### Integration

Integration involves the coordination and interfaces among inspection team members to achieve a more effective and organized inspection effort. Integration is possibly the most important and productive of the inspection activities. Thorough integration creates a synergism and enhances the quality and validity of the inspection report which, when combined with other unique attributes, strengthens OA-10's overall capacity to provide significant, value-added contributions to the safeguards and security community, as well as to DOE as a whole.

In order to take into account the interdependency of elements of the overall security system, the integration process between topic teams must continue throughout all inspection phases to ensure that all pertinent inspection data has been shared. This level of integration simply involves an exchange of information among different topic teams and an accompanying discussion of how information developed by one topic team influences the adequacy of the performance observed in another topical area. Information obtained through integration with other topic teams should be included with other information considered during analysis.

The fundamental goal of the integration effort is to ensure that potential systemic vulnerabilities

are adequately performance tested and analyzed. The topic team's objectives in support of this goal contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the inspection process.

From the topic team point-of-view, there are several major objectives of integration. First, integration allows topic teams to align their efforts so their activities complement, rather than detract from, one another. It would be non-productive to inspect physical security systems at one location, control of classified documents and material at a different remote location, and the protective force at a third location; using this approach, inspectors would accumulate a collection of unrelated facts. Therefore, topic teams must cooperate to make the best choices regarding what should be inspected at which locations. Early and continuing integration ensures that the activities of all topic teams are unified and contributes to the overall goal.

A second objective of integration is to allow topic teams to benefit from the knowledge, experience, and efforts of other topic teams. Sometimes ideas from one topic team can help another topic team focus inspection activities in a more productive and meaningful direction. For example, the physical security systems topic team may indicate that their planning efforts led them to the conclusion that the physical systems at a particular location are weak, resulting in heavy reliance on the protective force. Therefore, it may

be useful for the protective force topic team to plan to spend more time assessing protective force capabilities as they relate to this weakness, rather than spending a lot of time examining other areas.

The third objective of integration is to prevent topic teams from interfering with each other. Often, several topic teams concentrate their activities at the same location, resulting in multiple visits over time or a number of visits at the same time. This may cause undue disruption of the inspected facility and its personnel. Integration among topic teams can preclude this problem by having one or two topic teams visit a particular location and collect the data for several. All topic teams should be aware of what all other topic teams are doing, where they are doing it, and how it will affect their own activities.

Integration of data collection activities for performance testing is imperative. If the protective force topic team schedules a performance test that results in the prolonged lock-down or evacuation of a building, and the material control and accountability topic team schedules a performance test involving an emergency inventory or transfer of material in the same building at the same time, the resulting problem is obvious.

### **Integration by the Protective Force Topic Team**

A protective force, by its very nature, does not function in a vacuum. It is an integral part of the overall security system at a facility, and therefore must interact with other elements of that system. For this reason, the protective force should not be inspected in isolation. Inspection activities must acknowledge and reflect this interaction to determine how well the required interfaces are accomplished. This requires integration with inspection teams responsible for other areas. Information developed by the protective force topic team may affect how the results of

inspection activities in other topics are viewed. Similarly, results in other topical areas may have some bearing on how the adequacy of protective force performance is viewed.

Figure 3 outlines the general scope of the protective force topic and the direct interfaces with other topics and subtopics.

### **Planning Phase**

Throughout the planning meeting, the protective force topic team must integrate its planned activities with various other topic teams. Interaction is most frequent with physical security systems, material control and accountability, information security, and PPM. Some level of integration with all other topic teams is usually required. As noted, such integration allows the protective force topic team to gain the benefit of the expertise of members of other topic teams, examine issues emanating from document reviews or DOE management, focus inspection activities, and select performance tests.

Once the performance tests have been selected, it is important to discuss those that may have implications for other topic teams. The topic teams may provide important supplemental information to the protective force topic team, desire to participate in the test, or modify the exercise so the information gained can be better used by both teams. A further aim of these discussions should be to coordinate exercises. Without coordination, the inspected organization may be overloaded or the test may interfere with the data collection activities of other teams. Finally, there may be some operations that will require joint evaluation by members of several topic teams. For example, igloo opening and closing and the intra-site movement of SNM usually requires the participation of both the protective force team, the physical security systems team, and the Materials Control & Accountability (MC&A) team.




Figure 3. Areas of Direct Interface for the Protective Force Topic Team

## Conduct Phase

Close integration with other topic teams is essential during data collection activities. An inspection is a complex, integrated effort, and the onsite portion of the inspection involves intensive, concurrent data collection activity by several topic teams during a limited period of time. To achieve maximum benefit from on-site data collection, close cooperation between topic teams is essential. Therefore, throughout the conduct phase of the inspection, it is important that the protective force topic team discuss findings and issues with the other teams.

The protective force topic team must be aware of all performance tests planned and conducted by the physical security systems topic team during an inspection. Such tests often result in the activation of a sensor or alarm, and the protective force team must be made aware of the possibility of an alarm so they can respond appropriately. Protective force representatives must normally monitor all systems testing to ensure that security is maintained. Occasionally, tests conducted by the physical security systems topic team directly overlap with tests conducted by the protective force topic team—an example of this is badge checks. When such tests are planned by the protective force topic team, they must complement those conducted by the physical security systems topic team and not duplicate them. Also, testing of various alarms and sensors by the physical security systems topic team provides an opportunity for protective force inspectors to observe the reaction of SPOs to normal and abnormal sensor indications.

Another example of interface between the protective force and the physical security systems topic teams might be if site representatives indicate to the systems team that a system weakness at an access portal is compensated for by posting supplementary protective force personnel at that location. In this case, the systems team may request that the protective force team determine whether the compensatory

measure is sufficient to effectively offset the weakness.

At most locations, protective force personnel are involved in access controls and physical checks of tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) on facilities or containers. In addition, some sites use protective force personnel as second persons in material surveillance programs. Moreover, the material control and accountability (MC&A) topic team will conduct performance tests, such as missing item exercises and threat message exercises, that will normally require a response from the protective force. Other tests, such as trickle diversion exercises, TID procedures and training tests, and TID tampering and verification exercises, may not require an immediate response from the protective force, but they should be coordinated with MC&A. It may be necessary to modify protective force or CAS operations during barrier integrity tests. The protective force is also responsible for implementing procedures for material containment, including controlling access at portals, conducting searches, and responding to SNM alarms. Any of these procedures could be tested by MC&A during an inspection. In addition, SPOs are often required to maintain security during MC&A tests, open secure doors and security locks, and explain protective force roles in MC&A.

The site protective force will often participate in integrated exercises with MC&A. Examples of these exercises are:

- Mock shipment of SNM
- Testing of SNM and metal detector operations
- Emergency response exercises
- Review of routine duties (observations)
- Material control exercises requiring a protective force response.

Issues raised during these exercises may necessitate changes in inspection focus, additional performance tests, or further document reviews. The bottom line is to consider the impact of every issue raised and its relevance to other topics, and to maintain a flexible approach during data collection activities.

### Closure Phase

It is imperative that issues involving several topic teams be resolved, that impacts be clearly understood, and that a preliminary decision be made as to how and by whom the issue will be reported.

### Interface with Other Subtopic Areas

Inspectors of the protective force Training subtopic must determine whether management provides adequate resources to support training. Protective force inspectors must also determine whether management is ensuring that training is

integrated with operations, so that training, especially in-service training, is needs based. If the inspector of the Training subtopic discovers evidence of inadequate support in the form of insufficient equipment or inadequate numbers of qualified training personnel, the causes for this must be investigated with protective force management.

Deficiencies in proficiency with protective force equipment are usually attributable at least in part to deficiencies in training. Deficiencies noted in the use of equipment should be followed up by an inspection of appropriate lesson plans and an inspection of the training schedule, to determine whether adequate plans exist to teach the material.

Any inadequacies in protective force performance during LSPTs will probably have their cause as well as their remedy in protective force training. Inspectors of the Training subtopic should be involved in the various components of the inspection involving duties.

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## Section 7

## ANALYZING DATA AND INTERPRETING RESULTS

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**Introduction**

This section provides guidelines to help inspectors analyze data and interpret the results of data collection activities. The guidelines provide information on the analysis process, including factors to consider while conducting an analysis. Information is also included on the significance of potential deficiencies and suggestions for additional activities that may be appropriate if deficiencies are identified in a particular area. After completing each activity, inspectors can refer to this section for assistance in analyzing data and interpreting results to determine whether additional activities are needed to gather the information necessary to accurately evaluate the system.

When analyzing the data collected on a particular aspect of the site security system, it is important to consider both the individual facets of the security system and the system as a whole. In other words, failure of a single facet of a security system does not necessarily mean the security system failed. One must analyze the failure in terms of the entire security system.

**Analysis of Results**

The analysis process involves the critical consideration by topic team members of all

inspection results, particularly identified strengths and weaknesses (deficiencies). Analysis will lead to a logical, supportable conclusion regarding how well the protective force is meeting requirements and satisfying the intent of DOE policy. If more than one subtopic has been inspected, a workable approach is to analyze each subtopic individually and integrate the results of the individual analyses to determine the effects of subtopic results on each other and the overall status of the topic.

If there are no deficiencies, the analysis is a simple matter. If there are negative findings, weaknesses, deficiencies, or requirements that are not fully met, the analysis must consider the importance and impact of those conditions. Deficiencies must be analyzed both individually and in concert with other deficiencies, and balanced against any strengths and mitigating factors to determine their overall impact on the protective force's ability to meet the required requirements. Factors that should be considered during analysis include:

- Whether the deficiency is isolated or systemic
- Whether the protective force, contractor, and/or DOE field element management

previously knew of the deficiency, and what action was taken

- The importance or significance of the requirements affected by the deficiency
- Mitigating factors, such as the effectiveness of other protection elements that could compensate for the deficiency
- The deficiency's actual or potential effect on mission performance or accomplishment
- The magnitude and significance of the actual or potential vulnerability of DOE security interests resulting from the deficiency.

The analysis must result in conclusions concerning the degree to which the protective force meets the requirements and the resulting effect on the ability of the protective force to accomplish its mission.

## Ratings

The conclusions reached through the analysis of protective force inspection results lead to the assignment of a single rating for the topic. The topic team is responsible for assigning the rating; however, approval of final ratings rests with the Inspection Chief, the Director of OA-10, and, ultimately, the Director of OA.

## Interpreting Results

### Management

Most management deficiencies have the potential to reduce the protective force's ability to accomplish its mission. Lack of adequate supervision, comprehensive planning, appropriate policies and orders, personnel resources, or an adequate training program usually indicates that management is deficient in one or more of its responsibilities. When inspectors encounter problems in these areas, they should devote additional attention to management practices to

determine the full impact on protection effectiveness.

Inadequate supervision is most often a significant deficiency, and one that can usually be traced directly to management. Indicators such as the delayed review of reports, unresponsive SPOs, lack of essential equipment, low morale, ineffective command and control during performance tests, or poor SPO appearance usually signify deficiencies in supervision. The combined effect of these deficiencies may result in the inability of the protective force to provide adequate protection for vital DOE interests. When inadequate supervision is evident, inspectors should focus on the programs designed to provide for, manage, and supervise the protective force to determine why supervision is inadequate. Inspectors may consider conducting additional interviews with managers and supervisors, reviewing management oversight procedures, examining supervisor qualifications, and reviewing hiring and compensation practices.

The lack of comprehensive plans and orders normally has an adverse effect on the fulfillment of DOE requirements, the ability of protective force personnel to accomplish their assigned duties, and the support provided by local law enforcement agencies during emergencies. Management may fail to adequately consider the threat, understate or fail to consider all site vulnerabilities, or overestimate the capabilities of their response forces in preparing their plans and orders. Inspectors should compare management plans and orders with DOE policies, local requirements, and the site protection strategy to determine whether they are appropriate and sufficiently detailed to facilitate implementation.

The failure of management to provide sufficient personnel resources is a problem at some sites. This weakness can be the result of contractual arrangements, personnel policies, compensation, or other factors. Whatever the cause, lack of sufficient personnel resources usually has a significant adverse impact on the performance capabilities of the protective force. Inspectors

should review policies and procedures governing personnel, conduct additional SPO interviews, and review contractual and payroll documents in determining the root cause of the lack of personnel resources.

### Training

Usually, the failure of protective force personnel to adequately perform assigned duties is an indication of a deficiency in training. Problems that appear to be training related may result from defects in the design of the training program itself, or a failure by management to provide adequate oversight and resources to guide and support the program. Nevertheless, a deficient training program can significantly degrade the performance capabilities of protective force supervisors and personnel alike. Inspectors should closely examine all aspects of the training program, including management's involvement in the program, to determine why training is inadequate.

Frequently, problems in the training program emanate from a failure to tailor the program around complete, accurate, site-specific job tasks. This systemic failure can have a notable adverse impact on a training program's capabilities and the abilities of individual protective force members. When it appears that training material is not in concert with site-specific conditions or individual SPO needs, inspectors should examine site documents (SSSP, local directives), training documents, and lesson plans to determine whether they are consistent with job tasks and training needs.

A tendency to persist in "business as usual" can have a significant impact on protective force training programs. Most effective training programs are innovative, up-to-date, and designed to promote continuous improvement. They normally include interested and talented instructors who focus with enthusiasm on site-

specific requirements and individual SPO training needs. Inspectors should be aware that some training programs may meet the minimum requirements (mere compliance), but they may not fully satisfy the training needs or potential of the protective force.

### Equipment and Facilities

It is important that weapons be appropriate to both the mission and the threat. Changes in mission and threat may lead to the protective force being armed with inappropriate weapons or weapons that are no longer effective against the threat. Such a development could result in a significant deficiency and could place DOE facilities, material, and interests at risk. Also, changes in the threat or mission may justify the removal of lethal weapons from protective forces. Inspectors should be thoroughly familiar with the site mission, threat, and protection strategy in order to determine whether assigned weapons are appropriate.

The absence of adequate communications equipment or an insufficient number of radio channels dedicated to security use will have a significant impact on the capabilities of the protective force. One of the most important factors in ensuring that the protective force responds in a timely, coordinated, and effective manner is the ability of its members to communicate. If deficiencies exist, inspectors should determine the full extent of the problem (for example, lack of planning, budget constraints, or inadequate replacement policies).

Poor accountability practices, incomplete inventories, insufficient replacement parts, and missing items of critical equipment are indicators of a systemic problem that most often can be traced to inadequate supervision and a lack of management attention. Inspectors should consider reviewing the relevant aspects of the management program to determine the root causes of these deficiencies.

## Duties

In the Duties subtopic, identified deficiencies often have as their root causes deficiencies in training or supervision or both. If there is a significant number of deficiencies in a specific area, it may be necessary to determine whether findings in duties, training, management, or all three are appropriate. It is important for inspectors to clearly determine the root cause to enable management to permanently resolve the issue.

The inability to properly use assigned equipment generally indicates inadequate training. Deficiencies in such skills as clearing of malfunctions and the proper use of weapon sights can usually be remedied by providing training on the use of the appropriate weapons. Also, the failure on the part of SPOs to operate certain kinds of equipment, such as radiation, metal, and intrusion detection equipment, can usually be traced to a lack of training.

Sometimes, the inability to use auxiliary weapons may be related to a lack of policy guidance by management that provides the opportunity to use and test the equipment. Without such guidance, these weapons may remain in storage without being used. Inspectors should check management policies to determine whether provisions have been made for an adequate training program and whether the program is functioning properly.

The inability to properly conduct thorough entry and exit searches of vehicles, personnel, and hand-carried items usually results from a lack of proper training or supervision. When these conditions continue to recur, they may be directly attributable to the lack of management involvement.

Failure of the protective force to accomplish its denial/containment mission is a significant deficiency and usually is the result of a lack of management oversight, ineffective supervision,

or inadequate training. Inspectors should examine all aspects of the supervisory, management, and training programs to determine the root cause of this deficiency.

The inability of the protective force to gain control of SNM after a hostile takeover may result from a lack of adequate plans, a failure on the part of supervisors, a lack of management involvement, or a failure to adequately train response personnel in all of the environments that may be encountered (e.g., smoke, gas, booby traps, etc.).

The inappropriate application of the use of deadly force is usually related to the lack of proper training. Often, the rules governing the use of force are not clearly understood by the trainers or supervisors. It is essential that this condition be corrected through training and strong management intervention.

## Consideration of Integrated Security Management Concepts

As discussed in Section 1, integrated security management is not currently a DOE policy and OA will not use the guiding principles or core functions as a basis for ratings or findings. However, the integrated security management concept provides a useful diagnostic framework for analyzing the causes of identified deficiencies.

For example, inspectors may find that a required action is not being completed. Upon further investigation, the inspectors may determine that the reason is that there has not been a clear designation of responsibility for completing the required action. This situation may indicate a weakness related to line management responsibilities. In such cases, the inspectors would cite the deficient condition (i.e., the failure to complete the required action) as the finding and reference the requirement. In the discussion and opportunities for improvement, however, the inspectors may choose to discuss the general problem with assignment of responsibilities as a contributing factor.

As part of the analysis process, OA inspectors should review the results (both positive aspects and weaknesses/findings) of the review of the protective force topic in the context of the integrated security management concept. Using this diagnostic process, inspectors may determine that a number of weaknesses at a site or particular facility may have a common contributing factor that relates to one or more of the management principles. For example, a

series of problems in protective force training could occur if line management had not placed sufficient priority on protective force training and has not provided adequate resources to implement an effective training program. In such cases, the analysis/conclusions section of the protective force report appendix could discuss the weaknesses in management systems as a contributing factor or root cause of identified deficiencies.

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## APPENDIX A

### PERFORMANCE TEST PROCEDURES

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## APPENDIX A

### PERFORMANCE TEST PROCEDURES

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Performance testing plays a significant role in the data collection activities of the protective force topic team. This appendix addresses the procedures for planning and conducting performance tests in general, without dealing with specific tests. The purpose, importance, scope, and principles of protective force performance testing are addressed, followed by a detailed discussion of the procedures and considerations involved in planning and conducting performance tests.

#### **PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING**

Performance testing has a single purpose: to determine how well a tested subject (person, team, piece of equipment, procedure, or system) functions. The results provide two significant elements of information: 1) whether the required functions were adequately performed, and 2), if not, the areas of weakness or substandard performance. In protective force performance testing, the objective is to look for evidence and identify trends that indicate whether the protective force has the ability to accomplish its mission.

#### **IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING**

Performance testing is critically important to a valid evaluation of a protective force. A protective force, including all of its elements, exists to perform its designated functions in its site-specific environment. A valid assessment of protective force capabilities cannot be made solely by reviewing documents and other information pertaining to force employment, training, procedures, equipment, and so on. Regardless of what a protective force looks like on paper, it must perform. To determine whether a protective force can perform as required, the topic team has to see it in action. Security Police Officers must demonstrate that they can perform their routine and emergency duties by actually performing those duties. Equipment reliability and suitability must be demonstrated by actual operation in a realistic environment. Some performance can be observed under actual conditions; however, chance does not allow the spontaneous observation of sufficient routine and emergency functions during the course of an inspection. Therefore, the topic team must stage performance tests to provide the opportunities to observe the protective force performing its various functions.

#### **SCOPE OF PERFORMANCE TESTING**

Performance testing of a protective force involves a wide range of activities. Activities include both no-notice and announced performance tests, involving both routine and emergency situations. Tests range from the simple, such as determining whether a weapon fires or a Security Police Officer

correctly performs entry control procedures, through moderately complex tests of individual or team tactical skills, to more complex, integrated, ESS/MILES-enhanced tests conducted in conjunction with Emergency Management or Material Control and Accountability Performance Tests. Almost any function that has to be performed by a protective force or one of its elements can be tested, including:

- Individual routine and emergency duties
- Team routine and emergency duties
- Suitability of procedures
- Functionality and suitability of equipment.

## **GUIDING GOALS**

There are several goals that are so important to valid, useful performance testing that they must be considered at every step of test planning and conduct:

- **Realism** - In order to elicit an accurate response, tests must be conducted under conditions that are as realistic as possible. It is often impossible or impractical to test under totally realistic conditions; however, a continuous effort must be made to make tests and test conditions as real as possible, and to attempt to ensure that artificialities have a neutral impact on the outcome.
- **Safety** - The safety of personnel and facilities is as important as any other aspect of a performance test. No test conducted by OA-10 is important enough to justify serious bodily injury or significant facility damage. However, there is always an element of risk in testing protective force functions, just as there is an element of risk in the protective force's everyday activities. The challenge in performance testing is to find ways to conduct realistic and meaningful tests in as safe a manner as possible without exposing participants to undue hazard.
- **Test the Right Thing** - It is important that the objective of the performance test be relevant to the assigned mission of the protective force. The objective of each performance test must be clearly understood, and each test must be conceived, planned, and conducted with the objective in mind.
- **Collect the Necessary Data** - The purpose of a test is to collect required data. If a test does not yield the needed data, the time, effort, and money that went into the test are wasted. A data collection plan must be developed, and all test planning and conduct must support data collection requirements.

## **PLANNING**

Planning is important to any performance test. No matter how simple or complex the test, the planners have to determine the who, what, when, where, why, and how before they can execute the test properly. While planning may be relatively uncomplicated and quick for simple tests, planning for more complex performance tests is the most time-consuming, detailed, and difficult part of the test

procedure. Proper planning pays off, however; if a test has been thoroughly and skillfully planned, it will generally yield the required data, and frequently will do so even if unforeseen events crop up. The planning considerations described below are comprehensive in scope, and will accommodate planning needs for the most complex performance tests the protective force topic team will undertake. For simpler performance tests, some of the planning considerations will be quickly accomplished and others may not be applicable at all.

### **The Planning Team**

The topic team may choose to plan a test, or may require the facility to plan a test in coordination with and using guidelines provided by the topic team. This appendix assumes the topic team will plan the test, but the principles remain the same in any circumstance. The planning team for each performance test is responsible for devising a test that fairly and realistically achieves the stated test objectives. The size of the planning team will vary with the complexity of the test. At a minimum, the team will include a Federal staff member (Test Director), a responsible topic team member (Test Coordinator), and the point(s) of contact who will be acting as the DOE field element and/or contractor trusted agents for the test. For most tests, a safety representative will be a part of the planning process as a trusted agent, but more often the role of the safety representative will be to provide safety approval of test plans rather than participating as an active planner. For more complex performance tests, it may be necessary to include additional trusted agents, one or more Insiders, and representatives from the Composite Adversary Team.

The topic team member (Test Coordinator) is ultimately responsible for planning the performance test. This individual works out all the planning details with the trusted agents and others to ensure that the test objective(s) will be met through a fair and realistic test. The topic team member is also responsible for completing all required planning documents.

Whenever possible, the topic team must anticipate all special resources that may be required and initiate action to obtain them. If they anticipate the use of ESS/MILES equipment, the Security Training and Evaluation Shooting System (STRESS), or other specialized equipment, they should alert the Inspection Chief. If they anticipate that a Composite Adversary Team (CAT) will be needed, they must alert the Inspection Chief and the CAT Coordinator, who will arrange for CAT members with the appropriate skills to be available.

The trusted agents work closely with the responsible inspector and represent their organization in planning the details of the performance test. They provide site-specific knowledge and expertise during the planning process. They are also responsible for arranging all personnel and logistical support to be provided by the site or operations office.

Safety representatives, designated by both OA-10 and the DOE field element, are responsible for ensuring that planned activities fall within acceptable safety limits. Their responsibilities include suggesting changes or compensatory measures that would facilitate both safety and realism. Safety representatives are treated as trusted agents for purposes of confidentiality.

Occasionally, one or more members of the adversary team may be involved in planning. Their input is solicited when necessary and appropriate, normally to assist in planning specific scenario events.

### **Determining Test Objectives**

Before serious planning can commence, the objective(s) of the test must be clearly defined and stated. This is necessary whether or not the type can meet more than one objective. For example, an Entry Control Performance Test could test the adequacy of entry control procedures, or it could test a Security Police Officer's ability to properly apply those procedures. Which is the objective of the test? The planner needs to know. Detailed planning must be aimed at satisfying clearly understood objectives. The objective may be to see whether all protective force flashlights work, or whether all rifles are properly battle-sight zeroed, or whether protective personnel can properly perform certain specific skills or adequately execute specific procedures.

### **Determining How to Test**

After determining the test objective, the planner must select a testing protocol that provides maximum achievable realism, assures adequate safety, and satisfies the test objective(s). This determination involves several components:

- **How to Test** - The type of performance test and specific testing techniques must be determined. Test objective, realism, safety, available resources, and all other applicable variables must be considered in determining an acceptable testing method. The planner has to determine what skill, duty, or function is to be tested, and then devise the best method of testing it. The best way to test is to make the subject actually demonstrate the skill, perform the duty, or operate the equipment, under conditions that are as realistic as possible.
- **Where to Test** - Test location is important, and in some cases has a significant impact on realism. Generally, the best location is the location where the event being tested would actually occur. For example, if the test is to determine the tactical skills of the protective force in protecting the vital areas of a reactor, the test should be conducted at the reactor. An acceptable alternative might be a similar reactor that is off-line or shut down. A poor alternative would be a non-reactor building or facility. If testing arrest procedures in an office building, the best choice is an on-site office building. If testing entry control procedures, the tests should be conducted at actual entry portals, preferably at a representative sample of such portals.
- **When to Test** - The timing of the test also affects realism. When testing night firing skills, it's best to test at night. When testing day shift personnel on felony vehicle stop procedures, it's best to test in daylight. When testing entry control procedures, it's best to conduct the bulk of the tests during normal working hours, including shift change, when most entries and exits occur. When testing an event that would normally take place at a crowded facility, the test should take place when the facility is crowded, not after hours when it is deserted except for protection personnel.
- **How Many Tests to Conduct** - The number of iterations of a particular performance test will depend on the nature of the test and the available resources. Detailed planning requires an early determination of the number of tests to be conducted; this is especially true of complex tests and tests involving large numbers of personnel or use of scarce facilities.

## **Scenario Development**

Once preliminary decisions such as test objectives, location, and time have been made, planning of specific scenario events can begin. The scenario consists of those events that create the situation that will test the subject. The complexity of the scenario is directly related to the complexity of the test. When testing to see whether flashlights work, the scenario would be to switch on the selected flashlights and see whether they illuminate. For a Personnel Identification (Badge Check) Performance Test, the scenario events would be somewhat more complex, involving, at each test location, different types of false, stolen, or improper badges, different subjects trying to enter with the badges, and different methods of approach and dialogue for each subject. A Containment Performance Test would require even more complex scenario events, involving adversary pre-positioning, provision of an alarm sequence to the alarm station operator, specific defensive and offensive actions to be taken by the adversaries, and numerous other events designed to create realism and provide opportunities for the protective force to demonstrate its skills and capabilities.

Scenario development requires the planner to devise and think through a logical series of events that will elicit realistic responses and accomplish the test objective. As scenarios become more complex, particularly those involving adversaries and tactical procedures, there will be a wide range of scenario event options. It is important to judiciously choose among the options to select events that are realistic, within the appropriate threat guidance, and logical (in the sense of the flow of scenario events), and that also serve to fully satisfy the test objective. It is helpful to keep scenario events as simple and straightforward as possible unless there is a specific requirement to include intricate or complicated events.

## **Simulation**

There is some amount of simulation or artificiality in most performance tests. To preserve realism, it is best to keep simulation at a minimum. Performance tests involving live adversaries usually require the greatest amount of simulation, generally because of safety or test control requirements. When determining what must be simulated and how it will be simulated, a primary consideration should be to simulate reality as closely as possible. The following are some typical simulations encountered in protective force performance tests:

- **Response Times** - To keep protective force players within the test area, it is frequently necessary to place players who would normally respond from outside the test area into a holding area, and release them into test play according to a predetermined schedule. The best way to determine the release schedule is to conduct a no-notice response test and record the actual response time for each responder.
- **ESS/MILES Casualty Assessment** - Except in tests using a safety controlled live fire range, and in all tests involving live adversaries, live fire is prohibited. Therefore casualty assessments must be simulated by means of ESS/MILES equipment or some other method. Additional simulations may be required to account for body armor and the destruction of various types of vehicles.
- **Explosives** - Typically, inert dummy explosives and related equipment are carried, and are placed and set as actual explosives would be. A controller is required to verify that the

explosives are properly set, at which time he simulates the effects of the explosives, which may include throwing a grenade simulator, opening a door or gate, and assessing casualties.

- **Initial Player Positioning** - At times, adversaries are pre-positioned in the test area. For example, in Containment Performance Tests it is usual to place the adversaries inside the target building before the test. If this approach is taken, the protective force players must be briefed on the simulated events (through alarm chain, eyewitness observations, etc.) by which the adversaries entered the building. Similarly, protective force players are sometimes pre-positioned in their response positions or in a holding area for scheduled release.
- **Personnel and Time Limits** - At most sites, over a period of time, more and more protective personnel and local law enforcement personnel would be able to respond to a security incident. For test purposes it may be desirable to limit protective force players to a manageable yet realistic number; for example, those personnel in a target area and those who could respond to the area within 15 minutes. When this is done, it is reasonable to also limit the running time of the test, so that the protective force players do not have to continue long after they would have realistically received more resources.
- **Target Material** - If SNM or other sensitive devices are involved in scenario play, it is usually simulated using other materials or devices of similar size, weight, and configuration.
- **Location** - If the actual facility or building cannot be used, the test must be conducted at an alternative location. The layout and attributes of the test facility should be as similar as possible to the actual facility.
- **Controller Presence/Actions** - The mere presence of controllers is artificial, but necessary. At times, controllers must simulate scenario events, such as alarms, explosive effects, and breaching of barriers; or they may have to intervene to enforce safety rules or rules of conduct. Generally, controllers should intervene in test play only when necessary, and otherwise avoid interfering with test play.

### **Control Measures**

Conducting an orderly and safe test requires the planning and enforcement of various control measures. Some control measures are restrictive, so it is important to strike a balance between the need for realism and the need to control the test. Without being overly burdensome, sufficient control measures should be planned to ensure that the scenario can be executed properly and realistically, the test can be conducted safely, and the necessary degree of control can be exerted by the Test Coordinator during the entire test. Control measures generally apply to both sides, and the desired condition is that the cumulative effect of all control measures be neutral. The following are some typical control measures:

- **Boundaries** - Boundaries establish the limits of the test area. Players are not allowed to leave the test area, and armed protective personnel are not allowed to enter the test area except under controlled conditions.

- **Off-Limits Areas** - At times, certain areas (rooms, buildings, rooftops, and excavations) within the test area boundaries must be placed off limits, usually for safety or operational reasons. Radiation areas, construction areas, and rooms where armed protective personnel are sequestered are typically placed off limits. These areas are off limits to players on both sides, and frequently off limits to controllers and other non-player participants also. Locations of Off-Limits areas must be fully explained, and they must be locked, marked, or otherwise physically identified to all participants. The number of Off-Limits areas should be kept to a minimum. As agreed to by safety and operational trusted agents, it is sometimes sufficient to caution participants about the hazards in an area rather than place the area off limits.
- **Rules of Conduct** - This is a set of rules by which players on both sides must abide during tests involving live adversaries. While there is a fairly standard set of rules of conduct, they may be amended as conditions require for each test.
- **Safety Rules** - This is a set of safety-related rules by which all test participants must abide. There is a fairly comprehensive set of standard safety rules. These rules are normally modified to accommodate the scope and nature of the specific performance test and site-specific safety requirements.
- **Controller Actions** - Controllers are responsible for enforcing the rules of conduct and the safety rules. They may also have specific preplanned or spontaneous responsibilities, such as opening doors, passing messages to alarm station operators, releasing responders from a holding area, or assessing casualties. In larger tests, controllers are the Test Coordinator's eyes and ears, and assist him in carrying out the test plan in a safe, fair manner.
- **Communications** - In any test where not all participants are at the same restricted location, reliable communication is essential. The Test Coordinator must be able to communicate directly with all controllers, and either directly or indirectly with all players. Suitable methods of coordinating with the shadow force or summoning an ambulance must be established if necessary.
- **Test Initiation and Termination** - Conditions for starting and stopping the test must be established. Generally a test is started when all participants are in place and all safety and other requirements are satisfied. Conditions and procedures for temporarily stopping the test must be established, if necessary. Temporary delays should be avoided if possible, but are occasionally caused by safety or security incidents, or shift changes. Conditions for terminating the test are usually based on completion of the test scenario or reaching a predetermined time limit, but may also include the occurrence of a major safety or security event at the site, whether or not it involves test participants.

## **Logistics**

Some logistical planning is necessary for even the simplest performance test; complex tests may require extensive and detailed logistical planning. While the trusted agents are responsible for accomplishing most of the logistical tasks, it is up to the responsible topic team member to ensure that all logistical needs have been identified and that the trusted agents deliver the required support. The following are some typical logistical planning considerations:

- Personnel - The total number and attributes of participants must be determined. This includes the number of protective force personnel or other facility personnel and who they will be (that is, which individuals, shift, and Special Response Team). It also includes the number of adversaries that will be needed and any special qualifications they require. The required number of controllers and evaluators must be determined and their sources decided. Each controller and evaluator must be assigned a position and specific test responsibilities. All participants must be notified of their selection and told when and where to report and what to bring with them. It may be necessary to provide a general notification to all personnel working in the vicinity of the test area.
- Facilities - All facilities necessary for test preparation and conduct must be identified and scheduled. These would include the test area, briefing rooms, weapon and equipment issue and recovery areas, and possibly adversary training areas.
- Equipment - All equipment that is to be used in the test must be identified, the source of each item must be identified, and responsibility must be assigned for providing each item. Normal equipment categories are as follows:
  - Props - Various props are needed for testing purposes. A prop could be almost anything, including false or real badges, simulated explosives, rubber knives, replica weapons, briefcases, furniture, or safes.
  - Weapons/MILES/Ammunition - Total numbers and types of weapons, ESS/MILES equipment, and ammunition (live/blank) must be determined. Protective force weapons and ammunition are generally limited to what they actually have available. Adversary weapons and ammunition are limited only by the threat guidance, what can reasonably be made available to them, and what they can transport. Any pyrotechnics to be used by controllers must also be identified.
  - Duty Equipment - The protective force is limited to their normal duty equipment. The adversaries are unlimited, within reason. Controllers will need radios, ESS/MILES controller guns, and perhaps flashlights and other items.
  - Vehicles - Types and numbers of test vehicles (vehicles that will be used by players or will be in the scenario play) must be determined. Additionally, any vehicles needed for test control purposes must be identified.
  - Uniforms and Clothing - The protective force players usually wear their normal uniforms. Adversary uniforms or clothing will depend on the scenario. Controllers/evaluators/ observers will be issued some form of distinctive apparel, such as a traffic vest, cap, etc. Weather conditions should be taken into account, and cold weather or rain gear should be available if needed.
  - Special Equipment - Special equipment to be used by the protective force players should be identified, and should be limited to such equipment as they normally have available to them. Special adversary equipment needs must generally be identified early, so that it can be located and obtained before it is needed.

- Transportation - As necessary, arrangements must be made to transport all test participants to briefing areas, the test area, and the site of their specific assignment. Return transportation needs must also be identified and provided.
- Food/Drink - If the test involves outdoor activity in extreme weather conditions, either hot or cold, plans should be made to provide hot or cold drinks at appropriate places and times. Depending on the time and duration of the test, it may be appropriate to provide box meals to all test participants.

## **Safety**

Safety must be considered during all planning activities. Safety considerations will vary with the type of test activity, but may include general personal safety, weapons safety, vehicle safety, aircraft safety, and availability of medical, fire, and ambulance services.

Every performance test that has any safety implications, including most protective force performance tests, requires approval by the OA-10 and DOE field element safety representatives. The safety representatives will normally not agree to a test plan until it is complete and they have a clear picture of what is planned. However, the safety representatives should be involved early and throughout the planning process so that potential safety problems can be solved in a timely manner without causing delay or cancellation of the test.

Standard safety plans exist for various types of performance tests, but the standard plans are frequently modified to accommodate the particular test and the site specific conditions and requirements. An example of a standard safety plans is provided in Appendix D.

## **Security**

During any performance testing of protective force personnel or equipment, the security of the site must be considered. When personnel or equipment are taken off post or out of service for testing, or when personnel on post are carrying ESS/MILES weapons instead of live weapons, compensatory measures are frequently needed to provide for the minimum security needs of the facility. Any test, even a simple one involving only one or two Security Police Officers on post, may require compensatory measures if the test has the potential to divert the attention of on duty personnel from their normal responsibilities.

For most performance testing, test subjects are either brought in from off duty for testing, or they are relieved from their posts during the testing period; in these situations, other on-duty personnel provide the needed security. For some tests, such as no-notice tests at entry control portals, any needed compensatory measures would have to be more subtle, to avoid compromising the test element of surprise. For larger scale tactical tests where all normal security posts in the test area are manned by players equipped with ESS/MILES weapons, the common compensatory measure is to place armed shadow force personnel in strategic locations in or adjacent to the test area. Shadow force locations must be Off-Limits areas, and all shadow force personnel must be under the positive control of a controller at all times.

The need for compensatory measures should be determined by the local operations office. Whether they are employed is a decision to be made by the trusted agent or his/her superiors. The Test Coordinator does, however, have an obligation to raise the question if he believes compensatory measures may be required. If compensatory measures are required, the Test Coordinator has a definite interest in what they are and should be involved in their planning. As with any other planning consideration, the goal for these measures is to affect test realism and safety as little as possible. In this case, however, the final decision rests with the site, and the Test Coordinator must rely on persuasion, if necessary, to influence a reasonable solution.

### **Evaluation**

Evaluation of protective force performance tests are based on the requirements contained in various DOE policies. It is the topic team member's responsibility to identify the appropriate order citations that apply to a particular performance test. When necessary, he should also develop and provide an Evaluator Worksheet or Data Collection Form to assist evaluators. Examples of Evaluator Worksheets are provided in Appendix E.

The responsible topic team member must make appropriate plans to debrief all evaluators, consolidate and reconcile their evaluations, and produce a statement of the results of the performance test.

### **Schedule of Events**

A schedule of events helps tie test plans together and helps ensure that a time and place has been allotted for every required major test activity to be conducted on the day of the test. Items on the schedule should include all preparatory briefings or classes, equipment issues, test windows, debriefings, and equipment turn-in. The schedule of events is included in the test plan when appropriate.

### **Briefings**

Except for protective force personnel being tested on a no-notice basis, all participants usually receive some kind of briefing regarding the test and their parts in it. At a minimum, for even the simplest test, the controller(s) and evaluator(s) must be briefed on the scenario and their responsibilities. For many tests, three separate briefings are conducted: a protective force player briefing, an adversary player briefing, and a controller/evaluator/observer briefing. Each briefing should be prepared by the responsible topic team member and should be tailored to the specific audience.

Protective force players are briefed on the objective and scope of the test, how they will be evaluated, simulations and control measures they need to be aware of, allowable weapons and equipment, the schedule of events, the safety plan, and the rules of conduct. They are not provided information about the adversary or about scenario events of which they would not be aware in an actual emergency situation.

Adversary players are briefed on the test objective, their mission, simulations and control measures, the safety plan, the rules of conduct, the schedule of events, the scenario, and any other information they need to know.

Controllers/evaluators/observers sit in on the protective force player briefing, and are then separately briefed on their specific instructions and responsibilities, as well as more complete scenario details.

### **Planning Documents**

The essential results of the planning activities described above are formally recorded on planning documents that are then approved and become official guidance for the conduct of the performance test. Depending on the size and complexity of the test, the planning documents will be prepared in one of two forms. For small-scale or simple tests, a standard form OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan may be used. For larger or more complex performance tests, a customized Performance Test Plan must be written.

### **OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan**

This document is a printed, formatted form that is completed by checking appropriate boxes, filling in blanks, and writing short sentences or paragraphs. It consists of two parts: the basic plan and a Protective Force Appendix. For protective force performance tests, both parts must generally be completed. This form is designed to be completed quickly and easily. Any necessary information not called for on the form may be added by attaching additional pages. This form is suitable for many of the performance tests conducted by the protective force topic team. An example of the OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan form with Protective Force Appendix is provided in Appendix D.

### **Performance Test Plan**

Large-scale and complex performance tests require a formal plan that provides more detailed information than is included on the safety plan form. The Performance Test Plan normally consists of a basic plan and several appendices. An annotated outline of the basic plan and descriptions or examples of several appendices are provided in Appendix C. The provided format may be modified as necessary. The essential requirement is that all necessary information be included in the plan.

### **Approvals**

Before a performance test can be conducted, the plan must be approved by the appropriate persons. Generally, signatures required on a plan include those of:

- Inspection Chief
- Test Director
- Safety Representative
- DOE field element trusted agent

- DOE field element safety representative
- Contractor trusted agent.

### **Coordination**

A final word on planning involves the absolute need for coordination. As noted above, planning for some performance tests involves working out many details concerning facilities, personnel from various organizations, large quantities of equipment from various sources, and so forth. It is essential that the topic team test planner monitor the progress of those items assigned to the trusted agents, coordinate those items assigned to OA-10 and its support contractors, and coordinate as necessary with other topic teams.

A Performance Test Planning Checklist is provided in Figure A-1 to assist in ensuring that all critical areas have been addressed. This checklist is designed for a complex performance test; for simpler tests many of the entries will not be applicable.

### **CONDUCT**

Although planning is the most difficult and time consuming part of many performance tests, test conduct is no less important. If the test plan is not properly carried out, the planning effort and all other resources spent on the test will have been wasted to some degree. The conduct of a test merely involves the execution of the performance test plan. If the plan is detailed and thorough, the test should run smoothly from a control standpoint, and there should be built-in capabilities to deal with most unexpected events. However, there are still a number of tasks for the Test Coordinator to accomplish during test conduct, as outlined below. Figure A-2 provides a Performance Test Conduct Checklist that may be used to ensure that necessary pre-initiation and post-test actions are accomplished.

### **Briefings**

The conduct phase of a performance test begins with the first briefing. The content of the various briefings was outlined above, and will vary with the type of test. The briefings are the Test Coordinator's best, and often only opportunity to ensure that all test participants receive all necessary information and instructions. It is also his opportunity to start the test on a positive and professional footing. The Test Coordinator should ensure that all essential information, especially safety-related information, is understood by all personnel before a briefing is adjourned.

### **Final Coordination**

Final coordination of all aspects of test preparation should be made before the test window is scheduled to open. This includes ensuring that all necessary participants are present, facility preparations are complete, and all logistical requirements have been met.

- \_\_\_\_\_ Clearly define test objective
- \_\_\_\_\_ Appoint appropriate Trusted Agent(s)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Determine test method
- \_\_\_\_\_ Determine number of tests to be conducted
- \_\_\_\_\_ Determine test location
- \_\_\_\_\_ Determine test time(s)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Develop realistic scenario to support test objective
- \_\_\_\_\_ Identify and plan required simulations
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Time and event lines
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Response times and Holding Area
  - \_\_\_\_\_ ESS/MILES casualty assessment
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Explosives
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Initial positioning of players (both sides)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Personnel limits
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Time limits
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Target material
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Other:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Other:

**Figure A-1. Performance Test Planning Checklist**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Identify and plan necessary control measures
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Boundaries
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Off-Limits areas
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Rules of Conduct
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Special Controller actions
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Communications requirements for test control
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Formulate test initiation conditions
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Formulate test termination conditions
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all performance/safety plans have appropriate approval signatures
- \_\_\_\_\_ Identify logistical requirements, assign responsibility for each (as required)
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Adversary numbers and attributes
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Protective force players numbers and attributes
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Determine Controller/Evaluator positions
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Identify, assign, and notify Controllers/Evaluators
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Facility requirements
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Test Area
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Briefing rooms
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Other:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Equipment requirements
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Weapons/Ammunition/Pyrotechnics/ESS/MILES
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Props
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Personal and team duty equipment

**Figure A-1. (Continued)**

**Pre-Initiation**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Conduct adversary briefing
- \_\_\_\_\_ Conduct protective force player briefing
- \_\_\_\_\_ Conduct Controller/Evaluator/Observer briefing
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure equipment/weapons and ammunition issue and checks are completed
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all logistical requirements have been met
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all required safety checks have been completed
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all players are in place and ready
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all Controllers are in place and ready
- \_\_\_\_\_ Conduct communications checks
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure outside support agencies (fire, ambulance, etc.) are notified and ready, as appropriate
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure required performance test announcements are made on radio nets, public address systems, as appropriate

**Post-Test**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure normal security posture restored
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all participants have transportation to debriefing
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure all personnel are accounted for
- \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure weapons and ammunition checks are completed
- \_\_\_\_\_ Conduct debriefing

**Figure A-2. Performance Test Conduct Checklist**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Collect Evaluator Worksheets, Critique Sheets, Controller Comments, as applicable
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Food/Drink for participants
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Other:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Other:
- \_\_\_\_\_ Identify and address all safety concerns
- \_\_\_\_\_ Identify and address all security concerns; plan appropriate compensatory measures
- \_\_\_\_\_ Develop Evaluator Worksheets/Data Collections Forms
- \_\_\_\_\_ Write required performance test documents.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan w/Protective Force Appendix
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Performance Test Plan
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Schedule of Events
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Individual Controller Instructions
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Maps
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Rules of Conduct
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Safety Plan
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Scenario
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Briefing Notes
- \_\_\_\_\_ Test Plan Approved

**Figure A-2. (Continued)**

**Test Initiation**

The Test Coordinator should start the performance test only when everything is ready. He should poll every controller to determine that all participants are in place, ready, and have completed all required safety checks. He should check communications to ensure that he can communicate with all necessary personnel. If necessary, he should ensure that shadow force personnel are properly sequestered and adequately controlled, that fire and ambulance service is available, etc. When all essential personnel are in place and all conditions for test initiation are met, he should commence the test. When appropriate, a site-wide announcement should be made that a performance test is in progress.

**Control**

Once the test begins, the Test Coordinator must monitor test events to ensure that:

- All preplanned scenario events are executed as planned.
- Controllers are provided necessary supervision and advice.
- Timely decisions are made to resolve any test-related problems that may arise.
- Planned scenario events are adjusted as necessary.
- The test is conducted in a safe manner.
- Timely decisions are made in response to non-test related safety or security events.
- The test is terminated when the appropriate conditions are met.
- When appropriate, a sitewide announcement is made that the test has been terminated.

**Debriefing**

When test play is terminated, a debriefing should be conducted immediately by the Test Coordinator. For some tests, the debriefing may involve only controllers and evaluators. For larger, tactical tests, all players, controllers, and evaluators should attend. During the debriefing, players from both sides, as well as controllers/evaluators, review test events. The purpose of the debriefing is to ensure that all relevant information regarding test events is revealed and understood. The debriefing is quite important and is necessary to develop a clear understanding of test events, because in many tests each participant is able to actually observe only a small part of the test activity. It is particularly important to evaluators, who must be able to place their own observations into the context of overall test events.

If desired, additional written comments can be solicited from participants. Figure A-3, Controller/Evaluator Comment Sheet, and Figure A-4, Participant Critique Sheet, may be used for this purpose.



**Participant Critique Sheet**

POSITION: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIFIC DUTIES (if applicable): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

1. IMPRESSIONS OF PERFORMANCE TEST (Realism, Problems with Test Constraints, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND RESOLUTIONS (As applicable to the role you were playing. Examples: radio failure, weapons malfunction, coordination problems, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Figure A-4. Participant Critique Sheet**



## APPENDIX B

### PERFORMANCE TEST DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTARY

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## APPENDIX B

### PERFORMANCE TEST DESCRIPTIONS AND COMMENTARY

#### INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains generic performance test descriptions for a representative selection of the most commonly performed Duties performance tests. When performance tests are conducted for other subtopic areas, they are usually adaptations of the Duties performance tests. The results of Duties performance tests are always analyzed for their implications in other areas, and factored in accordingly.

The generic performance test descriptions follow the standard outline format employed by OA-10 for protective force inspections. The level of detail included in each outline is the level customarily required. Each individual outline is followed by a brief commentary, which incorporates planning and conduct considerations not addressed in the outline descriptions.

The individual performance test descriptions are grouped according to the standard subheadings used in various policy documents that describe protective force duties. Some subheadings will contain no generic descriptions. These represent areas where performance tests are not commonly administered or where the subject matter to be tested is ancillary to that of other areas. In these instances, the commentary discusses the alternative methods of data collection employed.

#### GENERAL SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE

##### Observation, Assessment, and Reporting

The two standard performance tests in this area are the Exterior and the Interior Patrol and Observation Tests described below. Many different variations can be developed from these tests to provide data on observation, assessment, and reporting skills. Many other performance tests (chiefly those discussed under the headings of Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control) also contribute useful data in relation to these criteria.

- Exterior Patrol and Observation Test
  - Objective: To test the awareness and capacity for observation of mobile exterior patrols and fixed post personnel.
  - Scenario: An item of equipment, such as a ladder, is placed adjacent to the perimeter fence, in a location that can be observed by fixed post personnel or roving patrols. The item will be clearly located within the designated clear zone. A label will be affixed to the item, identifying it as a performance test item and instructing the finder to complete all necessary notifications, clearly indicating that these notifications are in response to an exercise situation.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Do patrol personnel maintain proper patrol routes and observe irregularities within their patrol areas?
  - 2) Do fixed post personnel properly observe irregularities within their assigned areas of observation?
  - 3) Do these personnel take proper action and make appropriate notifications when irregularities or violations are observed?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

### ***Commentary***

This test is relatively simple to organize and administer. The primary difficulty encountered is the placement of the test object in the clear zone without being detected by non-protective force personnel (which invalidates the test). This difficulty is compounded by the need to run multiple iterations of this test, at different locations and on different shifts, in order to create a representative sample. The most effective procedure for overcoming the first difficulty has been to run these tests at the end of the day shift, when the attention of non-security personnel is focused on other matters, and to have the site point of contact arrange for the item to actually be placed by site construction or maintenance personnel, whose coming and going near the perimeter area tend to arouse less notice.

This test may be easily adapted to fit a variety of locations other than a protected area perimeter. It also can provide useful information on equipment (for example, effectiveness of perimeter lighting or the capability of night vision devices) and facilities (fields of observation from fixed posts).

- Interior Patrol and Observation Test

- Objective: To test the awareness and capacity for observation of interior foot patrols.
- Scenario: (Option 1) Protective force personnel are required to make checks of repositories and other classified storage areas on a regular basis. They are expected to check the vicinity of these areas for classified matter that has not been properly secured. A simulated classified document (consisting of classified cover sheets enclosing a sheet identifying the item as a performance test object) is placed in an area scheduled for a patrol check. When discovered, the item is to be reported using specified notification procedures. (Option 2) Protective force patrols are required to regularly inspect production facilities and related operational areas for evidence of sabotage or other malevolent threats. A fake bomb or other simulated instrument of sabotage is placed along a scheduled patrol route. When discovered, the item is to be reported using specified notification procedures.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Do patrol personnel maintain proper patrol routes and observe irregularities within their patrol areas?
  - 2) Do these personnel assess the situation properly and make appropriate notifications?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

***Commentary***

This test is a variant of the Exterior Patrol and Observation Test described above. Again, the major consideration in conducting the test is to place the test items in appropriate locations without being observed during the process. Further considerations include the placement of simulated classified documents (Option 1) in locations that are reasonably visible. Protective force patrols are required, for example, to check desk tops and similar surfaces in office areas where classified safes are located, but they are not expected to search through these offices, look under items of office equipment, or sift through stacks of paper. Similarly, in Option 2, protective force patrols are not expected to recognize every conceivable object in a work area, but only to note items that are either clearly out of place or that represent an obvious threat. The test item should be 1) placed in a location where the Security Police Officer has a reasonable chance of observing it (that is, not hidden behind a stack of equipment), 2) identifiably a threat item, such as a simulated bomb, and 3) clearly labeled as a performance test item. Under both options, agreement should be reached with the site point of contact before initiating the test that the items placed and the locations used combine to constitute a fair test. This will prevent potential validation problems later.

**Weapons-Related Skills**

Numerous performance tests can be performed in this area; most of them, however, are variations on a single theme, which is summarized in the Firearms Proficiency Test outline included below. Many of the criteria in this area relate to such skills as weapons handling and target identification, which can be tested without the use of live fire. Many of the Individual and Team Tactics performance tests can provide data relating to these criteria.

- Firearms Proficiency Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the ability of the protective force to meet DOE-established firearms proficiency standards.
  - Scenario: A representative sample of Security Police Officers is selected to fire the DOE-approved course for the handgun (rifle, shotgun). Shooters will be under the direction of site firearms instructors. The courses of fire will consist of the DOE-approved day and night handgun (rifle, shotgun) courses.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Is the range operated in accordance with accepted safety procedures?
  - 2) Does the instructor manage the qualification course in an appropriate and effective manner?
  - 3) Are shooters capable of passing the qualification course?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test. The performance test will be conducted in accordance with all site-approved range safety procedures.

### **Commentary**

This basic outline is adaptable to virtually all live-fire limited scope performance tests. The outline appears very simple, almost cursory, but it fully expresses the most important underlying premises for these performance tests. First, inspectors, no matter how qualified, do not supervise shooters. Supervision is provided by the site's qualified firearms instructors, who are most familiar with the facilities and whose terminology is that with which the shooters are most familiar. Second, the course of fire is one for which the shooters have been trained. Acting upon these premises should eliminate any controversy about safety (at least so long as the site itself is currently operating a safe firearms training program — if inspectors have any doubt about this, no firearms testing should be performed).

This approach also permits the performance test to serve data collection needs in the Training area, as well as the area of Weapons-Related Skills under Duties. If shooters cannot meet the site's own approved standard, then there is reasonable evidence of a training problem.

The outline can also be adapted to courses of fire other than qualification-type courses. It can, for example, also be used in the case of live fire "stress" courses or other specialized courses of fire. Since these courses are not standardized at most DOE facilities, course development and detailed safety plans must be developed in conjunction with site firearms instructors and safety personnel. As in all live fire activities, safety is the highest priority.

### **Individual and Team Tactics**

The performance tests discussed in this section are Duress Response, Alarm Response, Containment Operations, Denial Operations, and Building Entry/Clearing. These performance tests can be performed on a very limited scale. They may be elaborated or combined to create large scale exercises testing a broad range of protective force capabilities (with appropriate planning and coordination). Limited scale Duress Response and Alarm Response tests are frequently run as "no-notice" tests. Tests involving an adversary element must be ESS/MILES-enhanced and are subject to the standard ESS/MILES safety plans and rules of engagement. Taken together, they represent an extremely useful and flexible set of tests, which can yield worthwhile data in this area and in many other Duties areas.

- Duress Response Test
  - Objective: To determine whether the central alarm station (CAS) operator is able to perform required response functions and whether the protective force can conduct an effective response, using sound individual and team tactics.
  - Scenario: The inspection team initiates a no-notice duress test by having an on-duty SPO activate his duress instrument because he feels faint and is about to pass out. Receipt of the duress alarm, reporting, and dispatch of protective forces will be monitored at the CAS. Actions of the responding forces will be evaluated at the scene.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    - 1) Is the CAS being properly monitored?
    - 2) Is dispatch of security patrols prompt?
    - 3) Are protective force communications effective?
    - 4) Are proper individual and team tactics demonstrated?
  - Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

***Commentary***

Properly conducted, even a small scale, limited resource Duress Response test can yield data on a wide range of areas such as Command and Control, Alarm Station Operation, Individual Tactics, Team Tactics, Communications, and Observation, Assessment, and Reporting. The use of an on-duty Security Police Officer obviates the need for additional role players, yet gives responders something concrete to assess (for example, do they observe the SPO slumped at his post, do they attempt to raise him on the radio, what conclusions do they draw?). Depending on response procedures at the site and additional scenario inputs, the test can also drive a broader range of tactical actions.

It is vital to stress that both the initial duress alarm and all subsequent communications be accompanied by appropriate notification that these are exercise-related activities. It is also necessary to ensure that appropriate response exercise safety procedures be carefully reviewed for each oncoming shift during the period in which test exercises are to be conducted.

- Alarm Response Performance Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the ability of the protective force to respond to an alarm in a safe, effective manner.
  - Scenario: An alarm will be activated by a trusted agent. When the alarm annunciates at the CAS, the CAS operator will be advised by a controller that a test is taking place (alternatively, the controller at the CAS may simply give the alarm announcement to the

CAS operator as a scenario input). The CAS operator will initiate alarm procedures (with an accompanying notification that this is a drill). The protective force will then respond in accordance with established procedures.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Is the alarm received by the CAS?
  - 2) Is the alarm processed in a timely manner?
  - 3) Do protective force personnel use proper individual and team tactics?
  - 4) Are the numbers of responding personnel adequate?
  - 5) Is the alarm adequately assessed before being reported as cleared?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

#### ***Commentary***

Regardless of how the alarm is initiated, there are few significant differences between the Duress Response and Alarm Response performance tests. In small-scale, no-notice versions, there will be no role player (which is a positive safety factor). In larger scale, ESS/MILES-enhanced tests, Composite Adversary Team (CAT) role players may be used.

Other considerations are noted in the Commentary section under Duress Response, above.

- Containment Operations Performance Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the ability of the protective force to effectively contain an adversary or adversaries.
  - Scenario: The initiating event for this test is an Alarm Response Test employing actual adversary personnel. Responding elements are directed by their commanders to containment positions. Adversaries may attempt to evade containment.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    - 1) Is command and control of all tactical elements effectively exercised?
    - 2) Is containment planning effective?
    - 3) Do responding elements demonstrate sound individual and team tactics?
    - 4) Do responding elements demonstrate good communications procedure?
    - 5) Is containment effectively established and maintained?
  - Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

***Commentary***

This performance test is run as a follow-on to an Alarm Response performance test. It requires the use of an adversary element, and thus should be conducted as an ESS/MILES-enhanced exercise.

It should be noted that although the Containment performance test is a useful means of gathering data on individual tactics, it also directly addresses specific containment operations, command and control, communications, and team tactics standards and criteria.

- Denial Operations Performance Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the ability of the protective force to effectively prevent adversary elements from achieving tactical penetrations sufficient to place DOE security interests at risk.
  - Scenario: An individual adversary or adversaries, starting from a position outside the protected area (or from such other starting location as is suitable for test purposes), attempt to penetrate to a target location. This location should be one which is designated in site security plans as requiring a denial approach for protection. After detection and assessment of the threat, protective force elements will respond and attempt to deny the adversary access to the target location.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    - 1) Are command and control of all elements effectively exercised?
    - 2) Is the denial plan effective?
    - 3) Do responding elements demonstrate sound individual and team tactics?
    - 4) Do responding elements demonstrate good communications procedure?
    - 5) Are adversary elements effectively denied access to the target location?
  - Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

***Commentary***

The comments appropriate to this performance test parallel those made for the Containment Operations Performance Test, above.

- Building Entry/Clearing Performance Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of the Special Response Team (SRT) in planning and executing a building entry and clearing operation.
  - Scenario: In a simulated containment situation, the SRT is required to plan and execute a building entry and clearance mission against a simulated adversary force.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Are command and control effective?
  - 2) Are planning and coordination effective?
  - 3) Are individual and team tactics sound?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

### **Commentary**

When this is conducted as a stand-alone performance test, adversary elements are pre-positioned within the designated building and protective force personnel begin from established containment positions around the building. When conducted as part of a sequence of Alarm Response/Containment/Building Clearing tests, the action may be allowed to flow in a less structured manner (although adversary elements must eventually barricade themselves in the target location to drive the scenario to the Building Entry stage). Building Entry/Clearing tests should be performed with active adversaries and ESS/MILES enhancement. This test yields data for a wide variety of areas other than Individual Tactics.

### **Use of Individual Special Purpose and Duty Equipment**

Typical performance tests in this area simply require that protective force personnel demonstrate the required skill in operating the specified items of equipment. Much performance testing in this area can be achieved indirectly from exercises in the Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control areas. (Examples would include the employment of night vision devices in tactical exercises or the use of metal detectors during search tests.) More systematic evaluation of the ability of protective force personnel to use this equipment is usually conducted as part of post visits, with the individual Security Police Officer being interviewed concerning his knowledge of the use of the equipment and being observed demonstrating his understanding of the equipment.

### **Driving Skills**

Routine driving skills are observed during visits to roving vehicle posts. Emergency driving skills are evaluated by observation during the course of tactical exercises. Document review may also be employed to check emergency vehicle operator certification training records.

### **Communications Skills**

Communications skills are evaluated by observation during post visits. Further data in this area are generated during tactical exercises.

### **First Aid and Fire Protection**

Document review is employed to evaluate training and certification in these particular areas. Protective force personnel may also be interviewed concerning their knowledge in this area and may be asked to demonstrate specific first aid techniques. Formal performance tests, however, are generally not employed for data collection in this area.

### **Access and Egress Controls**

Performance tests conducted in this area include Identification of Personnel (Badge Check), Entry/Exit Search of Hand-Carried Parcels, and Vehicle Search performance tests. These performance tests are usually supplemented with post visits to access control points, observation of personnel carrying out these tasks, and interviews with these personnel.

- Identification of Personnel Procedures Tests
  - Objective: To evaluate the SPO's adherence to specified badge check procedures and ability to prevent misuse of badges to evade access and egress controls.
  - Scenario: Two badged employees are directed to exchange valid badges before entering the security area. Alternatively, fake badges containing a variety of errors are employed in attempts to enter the security area. The inspection team will observe the SPO's performance at this control point before, during, and after these attempts. Such attempts will be repeated using various personnel at other access control points and on other shifts to form a representative evaluation.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    - 1) Does the SPO understand and apply the identification of personnel procedures?
    - 2) Can the identification of personnel process be defeated by misuse of the badging system, permitting access of unauthorized personnel to critical areas?

### ***Commentary***

Although these are among the simplest of performance tests to conduct, there are difficulties that must be overcome. First, inspectors and Composite Adversary Team members become well known faces at access control points. For this reason, the most suitable role-players for these tests are regular facility employees. Care must be taken in selecting these personnel, however, to ensure that their identities are not also well known to the SPO on post. The site point of contact should employ a suitable number and variety of these personnel to permit a significant range of performance tests.

A second consideration is that the inspector and the point of contact must be near the test location to observe the test. Their presence tends to raise the alertness level of post personnel, which can invalidate the test. Inspection personnel must therefore attempt to maintain a low profile while observing these tests.

- Entry/Exit Search of Hand-Carried Parcels Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the SPO's ability to conduct an effective search of hand-carried parcels while processing pedestrian access.
  - Scenario: The inspection team places items of contraband, simulated classified information, and metal objects configured to represent SNM or instruments of sabotage in briefcases, lunch pails, and other hand-carried containers. These will be carried by badged employees attempting to enter or exit appropriate security areas. The inspection team will observe the parcel search actions of the SPO during this attempt.
  - Evaluation Criteria:
    - 1) Does the SPO understand the procedures governing search of hand-carried parcels?
    - 2) Does the SPO make proper use of available search equipment (X-ray or metal detectors) as specified in post orders?
    - 3) Is the SPO capable of conducting an effective search of a hand-carried parcel?
    - 4) Does the SPO understand the correct actions to be taken and notification to be made when discovering:
      - a) contraband
      - b) classified information
      - c) SNM
      - d) weapons or explosives?
  - Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

### ***Commentary***

Most of the considerations discussed under Identification of Personnel performance tests also apply to the personnel search tests. In addition, great care must be exercised to ensure that when the simulated prohibited item used might represent an immediate threat to the protective force personnel on post (e.g., a weapon or explosive device), that the test itself is halted as soon as the item is detected. Once the Security Police Officer has been informed that a test has taken place, he or she may be allowed to continue with the notification portions of the test.

- Vehicle Search Performance Test
  - Objective: To determine the Security Police Officer's understanding of search procedures and his or her ability to apply these procedures effectively.

- Scenario: An item of contraband is placed in a vehicle subject to search at an access control point. The inspection team will observe the actions of the SPO in conducting the search to determine whether correct procedures are followed and the item is discovered.
- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Does the SPO understand which vehicles are to be searched?
  - 2) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a proper search?
  - 3) Does the SPO understand the proper procedures to be followed when a prohibited item is discovered?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this exercise.

There are two specialized variants of this plan, for use in particular vehicle search conditions. The first focuses on the discovery of explosives. The second concerns attempts to conceal SNM on an exiting vehicle.

- Vehicle Search Performance Test (explosives)

- Objective: To determine the SPO's understanding of search procedures and of procedures to be followed when explosives are discovered, and to determine the SPO's ability to take appropriate and effective action based on these procedures.
- Scenario: An immediately recognizable simulated explosive device is hidden in a vehicle subject to 100 percent search or random search. The SPO will search the vehicle in accordance with prescribed procedures. If the device is discovered during the search, the SPO will be given the opportunity to make the appropriate notifications. The inspection team will observe the actions of the SPO conducting the search, other SPOs on the scene, the CAS operator, and the Site Security Commander. If the device is not discovered during the search, the test will be halted and the device pointed out to the SPO on the scene; then the response and notification portions of the drill will be completed as described above.
- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a proper vehicle search?
  - 2) Does the SPO understand the appropriate actions to be taken and notification to be made when explosives are discovered?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

- Vehicle Search Performance Test (SNM theft)

- Objective: To determine the SPO's understanding of vehicle search orders, regulations, and procedures and the ability to apply this understanding to prevent theft of SNM.
- Scenario: A metal object or container, configured and labeled to represent shielded SNM, is placed in a contractor vehicle (i.e., a vehicle subject to 100 percent search upon leaving the protected area). The driver will present the vehicle for search at an appropriate portal. The inspection team will observe the actions of the SPO at the portal during this event.
- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Does the SPO understand when vehicles are to be inspected/searched?
  - 2) Does the SPO understand how to conduct a detailed and thorough inspection and search of a vehicle?
  - 3) Does the SPO understand the appropriate actions and notifications to be made when SNM is discovered?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test.

### ***Commentary***

Most of the considerations concerning selection of role-players to drive the vehicles are the same as those discussed in relation to the Identification of Personnel performance tests. Similar care must be exercised in the selection of vehicles that are both 1) subject to 100-percent search, and 2) not likely to arouse suspicion simply by virtue of their appearance.

The explosives variant of this test recognizes that procedures at many sites call for the SPO to immediately report the discovery of a prohibited item to a supervisor; this task is done by radio at many vehicle search locations. Procedures, however, also call for radio silence in the presence of explosive devices, and the immediate evacuation of the immediate area. This variant is designed to test not only the SPO's ability to conduct a search, but also his ability to think clearly when the search uncovers a serious threat.

The SNM theft variant recognizes that special circumstances may apply at SNM portals. It also emphasizes the importance of selecting test objects that present a fair test to the SPO (since SNM shielding could come in many innocent-looking shapes and sizes).

## **Alarm Station Operator**

Performance testing of alarm station operators generally is carried out in conjunction with Alarm Response and other tactical performance tests. These tests are supplemented by post visits, observation, interviews, and document reviews.

## **Self-Defense**

Because of the possibility of injury in conducting performance tests in this area, data are also collected by having a random sample of personnel demonstrate competence in this area in a training environment (using mats and other safety equipment), with the site self-defense instructor serving as a sparring partner. This latter approach may also provide useful data with respect to self-defense portions of the Training subtopic.

- Use of Force, Apprehension, and Search Performance Test
  - Objective: To evaluate the ability of SPOs to apply DOE policy on the use of force in realistic site-specific scenarios; additionally, to evaluate the application of self-defense, subject control, and arrest techniques.
  - Scenario: A representative sample of SPOs is selected for this test. These personnel will receive a detailed briefing, which will stress adherence to safety procedures and the limitations governing the application of physical force during these tests; in particular, the briefing will stress the special safety prohibitions that will govern scenarios in which the baton might be drawn. A non-firing exercise handgun will be substituted for the SPO's service weapon during the performance test.

SPOs will encounter a variety of situations in an office building requiring them to take action and apply some degree of force, up to and possibly including deadly force, to resolve the situation. The scenarios may include an altercation between employees, theft of classified documents, burglary, intoxicated or psychologically disturbed employee, and/or suicidal employee. The scenarios will be played by Composite Adversary Team members. SPOs will be required to demonstrate a range of self-defense, subject control, and arrest techniques. They may also be required to draw their baton or a non-firing exercise handgun, substituted for their service weapon.

- Evaluation Criteria:
  - 1) Does the SPO apply only the amount of force necessary and in compliance with DOE policy to resolve the situation while protecting his or her life and the life of others?
  - 2) Does the SPO identify and preserve items of evidence?
  - 3) Does the SPO demonstrate proper techniques for approaching, handling, and controlling hostile and non-hostile subjects?

- 4) Does the SPO use proper self-defense techniques?
  - 5) Does the SPO use proper arrest and search techniques?
- Safety Plan: A Safety Plan will be completed for this performance test. This plan will incorporate special controls upon the application of physical force in contact situations.

### ***Commentary***

This test may be repeated with variations to test many different responses. The variations are introduced by having role players respond in different ways during the scenarios. Great care must be given in coaching the role players to perform in ways that will elicit the desired responses. Great care must also be taken to ensure that role players do not offer levels of resistance that could lead to uncontrolled grappling, with its attendant risk of injury; therefore, role players will become passive during actual physical contact, allowing themselves to be controlled and handcuffed. This "passive role" must be written into the test plan and safety plan, and role players must be fully briefed on the limitations on level of resistance. This issue must also be addressed thoroughly in briefing protective force participants prior to initiating the scenarios. Again, it should be emphasized that the focus of these drills is on the selection of the right techniques and levels of force. Tests of the SPO's actual ability to fully apply restraint techniques must be conducted only in an appropriate training environment, with proper safety equipment and a qualified sparring partner (typically, the site's own self-defense instructor).

In addition to providing data in this area, these exercises provide useful information on such areas as Individual and Team Tactics, and Observation, Assessment, and Reporting. This latter area can be served by having each participating SPO complete a protective force standard incident report at the scenario site. A comparison of this report with the actual events observed by controllers during the scenario yields data concerning the SPO's ability in this area.

### **Supervisory Skills**

This area is evaluated using document review, interviews, and observation. Supervisory skills are also demonstrated during many of the performance tests described under Individual and Team Tactics and Access and Egress Control.

### **Knowledge of Laws, Policies, Regulations, and Orders**

This area is generally evaluated by observation during performance testing in other areas and during post visits. Interviews and written knowledge tests are also employed

## **CANINE HANDLERS**

Evaluation of canine handling is generally performed by having the handler and his dog demonstrate their capabilities to an inspector. With appropriate safety precautions, canine team performance can also be tested in conjunction with other performance tests such as Building Entry/Clearing and Vehicle Search.

## **AVIATION**

Aviation operations are tested in conjunction with System Performance tests and large-scale tactical LSPTs requiring the employment of aviation assets. Further evaluation is conducted by reviewing certification records and other documents of aviation personnel and by interviewing these personnel.

## **EXPLOSIVE ENTRY TECHNIQUES**

The tactical context of these techniques is generally simulated as part of other tactical exercises. Further evaluation is conducted by interviewing protective force explosives technicians and tactical personnel.

## **PLANNING TACTICAL ASSAULTS**

This area is evaluated as part of the various tactical exercises described above, supplemented by observation and interviews with shift supervisors and tactical team leaders.

## **SNIPER/OBSERVER TEAMS**

Tactical criteria in this area are evaluated by observing the participation of these teams in tactical exercises. Marksmanship capabilities of these teams will be evaluated in an appropriate range environment, under the guidelines described above for firearms proficiency testing.

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## APPENDIX C

### PERFORMANCE TEST PLAN ANNOTATED OUTLINE

**Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations**

**Performance Test Plan**

**(Name of Inspected Site)**

**(Date of Plan or Performance Test)**

**Objective**

This section should briefly state the objectives of the performance test. The statement would include why the test is being conducted, who is being tested, and what is being evaluated.

**Description**

This section should consist of a brief summary of how the performance test will be conducted. It should include where the test will be conducted, the type of test, whether or not the test will be ESS/MILES-enhanced, whether or not it will involve multiple stages or phases, and a broad statement of the scenario. It should not reveal specific scenario information, but should refer to the appropriate appendix for descriptions of the general and specific scenarios.

**Scope**

This section should outline the scope of the performance test. It should indicate the numbers and types of protective personnel being tested, as well as any other personnel who may be involved as players. Also included would be reference to Composite Adversary Team participation. Any limitations on normal protective force resources should be indicated, as should any time limits imposed on the duration of the test. The number of iterations of the test should be stated and should indicate whether different protective personnel will participate in each iteration.

**Evaluation**

This section should state how the performance test will be evaluated. It should include generally who the evaluators will be and the methods of data collection (for example, direct observation). It should describe the areas, functions, or duties that will be evaluated, and refer to the appropriate appendix containing the Evaluator's Worksheet or Data Collection Form. This section should also state how the performance test results will be factored into ratings.

### **Responsibilities**

This section should identify the major performance test responsibilities assigned to OA-10, the inspected DOE field element and contractor, the players, and the Controllers. It should, in broad terms, outline planning, logistical, control, safety, and security responsibilities, as applicable.

### **Engagement Simulation**

This section should provide all necessary details about the various simulations which will be involved in the performance test. Addressed, as appropriate, would be such items as:

- Time and event lines
- Holding area and release times
- Casualty assessment methods, rules, and procedures
- ESS/MILES-related procedures (reset, body armor, and vehicle kills)
- Explosives and pyrotechnics
- Initial positioning of players
- Simulated target material
- Rules of conduct.

### **Test Boundaries/Off-Limits Areas**

This section should provide a narrative description of the test area and a listing of all Off-Limits areas. If applicable, it should refer to the appropriate appendix containing maps depicting the test area and Off-Limits areas.

### **Equipment**

This section should describe equipment to be used during the performance test. Equipment needs for three categories of participants must be addressed: protective force players, adversaries, and Controllers. It should address such items as:

- Weapons, including ammunition types and allowances, for both real and test (blank, ESS/MILES)
- Uniforms, including special clothing

- Communications, including radio channels, call signs, and performance test caveats; and other communication methods
- Vehicles, including performance test vehicles and control vehicles
- Other equipment
- ESS/MILES, including source and rules for use
- Equipment accountability, including issue and retrieval procedures.

### **Personnel Assignments**

This section should assign Coordinator, Controller, and Evaluator positions by name. Assignments normally include identification of types of radios and special equipment to be carried by each individual named.

### **Observers**

This section explains in detail how performance test observers will be accommodated. It identifies the designated observer areas and specifies any restrictions placed on observers.

### **Safety**

This section normally just refers to the appendix containing the Safety Plan. However, any additional safety-related information can be included in this section.

### **Response to Actual Emergencies**

This section should explain the conditions under which an actual emergency or an actual safeguards and security event would interfere with performance test conduct, and explain the procedures to be implemented if such an event occurs.

### **Performance Test Initiation and Termination**

This section explains when and how the performance test will be initiated and the conditions under which it will be initiated. It also explains similar issues for performance test termination.

### **Schedule of Events**

This section provides a schedule of significant conduct events, starting with the first briefing (or equipment issue, whichever comes first) and ending with equipment turn-in or debriefing (whichever comes last).

### **Approvals**

This section contains the titles and signatures of all persons required to approve the plan.

## **Appendices**

The Performance Test Plan includes the following appendices:

- Appendix A: Scenario
- Appendix B: Evaluator Worksheet
- Appendix C: Controller Instructions
- Appendix D: Maps
- Appendix E: Rules of Conduct
- Appendix F: Safety Plan

### **Appendix A - Scenario**

This appendix provides a narrative of the general scenario description, as well as specific significant scenario events that are planned.

### **Appendix B - Evaluator Worksheet**

This appendix consists of a copy of the appropriate Evaluator Worksheet or Data Collection Form.

### **Appendix C - Controller Instructions**

This appendix consists of specific instructions for individual Controllers. These instructions contain only special instructions unique to a specific Controller position, and do not include general instructions applicable to all Controllers. For example, if a Controller has special casualty assessment responsibilities, is required to open a door under certain circumstances, or is required to provide specific information to a player under certain conditions, etc., details of his responsibilities will appear here. Not all Controllers will receive special instructions.

## **Appendix D - Maps**

This appendix consists of maps detailing the test area and Off-Limits areas.

### **Appendix E - Rules of Conduct**

(The following are typical rules of conduct. This list may be expanded or otherwise altered to accommodate the specific needs of the performance test being planned.)

1. All players (both site personnel and OA-10 personnel) will follow all instructions given by Controllers.
2. All players (both site personnel and OA-10 personnel) should avoid unnecessarily damaging property.
3. If it is necessary to halt problem play, an announcement will be made over all radio nets, and a signal will be given by means of continuously sounding vehicle horns. If problem play is temporarily halted, all players will stop where they are, and immediately cease fire, movement, communication, and all other problem play.
4. Once "killed," a player must immediately cease fire, movement, communication, and all other problem play activities. The player must turn off his weapon transmitter, silence his harness, and remain in place until the test is terminated. If feasible from a safety standpoint, all "killed" players should lie down on the ground.
5. If a vehicle is "destroyed" by a LAW hit (green light), all occupants are out of action. They will not dismount the vehicle, fire their weapons, make radio calls, or communicate in any way with other players.
6. If a vehicle is "destroyed" by small arms fire (red light), passengers are out of action if their ESS/MILES detector harnesses are activated.
7. Players may remove weapons, radios, and ammunition from fallen players. No other articles may be removed.
8. Players violating or deliberately attempting to circumvent these rules or gain an unfair advantage by using unrealistic tactics, such as hiding behind cardboard, covering laser detectors, or removing headbands, will be taken out of action by a Controller. Persons endangering themselves or others by ignoring safety rules will likewise be taken out of play.

## **Appendix F - Safety Plan**

This appendix is the Safety Plan written for the performance test. It may consist of a completed OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan, with Protective Force Appendix. When this form is used, appropriate reference to the Performance Test Plan and its appendices should be made on the form to avoid duplication in the documents.

In some cases, the OA-10 form may not be considered appropriate, and a custom safety plan will be written. At a minimum, the Safety Plan must address the following:

- Specific safety requirements for
  - weapons and munitions, including ESS/MILES
  - personnel, including health physics considerations
  - vehicles, including water and aircraft
  - simulated targets and equipment (e.g., SNM, explosives, communications jammers)
- Safety responsibilities of
  - players
  - team leaders/supervisors
  - controllers
  - observers
- Safety support available, such as medical, fire, and ambulance, and who will provide it and how it will be summoned if needed.

Generally, all applicable items in the OA-10 form mentioned above, plus any test- or site-specific safety requirements, should be included.

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## APPENDIX D

OA-10 PERFORMANCE TEST SAFETY PLAN WITH  
PROTECTIVE FORCE APPENDIX

## APPENDIX D

### PERFORMANCE TEST SAFETY PLAN WITH PROTECTIVE FORCE APPENDIX

---

Type of Performance Test

---

Performance Test Date and Time

---

Safety Plan Name and Person Preparing

Scenario

(Provide a **step-by-step** description of **how** the performance test will be conducted. **Include initiating and terminating events. Be specific.**)

Protective Force (PF) Response

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If no-notice PF response is desired, check those measures being taken to ensure safety during the response.

\_\_\_ Drill announcements will be made on all PF nets immediately after PF response is initiated and periodically thereafter.

\_\_\_ OA-10 Controller located in PF central alarm station (CAS).

\_\_\_ The PF is instructed that an exercise will take place and they are to follow the safety and health requirements contained in this plan and the site procedures. **This instruction will be provided by site representatives briefing the PF prior to the shift during which the performance test will take place.**

\_\_\_ Controllers are located at the exercise location.

If PF response is not desired, check those measures being taken to preclude response.

\_\_\_ Prior notification of CAS

\_\_\_ Prior notification of PF

\_\_\_ Presence of non-playing PF personnel briefed on the scenario (\_\_\_ Officer or \_\_\_ SPO) at the performance test location

\_\_\_ OA-10 Controller located in Central Alarm Station (CAS)

List other specific safety measures below.

Performance Test Boundaries

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

If applicable, describe the performance test boundaries and the restrictions on performance test participant movements in detail below.

Off-Limits Areas

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

If applicable, describe off-limits areas and how they will be designated below.

Safety Equipment

\_\_\_ controller radios

\_\_\_ PF radios

\_\_\_ orange vests

\_\_\_ "glow sticks"

\_\_\_ first aid kit

\_\_\_ flashlights

list other required safety equipment below.

Specific Safety Hazards Not Covered Elsewhere

applicable

not applicable

If applicable, list below and include mitigating actions taken.

Radiation Safety Provisions

applicable

not applicable

If yes, check those applicable to this performance test:

Personnel participating in the performance test have been briefed concerning radiation safety requirements for the area in which the performance test will be conducted.

OA-10 personnel will be continuously escorted while in the radiation areas in which the performance test will be conducted.

List below any other specific radiation safety provisions for the performance test.

Personnel Assignments (List Below)

Protective Force Appendix Required?

yes

no

Operations Office/Area Office Safety Review

List pertinent safety procedures concerning this Performance Test not addressed in this plan.

---

(Name of Operations/Area Office or Contractor)

---

Trusted Agent and/or Site Point of Contact Date

---

LLEA Representative (if applicable) Date

---

Operations Office/Area Office Safety Representative Date

OA-10 Review and Approval

---

OA-10 Safety Representative

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OA-10 Topic Lead

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OA-10 Inspection Chief

Performance Test Safety Plan

Protective Force Appendix

(Some of the items in this appendix are also contained in the OA-10 Performance Test Safety Plan. This duplication is necessary so that this appendix may also serve as comprehensive briefing notes for certain protective force performance tests.)

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Type of Performance Test

LLEA Response

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If LLEA response is desired, check those measures being taken to ensure safety during the response.

\_\_\_ LLEA is notified that their response is part of a drill no later than immediately after response is initiated.

If LLEA response is not desired, check those measures being taken to preclude response.

\_\_\_ LLEA headquarters is notified that an exercise which will not require their response is taking place.

\_\_\_ LLEA units in the field are notified that an exercise which will not require their response is taking place.

List below all LLEA agencies in the immediate area of the facility that could potentially become involved.

Have they all received the appropriate notifications?

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

List below other specific safety measures related to LLEA.

Participant Holding Area for the Performance Test

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

If applicable, describe measures being taken to ensure that participants do not come into contact with personnel with live weapons and ammunition while waiting to participate (e.g., Controller).

ESS/MILES Safety Provisions

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If yes, check those applicable to this performance test.

\_\_\_ No live-fire weapons or ammunition of any type will be allowed within the exercise area except when under the direct supervision of a Controller, or secured so as to be inaccessible to exercise participants.

\_\_\_ All 5.56-mm and/or 7.62-mm magazines shall have live round excluders installed.

\_\_\_ Shotgun barrels shall be equipped with live round excluders.

\_\_\_ M-60 machine gun barrels and feed plates shall have live round excluders installed.

\_\_\_ LAWs shall not be fired until an area 30 feet behind and 5 feet to each side of the weapon is clear.

- \_\_\_ Performance test participants shall be cautious of hot propellant gases vented from the side of revolvers when fired.
- \_\_\_ Performance test participants shall not point a weapons toward another person's eyes within 10 feet of that person.
- \_\_\_ All automatic and semi-automatic ESS/MILES-equipped weapons used in the performance test shall be equipped with blank fire adapters.
- \_\_\_ To avoid the explosive simulators in the ESS/MILES systems, exercise participants shall not come into close proximity to the ESS/MILES systems on exercise vehicles.
- \_\_\_ The only blank ammunition permitted for revolvers are red-colored plastic "primer only" blanks.

List any other performance test-specific ESS/MILES safety provisions below.

**Safety Provisions for Live-Fire Weapons Carried During Response Exercises**

- \_\_\_ applicable
- \_\_\_ not applicable

If yes, check below those items applicable to this performance test.

- \_\_\_ During PF response exercises with live-fire weapons, handguns will not be unholstered, round will not be chambered in any weapon, magazines will not be inserted into any weapon (unless normally carried with a magazine inserted), and no weapon will be pointed at any person.
- \_\_\_ Immediately following any performance test in which live-fire weapons of any type are carried by responding SPOs, a protective force supervisor will personally inspect all weapons to ensure that a round of ammunition was not inadvertently chambered.

List below any other test-specific, live-fire weapons safety provisions.

Shadow Force Safety Provisions

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

If yes, check below those items applicable to this performance test.

\_\_\_ Controllers stationed in all Shadow Force holding areas and areas within the performance test boundaries containing live weapons or ammunition accessible to exercise participants.

\_\_\_ Shadow Force Controllers chosen from PF management or supervisory personnel.

\_\_\_ Member of PF management, designated as Shadow Force Coordinator.

\_\_\_ The Shadow Force Coordinator, all Controllers, the Shadow Force, and all performance test participants (PF and adversaries) have been fully briefed on the following procedures for release of the Shadow Force to respond to an actual or suspected security emergency.

- 1) The Shadow Force Coordinator will notify the OA-10 Exercise Coordinator of the situation and determine whether or not it is part of the exercise scenario.
- 2) If the OA-10 Exercise Coordinator verified that the situation is not part of the exercise scenario, the OA-10 Exercise Coordinator will ensure that all exercise participants are aware that the Shadow Force is leaving the holding area(s) and either temporarily or permanently cease exercise-related activities.
- 3) Only after Items 1 and 2 have been accomplished will the Shadow Force Coordinator direct the Shadow Force Controllers to release the Shadow Force from the holding area(s).

List below any other test-specific Shadow Force safety provisions.

Personnel Safety Provisions

applicable

not applicable

If yes, check those applicable to this performance test.

All designated hazardous areas will be avoided by exercise participants.

No gas, smoke, explosive simulators, or other types of burning or exploding munitions will be used by exercise participants.

Each participant must monitor his/her own physical condition for signs of overexertion.

Any participant who observes another person injured or otherwise in need of assistance will immediately cease exercise activities and render aid.

All injuries, no matter how slight, must be immediately reported to the nearest Controller.

Individual exercise participants are personally responsible for the safe use of their weapon.

Individual participants are personally responsible for inspecting blank ammunition issued to them to ensure that no live ammunition is present.

The only physical contact allowed between participants is when an SPO is placing a suspect under arrest. Physical contact during an arrest is limited to search and handcuffing. No violent physical contact will be allowed. If Controllers observe violent or potentially violent physical contact, they will immediately order participants to "freeze." Any order from a Controller to "freeze" must be obeyed immediately and without question.

No physical contact will be permitted between SPOs and other persons participating in the performance test.

Approach to or contact with a "dead" player is allowable only to obtain a weapon, radio, or ammunition.

No attempt will be made to disarm a live player by grabbing their weapon.

All ascents or descents from elevated positions will be by ladder, stairway, or other safe method. Jumping from elevated positions will be avoided, but if necessary, will be done safely.

\_\_\_ All visitors, observers, and Controllers must remain in their designated positions throughout the exercise.

\_\_\_ Performance test participants are not permitted to have knives on their person inside the performance test boundaries.

Will explosive simulators be used by controllers during the performance test?

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If yes:

\_\_\_ Controllers or players designated to use explosive simulators have been instructed in their safe use.

Will environmental conditions (extreme heat, cold, ice/snow) affect the safety of performance test participants?

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If yes, describe the mitigating provisions below.

Will OA-10 personnel operate or handle any equipment other than radios and weapons?

\_\_\_ yes

\_\_\_ no

If yes:

\_\_\_ OA-10 personnel are familiar with the hazards of the equipment involved and the required safety measures.

List below any other test-specific personnel safety provisions.

Vehicle Safety Provisions

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

If yes, check those applicable to this performance test.

\_\_\_ No vehicle will be driven in such a manner that posted speed limits are exceeded or safe driving rules are violated.

\_\_\_ Only those vehicles involved in the performance test will be used for cover and movement.

\_\_\_ Vehicles may not be mounted or dismounted until they come to a full stop.

\_\_\_ There will be no attempt to use a vehicle to crash, block, or in any way endanger another vehicle. Roadblocks will be simulated by placing the blocking vehicle(s) on the shoulder of the road and notifying a Controller that a roadblock has been established. If the blocking vehicle(s) present could effectively obstruct the roadway, the Controller will not allow the vehicle being blocked to pass.

\_\_\_ All accelerations, deceleration, cruising, turns, etc. will be accomplished in a safe manner and in accordance with professional driving practices.

\_\_\_ All personnel in moving vehicles will wear seat belts at all times. Personnel in the open back of moving vehicles will wear "monkey straps" of a sufficient length to preclude falling from the vehicle.

List below any other test-specific vehicle safety provisions.

Live-Fire Provisions

\_\_\_ applicable

\_\_\_ not applicable

Note: OA-10 conducts live-fire performance tests using either the inspected facility's standard courses of fire or OA-10-developed courses of fire. If the inspected facility's courses of fire are used, the facility's range safety procedures are used, and copies of the courses of fire and

the range safety procedures must be attached to this plan. If OA-10-developed courses of fire are used, range safety procedures specific to the courses of fire must be developed and

integrated with the facility's standard range safety procedures. A detailed description of the OA-10-developed courses of fire, the course of fire-specific range safety procedures, and the facility's standard range safety procedures must be attached to this plan.

- Inspected facility's standard courses of fire
- OA-10-developed courses of fire
- Courses of fire and range safety procedures attached

**Participant and Controller Safety Briefings**

- applicable
- not applicable

If yes, provide briefing schedule below:

- Controller Briefing
- Participant Briefing
- Performance Test Initiation.

Briefing Location:

**Safety Responsibilities (check those that apply to this performance test)**

**OA-10**

- The OA-10 Exercise Coordinator is the senior safety officer for the performance test. He/She will signal the beginning and end of the performance test, and will supervise all other controllers.
- Conduct performance test-specific safety briefings.

Site

- \_\_\_ Conduct site-specific safety briefings for the performance test.
- \_\_\_ Conduct safety survey of performance test area and clearly mark hazardous and off-limits areas.
- \_\_\_ Provide emergency medical services and fire protection.
- \_\_\_ Notify facility personnel in the area of the performance test.
- \_\_\_ The site representative at the performance test location will ensure that SPOs do not use physical force against exercise participants or threaten them with weapons.
- \_\_\_ Ensure that the PF does not respond to this performance test.
- \_\_\_ In the case of no-notice response performance tests, site representatives will ensure that the PF is instructed that revolvers will not be unholstered, rounds will not be chambered in shotguns, magazines will not be inserted in M-16 rifles, and no weapon will be pointed at any person during the performance test. In addition, safe driving practices (if applicable) and common sense safety precautions will be observed.
- \_\_\_ Site Controllers are responsible for safely redirecting PF response during an actual or suspected security emergency, subject to the procedures contained in the SHADOW FORCE SAFETY PROVISIONS section of this plan, if applicable.

Specific Controller Safety Responsibilities

- \_\_\_ All Controllers are designated as assistant performance test safety officers. Any Controller who observes any unsafe act or condition will immediately perform corrective action or halt the performance test until the unsafe act or condition is corrected.
- \_\_\_ Conduct safety checks of their area and of the performance test participants to whom they are assigned, and report the results to the Exercise Coordinator prior to the beginning of the performance test.
- \_\_\_ Ensure that all personnel to whom they are assigned comply with the provisions of this safety plan and with common sense safety precautions.
- \_\_\_ Halt the performance test any time that an uncorrectable safety hazard becomes evident.
- \_\_\_ The controller in the CAS shall ensure that CAS radio communications during the PF response are preceded with the announcement, "This is a drill."

Specific Safety Responsibilities for Protective Force Supervisors and Adversary Team Leaders

- \_\_\_ Personally inspect all weapons, magazines, and ammunition assigned to members of their team for compliance with this plan.
- \_\_\_ Report the results of these inspections to a Controller.
- \_\_\_ Ensure that all personnel under their control comply with the requirements of this plan and with common sense safety practices.
- \_\_\_ Preclude, either by personal intervention or by reporting to a Controller, any unsafe act that occurs during the exercise.

Specific Safety Responsibilities for Individuals

- \_\_\_ All players will inspect and load their own ammunition after it has been approved by a safety officer.
- \_\_\_ Each player is personally and individually responsible for the safe use of his/her weapon.
- \_\_\_ Each player is personally and individually responsible for monitoring his/her own physical condition.
- \_\_\_ Each vehicle driver is personally and individually responsible for the exercise of appropriate caution in driving and for following the safe driving rules contained in this plan.

List below any other performance test-specific safety responsibilities:



## APPENDIX E

### EVALUATION CRITERIA AND WORKSHEETS

## APPENDIX E

### EVALUATION CRITERIA AND WORKSHEETS

#### EVALUATION CRITERIA

Evaluation of protective force performance during performance tests is normally based on the requirements of DOE policy documents, including DOE O 473.2, DOE M 473.2-2, and other applicable documents.

#### Evaluator Worksheets

It is often helpful, even necessary, to develop Evaluator Worksheets to assist evaluators in recording, analyzing, and evaluating performance. These worksheets are particularly useful for complex performance tests and those that employ numerous evaluators and can ensure that all evaluators know which criteria are applicable and assist in achieving complete evaluation coverage.

Once the appropriate criteria have been identified for a particular performance test, it is a simple matter to construct an Evaluator Worksheet. Evaluator Worksheets may be constructed for any performance test.

#### Sample Evaluator Worksheets

Sample evaluator worksheets provided are:

	<b>Page</b>
• Adversary Apprehension Performance Test (long form) .....	E-2
• Adversary Apprehension Performance Test (abbreviated form) .....	E-9
• Air/Ground Tactics Performance Test .....	E-10
• Building Clearing Performance Test .....	E-18
• Command and Control Performance Test .....	E-28
• Containment Operations Performance Test .....	E-33
• Demonstration Performance Test .....	E-39
• Individual and Small-Team Tactics Performance Test .....	E-49
• Vehicle Stop Performance Test .....	E-54

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Evaluator's Worksheet

ADVERSARY APPREHENSION PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_ FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Authority

- A. Was a single security police officer clearly in charge?
- B. Were commands to adversaries given in a forceful manner?
- C. Were commands clear, simple, and non-conflicting?
- D. Were reactions to stalling or arguing appropriate and met with continuous commands to maintain authority?
- E. Did the bearing and conduct of security police officers clearly establish their authority over the adversaries?
- F. Was overall authority effective?

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Application of Force

- A. Was the minimum level of legal force that is necessary applied to accomplish adversary apprehension?
- B. Was the minimum level of legal force that is necessary applied to prevent the adversaries' escape?
- C. Was the level of force excessive to the extent that it caused an escalation of the problem?
- D. Was the applied force effective, minimizing the danger to the security force and other non-hostile personnel?
- E. Was fire discipline and fire control maintained, with appropriate use of tactics, target acquisition, and selective fire?
- F. Did conditions justifying the use of deadly force exist before deadly force was applied?
- G. Was overall application of force appropriate?

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Approach

- A. Were suspects placed in a position of incapacitation that provided a tactical advantage to the security police officers?
- B. Were suspects separated beyond reach from each other, yet remaining in full view of the security police officers?
- C. Was a search officer clearly designated?
- D. Did the movement of the search officer avoid masking the fire of the cover officer(s)?
- E. Was each adversary visually searched, from behind protective cover, prior to the approach?
- F. Did the visual search detect all observable details (e.g., weapons)?
- G. Did commands for the visual search facilitate easier observation of weapons?
- H. Did, upon sighting a weapon, the security police officer announce that fact to his partner(s) and initiate an effective disarming technique?
- I. Was the approach handled appropriately overall?

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Handcuffing

- A. Were handcuffs readily available to the search officer?
- B. Was maximum control maintained over the suspect while the handcuffs were being applied?
- C. Was the handcuffing technique used effectively and did it minimize the potential for injury to the suspect and security police officer?
- D. If steel handcuffs were used, were they double-locked?
- E. Were adversary's hands cuffed behind his back?
- F. Was the handcuffing procedure effective?

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Body Search

- A. Were adversaries placed at a disadvantage?
- B. Were all areas of the body searched and all contraband discovered and removed?
- C. Was the search officer equipped with an appropriate weapon?
- D. Did the search officer keep his weapon secured in the holster?
- E. Was maximum control of the suspect maintained during the search?
- F. Did the covering officer avoid masking potential fire of the searching officer?
- G. Were adversaries denied access to security police officer's weapons?
- H. Overall, was the body search successful?

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Removal

- A. Was maximum control maintained over suspects during removal?
- B. Did the removal technique minimize the potential for injury to suspects and security police officers?
- C. Was Miranda warning given if appropriate?
- D. Was removal accomplished safely and effectively?

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_

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Abbreviated Evaluator's Worksheet

ADVERSARY APPREHENSION PERFORMANCE TEST

SPO Name \_\_\_\_\_

Facility \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
Did the SPO evaluate the situation correctly?	_____	_____
Did the SPO establish authority?	_____	_____
Were SPO commands clear, simple, and non-conflicting?	_____	_____
Were SPO reactions to suspect stalling or arguing appropriate?	_____	_____
Did the SPO request backup?	_____	_____
Did the SPO act as command officer to avoid confusion?	_____	_____
Did the SPO indicate that he had an arrest plan in mind?	_____	_____
Were weapons located in visual search handled immediately, effectively, and safely?	_____	_____
Did the SPO concentrate attention on the hands of the suspect(s)?	_____	_____
Was the SPO in maximum control and minimum danger when handcuffing and searching the suspect(s)?	_____	_____
Did the covering officer avoid masking potential fire during handcuffing and searching?	_____	_____
Was the search thorough? (All weapons found?)	_____	_____
Was the level of force appropriate?	_____	_____

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

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Evaluator's Worksheet

AIR/GROUND TACTICS PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_

FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Planning

- A. Were appropriate existing plans utilized?
- B. Did the air/ground team develop a viable ad hoc plan?
- C. Were alternative plans developed?
- D. Was the amount of time required to plan or discuss actions excessive?
- E. Was overall planning effective?

OVERALL COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_

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Communications

- A. Were radios used excessively when other methods of communication were available and appropriate?
- B. Were alternate means of communication (hand and arm signals, etc.) used?
- C. Were communications clear and understandable?
- D. Was radio circuit discipline maintained?
- E. Was security discipline maintained?
- F. Were overall communications effective?

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**Individual Ground Tactics**

- A. Were proper movement techniques (crawl, rush, etc.) used?
- B. Were cover and concealment used properly?
- C. Was minimum exposure maintained during firing?
- D. Was route selection sound?
- E. Were camouflage techniques used effectively?
- F. Were fire control and fire discipline maintained?
- G. Were individual movements such that covering fire was not masked?
- H. Was noise discipline maintained?
- I. Was light discipline maintained?
- J. Was the SPO aware of his overall surroundings?
- K. Were overall individual tactics sound?

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Air/Ground Coordination

- A. Was mission commander appropriately located?
- B. Were adequate frequencies available for air/ground communications?
- C. Were air and ground force activities appropriately coordinated?
- D. Were air and ground activities mutually supporting?
- E. Were codes/call signs/procedures mutually understood?
- F. Were air and ground commanders familiar with each other's plans?
- G. Was air/ground coordination system capable of responding to changing situations?
- H. Overall, how effective was air/ground coordination?

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Helicopter Tactical Employment

- A. Was helicopter exposure to hostile fire minimized consistent with mission requirements?
- B. Were air safety requirements appropriately observed?
- C. Was helicopter employment as a search element appropriate?
- D. Was helicopter employment as a blocking/screening element appropriate?
- E. Was helicopter employment as a weapons platform appropriate?
- F. Overall, was helicopter tactical employment sound?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

BUILDING CLEARING PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_

FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Command and Control

- A. Was the command authority within the area security force clear and effective?
- B. Was the authority between separate elements clear and effective?
- C. Did the security force leaders control the actions of the security force?
- D. Was the succession of command predesignated?
- E. Was any exchange of command appropriate and effective?
- F. Was overall command and control effective?

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Communications

- A. Were radios used excessively when other methods of communication were available and appropriate?
- B. Was radio circuit discipline maintained?
- C. Was security discipline maintained?
- D. Were codes and authentication systems used?
- E. Were communications clear and understandable?
- F. Were communications effective?

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**Individual Tactics**

- A. Was minimum exposure maintained during observation and firing?
- B. Was cover and concealment used properly?
- C. Were danger areas crossed tactically?
- D. Was noise discipline maintained?
- E. Was light discipline maintained?
- F. Was route selection sound?
- G. Were fire control and fire discipline maintained?
- H. Was individual movement covered by friendly observation or fire?
- I. Were SPOs aware of their total surroundings?
- J. Overall, were individual tactics sound?

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Team Tactics

- A. Were movement techniques tactically sound?
- B. Were exposed movements covered by observation and fire?
- C. Was appropriate equipment (mirrors, flashlights, doorstops, etc.) available and used effectively?
- D. Was the building search conducted in a systematic fashion?
- E. Were cleared rooms identified or secured?
- F. Was the building entry diversion used effectively?
- G. Were appropriate weapons used by the search team?
- H. Were captured suspects removed through areas previously searched?
- I. Did the search team maintain 360-degree security?
- J. Did the search continue until the entire building was cleared?
- K. Did teams function in a coordinated manner?
- L. Were team tactics effective?

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Suspect Handling

- A. Were commands to suspects given in a forceful manner?
- B. Were commands to suspects clear, simple, and nonconflicting?
- C. Were reactions to stalling or arguing appropriate?
- D. Did a single security police officer act as the command officer to avoid confusion?
- E. Did the security police officer show evidence through the command process that he possesses a firmly established prearranged arrest plan in his mind?
- F. Were any weapons that were located in the visual search of the suspects handled immediately, effectively, and safely?
- G. Did the security police officers concentrate their attention on the hands of the suspects?
- H. Were the suspects handcuffed and searched with the security police officer in maximum control and minimum danger?
- I. When possible, was the suspect covered by a backup officer's unmasked potential fire during the handcuffing and searching?
- J. Was the suspect search thorough and were all weapons found?
- K. If a Miranda warning was necessary, was it given but not at the expense of diverting the security police officer's attention from a perceived threat?
- L. Was the removal of the secured suspect, when appropriate, done with maximum control minimum danger to the security police officer, through a portion of the building already searched?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

COMMAND AND CONTROL PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_

FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Planning

- A. Were response contingency plans developed?
- B. Were contingency plans specific?
- C. Was available time used for detailed planning?
- D. Were plans mission-oriented?
- E. Were all plans viable?
- F. Were ad hoc plans rapidly developed to address the problem?
- G. Were the plans clear, complete, and concise?
- H. Was overall planning effective?

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Allocation of Resources

- A. Was the command element aware of all available security resources?
- B. Were the capabilities of all available security resources understood by the command element?
- C. Was the commitment of available resources based on the situation and target priorities?
- D. Was overall allocation of resources effective?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

CONTAINMENT OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_ FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Command and Control

- A. When security personnel initially arrived on scene, was one person clearly in charge?
- B. Was any exchange of command appropriate and effective?
- C. Was the succession of command pre-designated?
- D. Was authority between separate elements clear and effective?
- E. Did security force leaders control the actions of the security force?
- F. Was the commander and command post located out of the line of fire?
- G. Was overall command and control effective?

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Communications

- A. Were radios used excessively when other methods of communication were available and appropriate?
- B. Were alternate methods of communication used where appropriate?
- C. Was radio circuit discipline maintained?
- D. Was security discipline maintained?
- E. Were codes and authentication systems used?
- F. Were communications clear and understandable?

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Containment

- A. Did inner containment provide complete observation and fire coverage over the incident site?
- B. Were inner containment positions mutually supporting?
- C. Were all viable avenues of escape blocked or covered by observation and fire?
- D. Was there rapid compensation for gaps in inner containment caused by casualties?
- E. Were workers and bystanders safely evacuated from the incident site?
- F. Was an outer containment perimeter established?
- G. Did outer containment effectively isolate the incident site?
- H. Was containment effective?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

DEMONSTRATION PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_ FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Command and Control

- A. Was command authority within the area security force clear and effective?
- B. Was command authority between separate response elements clear and effective?
- C. Were plans made for authority in depth (succession of command)?
- D. Did all personnel know the chain of command?
- E. Did the response force leader control the actions of the security force(s)?
- F. Was any exchange of command appropriate, effective and timely?
- G. Were responding security elements notified of changes in command?
- H. Was the authority line between the appropriate HQ/EOC and the on-scene commander clear and effective?
- I. Was overall command and control effective?

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Planning

- A. Were response contingency plans developed?
- B. Were contingency plans specific?
- C. Was available time used for detailed planning?
- D. Were plans mission-oriented?
- E. Were all plans viable?
- F. Were improvised plans rapidly developed to address the problem?
- G. Did all personnel understand the plans?
- H. Were the plans clear, complete, and concise?
- I. Was overall planning effective?

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Communications

- A. Were initial notifications and requests for assistance made quickly and clearly?
- B. Were radio communications relied on too heavily?
- C. Were alternative means of communications used where appropriate?
- D. Was communications security discipline maintained?
- E. Was radio circuit discipline maintained?
- F. Were codes and authentication systems used?
- G. Were communications understandable?
- H. Were communications between the scene and HQ/EOC effective?
- I. Were communications with demonstrators clear and effective, projecting a positive public image in a professional manner?
- J. Were communications with non-participants in the area clear and effective, projecting a positive public image in a professional manner?
- K. Were overall communications effective?

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Application of Force

- A. Was the minimum level of legal force necessary applied to prevent the demonstrators from penetrating the facility?
- B. Was the minimum level of legal force necessary applied to protect facility assets?
- C. Was the minimum level of legal force necessary applied to affect arrests?
- D. Was the level of force excessive to the extent that it caused an escalation of the problem or an unnecessary adverse media event?
- E. Was the applied force effective in minimizing the danger to the security force, demonstrators, and non-participants?
- F. Did the level of force escalate appropriately; that is, did force increase in direct proportion to resistance?
- G. Was any use of chemical agents, batons, K-9s, etc., justified, proper, and effective?
- H. Did conditions justifying the use of deadly force exist before deadly force was applied?
- I. Was overall application of force appropriate?

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Intelligence

- A. Was intelligence-gathering attempted in an organized, coordinated manner?
- B. Were essential elements of information identified and sought?
- C. Were all forces aware of their intelligence-gathering responsibilities?
- D. Were technical assets used for intelligence-gathering when available and appropriate?
- E. Was intelligence passed effectively to the EOC or appropriate level?
- F. Following the demonstration, were witnesses adequately debriefed?

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Security Force Discipline

- A. Were security force members responsive to supervisors?
- B. Did security force members maintain a positive, confident attitude and professional manner?
- C. Did security force members' conduct project a positive self, community, and national image?
- D. Were pre-exercise preparations conducted in a professional manner?
- E. Were exercise conduct and safety rules observed?
- F. Was overall security force discipline adequate?

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Arrest Procedures

- A. Were demonstrators given the opportunity to leave before being placed under arrest if appropriate?
- B. Were proper notifications (notice of trespass, notice of arrest) made to demonstrators if appropriate?
- C. Were effective commands to cause the suspect to comply used and reaction to non-compliance safe and effective?
- D. Were restraint and handcuffing effective and safe?
- E. Were search procedures thorough and effective?
- F. Were searches conducted by a security police officer of the same gender when possible?
- G. Were proper procedures used in dealing with juveniles if any are present?
- H. Was there an effective documentation and accountability system for arrestees' personal effects?
- I. Were arrestee movement techniques appropriate, effective, and safe for the security police officers and the demonstrators?
- J. Was control maintained over arrestees after they were placed in transport vehicles?
- K. Were post-arrest administrative procedures performed effectively?
- L. Was each suspect provided Miranda warning if appropriate?
- M. Were arrest procedures effective?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-TEAM TACTICS PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_

FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Planning

- A. Were appropriate existing plans utilized?
- B. Did the team develop a viable ad hoc plan?
- C. Were alternative plans developed?
- D. Was the amount of time required to plan or discuss actions excessive?
- E. Was overall planning effective?

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Communications

- A. Were radios used excessively when other methods of communication were available and appropriate?
- B. Were alternate means of communication (hand and arm signals, etc.) used?
- C. Were communications clear and understandable?
- D. Was radio circuit discipline maintained?
- E. Was security discipline maintained?
- F. Were overall communications effective?

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Individual Tactics

- A. Were proper movement techniques (crawl, rush, etc.) used?
- B. Were cover and concealment used properly?
- C. Was minimum exposure maintained during firing?
- D. Was route selection sound?
- E. Were camouflage techniques used effectively?
- F. Were fire control and fire discipline maintained?
- G. Were individual movements such that covering fire was not masked?
- H. Was noise discipline maintained?
- I. Was light discipline maintained?
- J. Was the SPO aware of his overall surroundings?
- K. Were overall individual tactics sound?

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Evaluator's Worksheet

VEHICLE STOP PERFORMANCE TEST

EVALUATOR NAME \_\_\_\_\_

FACILITY \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY/LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CRITERIA

Planning

- A. Did viable vehicle stop plans and procedures exist?
- B. Was available time used to develop situation specific plans?
- C. Were plans clear, complete, and concise?
- D. Did all personnel understand the plans?
- E. Was overall planning effective?

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Preliminary Actions

- A. Was a single point of command established prior to the stop?
- B. Was the risk level associated with the vehicle to be stopped clearly understood?
- C. Was communication of pertinent information concerning the vehicle immediate?
- D. Were commands to the suspect vehicle occupants given in a tactically sound manner?
- E. Was the level of force available adequate to meet the perceived threat; if not, was assistance requested?
- F. Did the security police officer concentrate on the greatest threat, the vehicle occupants, and act upon that threat in an effective, timely, and defensive manner during the vehicle stop?
- G. Did preliminary actions support overall mission accomplishment?

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Teamwork

- A. Was a single security police officer clearly in charge?
- B. Was all exposed movement covered by observation and potential fire?
- C. Were all individual movements such that covering fire was not masked?
- D. Did security police officers communicate clearly and efficiently with each other?
- E. Was the amount of time required to plan or discuss actions excessive?
- F. Was the transition of responsibilities (such as the provision of covering fire) immediate?
- G. Was teamwork effective?

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Vehicle Stop Procedures

- A. Was the vehicle stop made at a location advantageous to the SPO (in terms of lights, noise, terrain, and available support)?
- B. Did the stopping distance from the suspect vehicle allow for optimum visual coverage and maximum control with voice commands?
- C. Was the security vehicle positioned to maximize its protective cover from the suspect vehicle?
- D. Was the security vehicle or other barrier used properly for cover?
- E. Was the method of communicating orders to the suspects effective?
- F. Was the suspect vehicle covered at all times with an appropriate weapon?
- G. Were the vehicle stop procedures effective overall?

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Suspect Handling

- A. Were commands to suspects given in a forceful manner?
- B. Were commands to suspects clear, simple, and non-conflicting?
- C. Were reactions to stalling or arguing appropriate?
- D. Did a single security police officer act as the command officer to avoid confusion?
- E. Did the security police officer show evidence through the command process that he possesses a firmly established, pre-arranged arrest plan in his mind?
- F. Were any weapons located in a visual search of the suspects handled immediately, effectively, and safely?
- G. Did the security police officers concentrate their attention on the hands of the suspects, while maintaining an awareness of their total surroundings?
- H. Were the suspects handcuffed and searched with the security police officer in maximum control and minimum danger?
- I. Was the suspect covered by a back-up officer's unmasked potential fire during the handcuffing and searching when possible?
- J. Was the suspect search thorough and all weapons found?
- K. If a Miranda warning was necessary, was it given but not be the expense of diverting the security police officer's attention from a perceived threat?
- L. Was removal of the secured suspect, when appropriate, done with maximum control and minimum danger to the security police officer?
- M. Was overall suspect handling effective?

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Application of Force

- A. Was the minimum level of force that is necessary applied to neutralize all adversaries in the vehicle?
- B. Was the level of force excessive to the extent that it caused an escalation of the problem?
- C. Was the applied force effective in minimizing the danger to the security force and other non-hostile personnel?
- D. Did all personnel maintain fire discipline and fire control, using appropriate tactics, target acquisition, and selective fire?
- E. Did conditions justifying the use of deadly force exist before deadly force was applied?
- F. Was overall application of force appropriate?

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APPENDIX F

REFERENCES

## APPENDIX F

## REFERENCES

1. Title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.), relating to –
  - a. Espionage (sections 792 to 798);
  - b. Treason and subversive activity (sections 2381 to 2385);
  - c. Sabotage (sections 2151 and 2153 to 2156);
  - d. Theft or destruction of Government property (sections 33, 81, 641, 659, 831, 844, 1361 to 1363, 1366, 2071, 2112, and 2114);
  - e. Extortion and threats (sections 876 to 878);
  - f. Riots (section 2101);
  - g. Crime against a person (sections 111, 113, 114, 1111, 1112, 1114, and 2111);
  - h. Assassinating, kidnaping, or assaulting any agency head or deputy (section 351);
  - i. Powers of marshals and deputies (section 3053);
  - j. Conspiracy (section 371); and
  - k. Counterfeit badge/identification (sections 499, 701, 911, and 912).
  
2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq.)
  - a. Chapter 12, “Control of Information,” sections 141-146 (42 U.S.C. 2161 to 2166), which set forth the principles for the control of Restricted Data.
  - b. Chapter 14, “General Authority.”
    - (1) Section 161, “General Provisions” (42 U.S.C. 2201), which sets forth the authority necessary to perform the functions of DOE.
    - (2) Section 161k, (42 U.S.C. 2201k), which provides statutory authority for DOE and contractor personnel to carry firearms and make arrests without warrant.
  - c. Chapter 18, “Enforcement.”
    - (1) Sections 221 to 233 (42 U.S.C. 2271 to 2281), which set forth the authority necessary to protect Restricted Data and property, and establish criminal penalties for violation of the Atomic Energy Act.
    - (2) Section 229 (42 U.S.C. 2278a), which sets forth the authority to issue regulations and establishes penalties for violating these regulations relating to the entry upon or carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any DOE property.
    - (3) Section 236, which makes criminal destroying or physically damaging DOE nuclear facilities or fuel, using or tampering with machinery to cause an unauthorized interruption of normal operations of such facilities, or attempting to commit any of these acts.
  
3. Title 42, U.S.C. 7270a, which provides statutory authority for DOE and contractor employees at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to carry firearms and to make arrests without warrant.

4. Title 10 CFR Part 860, Trespassing on Department of Energy Property, which makes trespassing on posted DOE property a crime.
5. Title 10 CFR Part 1046, Physical Protection of Security Interests, which sets forth policies and procedures applicable to DOE contractor personnel and establishes their requirements for medical and physical fitness qualification; physical fitness training; medical examination and certification; access authorization; and security training, qualification, and certification.
6. Title 10 CFR Part 1047, Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force officers, which establishes policy concerning arrests and associated use of force by DOE and contractor PF personnel assigned to protect nuclear weapons, SNM, classified matter, nuclear facilities, and related property.
7. Title 10 CFR Part 1049, Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force officers of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which establishes policy concerning arrests and associated use of force by SPR PF personnel, and requirements for training and qualification to carry firearms.
8. Title 14 CFR Part 61, Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors, which prescribes the requirements for issuing pilot and flight instructor certificates and ratings, the conditions under which those certificates and ratings are necessary, and the privileges and limitations of those certificates and ratings.
9. Title 14 CFR Part 108.11, Carriage of Weapons, which provides requirements for the carrying of weapons aboard and airplane.
10. Title 14 CFR Part 135, Operating Requirements: Commuter and On-Demand Operations, which governs helicopter operations.
11. DOE O 440.2, AVIATION, of 9-25-95, which provides aviation requirements and responsibilities.
12. DOE O 440.1A, WORKER PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE FEDERAL AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, of 3-27-98, which establishes firearms safety requirements and responsibilities.
13. DOE O 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM OPERATIONS, of 5-12-93, which establishes policy for and implementation of the management and operation of the Transportation Safeguards System program.
14. DOE M 440.1-1, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, of 9-30-95, which provides information and guidance related to the safe use and storage of explosives.
15. DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, of 9-28-95, which establishes requirements and responsibilities for the Safeguards and Security Program.
16. DOE O 471.2A, INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, of 3-27-97, which establishes requirements and responsibilities for the protection of classified and sensitive information.

17. DOE O 472.1B, PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTIVITIES, of 3-24-97, which establishes requirements and responsibilities for the Personnel Security Program and the Personnel Security Assurance Program.
18. DOE O 473.2, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM, which establishes policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the operation of the DOE Protective Force Program.
19. DOE M 473.2-1, FIREARMS QUALIFICATION COURSES MANUAL, of 7-8-97, which provides standardized courses of fire to ensure that all personnel authorized to carry firearms under 42 U.S.C. 2201k or 42 U.S.C. 7270a are consistently qualified.
20. DOE M 473.2-2, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM MANUAL, which provides detailed requirements to supplement DOE O 473.2.
21. DOE O 5632.1C, PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, of 7-15-94, which establishes policy, requirements, and responsibilities for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests.
22. DOE M 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, of 7-15-94, which provides detailed requirements to implement DOE O 5632.1C.
23. *Design Basis Threat for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities (U)*, of 2-13-96, issued by the Director, Office of Security Affairs, which identifies and characterizes the potential generic adversary threats to the DOE programs and facilities which could adversely impact national security, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment.
24. Presidential Decision Directive-39, U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, of 6-21-95, which establishes policy, requirements, and responsibilities to deter, defeat, and respond to terrorist attacks on U.S. territory and resources, both people and facilities.
25. *Context and Protocols for Performance Testing of Protective Forces*, February, 1999, published by the Office of Oversight, which establishes policies and procedures for the planning and conduct of certain performance tests by the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance.
26. *Composite Adversary Team Standard Operating Procedures*, October, 1997, published by the Office of Oversight, which establishes policy and procedures, and assigns responsibilities for the acquisition, training, deployment, conduct, administration, supervision, and coordination of the Composite Adversary Team.
27. TTM 1-I, “Basic Tactical Training for the Security Inspector,” 1985, issued by DOE.
28. TTM 1-II, “Advanced Tactical Training for the Security Force Supervisor,” 1985, issued by DOE.
29. TTM 1-III, “Special Tactical Training for the Response Force,” 1985, issued by DOE.

30. National Institute of Justice Standard 0101.02, Ballistic Resistance of Police Body Armor, 2-28-84, which identified levels of protection for personnel protective armor.
31. National Institute of Justice Report 100-83, which identifies relative incapacitation indices of various small arms ammunition.
32. Underwriter Laboratories Standard 752, which specifies levels of bullet penetration resistance.